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ABSTRACT 
Organisations in the developing countries need to protect their information assets (IA) in 
an optimal way. This thesis is based upon the argument that in order to achieve fully 
effective information security management (ISM) strategy, it is essential to look at 
information security in a socio-technical context, i.e. the cultural, ethical, moral, legal 
dimensions, tools, devices and techniques. The motivation for this study originated from 
the concern of social chaos, which results from ineffective information security practices 
in organisations in the developing nations. The present strategies were developed for 
organisations in countries where culture is different to culture of the developing world. 
Culture has been pointed out as an important factor of human behaviour. This research is 
trying to enhance information security culture in the context of Zanzibar by integrating 
both social and technical issues. 
The theoretical foundation for this research is based on cultural theories and the theory of 
semiotics. In particular, the study utilised the GLOBE Project (House et al, 2004), 
Competing Values Framework (Quinn and Cameron; 1983) and Semiotic Framework 
(Liu, 2000). These studies guide the cultural study and the semiotics study. The research 
seeks to better understand how culture impact the governance of information security and 
develop a framework that enhances the governance of information security in non-profit 
organisations. ISO/IEC 27002 best practices in information security management 
provided technical guidance in this work. 
The major findings include lack of benchmarking in the governance of information 
security. Cultural issues impact the governance of information security. Drawing the 
evidence from the case study a framework for information security culture was proposed. 
In addition, a novel process model for information security analysis based on semiotics 
was developed. The process model and the framework integrated both social and 
technical issues and could be implemented in any non-profit organisation operating 
within a societal context with similar cultural feature as Zanzibar. The framework was 
evaluated using this process model developed in this research. The evaluated framework 
provides opportunities for future research in this area. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Information Systems (IS) in organisations – already ubiquitous in developed countries – 
are being deployed in developing countries more and more: services such registration of 
birth and death, issue of passport, registration of marriage, collection of tax, registration 
of voters, payroll, and public finance amongst others have been computerised or are under 
active considerations for automation. Securing these services has become a vital function 
within the information system governance establishments. With an increased dependence 
on the IS connected over open data networks, efficient information security governance 
has become a crucial success feature for organisations in the developed or developing 
countries alike. Developing countries are going through processes that developed 
countries went through many years ago. In order to achieve effective information security 
governance, it is essential to develop and implement effective information security 
governance based on a local context. The focus of this research is to enhance information 
security governance in non-profit organisations in the context of a developing country.    
According to (United Nations, 2008) developed countries are Canada, the United States, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and European countries, while the remainder are 
developing countries. The adoption of information systems faces many challenges in 
many developing countries such as lack of skilled personnel (Cheang and Sang, 2009; 
Mundy and Musa, 2010; Karokola and Yngström, 2009; Kimwele, Mwangi and Kimani, 
2010), financial constraint (Karokola and Yngström, 2008; Kimwele, Mwangi and 
Kimani, 2010), national culture, and inferior infrastructures (Cheang and Sang, 2009; 
Mundy and Musa, 2010; Karokola and Yngström, 2009) among others. Past studies have 
indicated social issues are at least as vital as technical issues in implementing information 
security governance (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). 
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An information system (IS) is defined as “A discrete set of information resources 
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or 
disposition of information” (CNSS, 2010; p.37). It also includes industrial/process 
controls equipment, equipment for telephone switching and exchange; and equipment for 
environmental control (CNSS, 2010). 
1.1 Overview of the research problem  
The discipline of information security is concerned with the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information assets. There are several unsolved issues related with efficient 
information security governance in the developing countries such as voter registration, 
voting, passport, national identity, financial records and education records. 
The present information security governance studies seek to tackle some of these issues; 
however, most of these studies argue within a culture of western societies. These studies 
may not be applicable to societies outside the west. 
This research is concerned with improving information security governance in an 
organisation that resides in a culture outside the Western society, specifically Zanzibar. 
The main research question is:  
RQM. What organisational factors need to be tackled or managed to develop 
and implement effective information security governance in the context of 
Zanzibar? 
1.2 Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research is: 
To develop a useful, integrated and theoretically robust framework that will support non-
profit organisations to succeed in the challenging task of improving quality information 
security governance within the context of Zanzibar. The objectives of the research are to: 
 Understand the existing information security strategies 
 Understand the current state of information security in non-profit organisations 
 Understand the cultural factors which may impact development and 
implementation of information security governance 
 Develop a framework for improving information security culture in the Zanzibar 
context  
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1.3 Research Motivation 
The researcher has experienced the deployment of IS at various organisations in Zanzibar 
and how the adopted IS have transformed the way services are provided. However, the 
researcher has doubted the sustainability of IS usage in Zanzibar and other developing 
countries in general. As more countries are connected through open networks and IS 
usage increases so do criminal activities on information systems (Lee, 1997). Many 
developing countries have experienced information security breaches. Some public 
institutions in Tanzania have been victims of cyber attacks including Tanzania National 
Bureau of Statistic, the Tanzania Parliament, Tanzanian Revenue Authority and Bank of 
Tanzania (Mutarubukwa, 2010). Another incident occurred when two Bulgarian nationals 
were caught stealing at Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) in Dar es Salaam (Juma, 2009). 
Since the introduction of multi-party democracy in Zanzibar in 1992, elections have been 
marred with claims of ballot rigging. Tanzania is not the only developing country to face 
information security breaches. Hackers succeeded to deface a website of Ministry of 
Environment of Cambodia (Cheang, 2009). In Zanzibar, majority of employees work in a 
non-profit sector. The researcher as an employee of in this sector did observe that 
computer users in this sector have only fear of losing their data to viruses. The researcher 
as an IS professional would like to see this trend in security vulnerability for 
organisations in developing countries to be halted. The current thesis helps in this by 
identifying the cultural factors that influence governance of information security and 
develop a framework that will enhance management of information security in the non-
profit organisations. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The research work presented in this thesis addresses the study purpose and the study 
objectives through the following research questions: 
RQ1. What are the existing information security strategies? 
RQ2. What is the current state of information security governance in non-profit 
organisations in the context of Zanzibar? 
RQ3. What are the cultural factors that impact upon information security governance in 
non-profit organisations in the context of Zanzibar? 
RQ4. How can non-profit organisations improve their information security governance 
in the context of Zanzibar?  
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the Framework 
(10) 
Semiotic Based Framework for 
Information Security Culture 
A Semiotic Process Model for 
Enhancing Information Security 
Governance: Phase II 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
Input/Output Task (step) Outcome KEY: 
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An approach of mixed methods consisting of quantitative and qualitative approaches will 
be employed in this research work to address the research questions. This will, in turn, 
seek to achieve the research objectives, realise the research purpose and bring about a 
better understanding of the research problem. 
1.5 Overview of the research process 
This investigation went through a series of processes as described in the Figure 1.5.1. An 
exploratory case study was performed, consisting of several organisations. Data 
collection and analysis was conducted using a mixed methods approach. The details of 
the research processes are presented in Chapter 3. 
1.6 Research Benefits 
This research will be relevant to non-profit organisations such as public sector 
organisations in the developing countries. The benefits of this thesis include: 
 A process model for enhancing information security governance grounded by the 
theory of semiotics for organisations in the developing countries. 
 A framework for information security culture for organisations in the developing 
world. 
 A contribution to the knowledge of non-profit organisations concerning their 
state of information security governance in the developing countries. 
 A contribution to the knowledge concerning integrating social and technical 
issues in developing model for information security governance. 
 A contribution to the knowledge concerning cultural factors, which may 
influence information security governance in the Zanzibar context. 
 Present an analysis of information security governance processes and information 
security culture in the context of Zanzibar. 
 Present a healthy foundation for further research into information security 
governance in the developing countries. 
 An awareness of the information security needs of non-profit organisation in the 
developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
1.7  Research Focus 
The focus of this thesis is on the factors relevant to the management of information 
security in non-profit organisations in the developing countries. The issues that are 
considered peripheral to the focus of this thesis are: 
 Activities and factors associated with information security governance within 
organisations in a developing country environment. 
 Issues related to information security culture in organisations in the context of a 
developing country. 
 Technical issues of information security in organisations in the context of a 
developing country. 
 
1.8  Potential Limitations 
The potential limits of the research are: 
 The research project is focused on non-profit organisations which are in public 
sector. The findings may not be appropriate for organisations in a different 
cultural context. 
 The organisations happened to be in different fields and sizes. 
 The research had smaller population of participants and conclusions are drawn 
from on data collected in Zanzibar. 
 
1.9  Layout of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 has presented the research problem and the research infrastructure including 
the research purpose, objectives, the research questions and approach. 
Chapter 2 discusses the literature review. It provides the foundations of the research. 
Chapter 3 is the discussion of the research methodology. 
Chapter 4 presents the data analysis and research findings for Phase I of the research. 
Chapter 5 is a presentation of the data analysis and research findings for Phase II of the 
research. 
Chapter 6 discusses recommendations for improving information security in the form of a 
framework of information security culture. 
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Chapter 7 discusses recommendations for refining the framework for information security 
culture in the form of a semiotic process for information security governance. 
Chapter 8 is a discussion of conclusions of the thesis. 
1.10    Summary 
This chapter has presented the research problem and the research infrastructure including 
the research purpose, objectives, the research questions and the approach taken to the 
research project. The chapter concludes with an overview of the potential limitations of 
the research project. 
In the next chapter, Chapter 2, the relevant literature is discussed which provides the 
theoretical foundation of this research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2 THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the literature on the relevant areas of the research project; 
information security management practices, ICT in the developing countries, culture, 
organisational semiotics, and relevant features of Zanzibar. The aim of literature review is 
to highlight gaps in the literature concerning information security management in non-
profit organisations in the developing countries and provide background information on 
the literature that is used to form the theoretical framework for the research project. 
2.2 Information Security Background 
2.2.1 Definition of information security 
According to CNSS (2010, p.37), information security is “the protection of information 
and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability”. 
The foundation of information security consists of the three properties which are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (Bishop, 2003, p.3; Pﬂeeger, 1997). In this thesis, 
information security is defined as “preservation of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information; in addition, other properties, such as authenticity, 
accountability, non-repudiation, and reliability can also be involved” (BSI, 2007; p.1). 
The properties of information security are defined below: 
 Confidentiality means that information is disclosed to an authorised user.  
 Integrity means information is not modified by an unauthorised user.  
 Availability means information is available when required to an authorised user.   
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 Authenticity means a user attempting to access the information is in fact the user 
to whom the level of access belongs.  
 Accountability means the user is responsible to the safeguarding of the 
information the user accesses.  
 Non-repudiation means a sender of information cannot denies having sent the 
information. 
 Reliability means information is being consistently processed according to its 
design. 
2.2.2 Threats on information systems 
In order to provide protection we need to provide certain measures according to a threat 
that information system is facing. A threat is a cause of harm to an organisation. Threats 
could be caused by external or internal sources including but not limited to employees 
actions, act of nature, malicious codes, technical failures, deliberate attacks and 
competitors (Whitman and Mattord; 2005, Posthumus and von Solms; 2004). Attacks 
could be in the form of automated attacks or combination of social engineering and 
automated attacks (Radiant and Gonzalez; 2007). 
Threats target vulnerabilities in an information system to cause damage. Vulnerability is a 
weakness of an information system that can be exploited by a threat (BSI, 2007). 
Vulnerabilities could be unsecured ICT equipment, weak password, immature software, 
untrained employees and weak physical security, among others.  
A social engineering attack is a technique where an attacker employs tactics to leverage 
human trust on the targeted system to acquire confidential information. Phishing is an 
example of a social engineering attack in which an attacker sends an email to an 
individual alleging to come from a trusted source, such as a free email provider such as 
Hotmail or Yahoo. The email requests that the user reply with account information and 
the user’s account password, so the trusted source can verify the correct functioning of 
the account.  
Some attackers send unsolicited emails in bulk to recipients. These emails are called 
Spam. These emails might cause congestions in a network. Spam emails might be for 
adverts, scam, charity, offers et cetera.  
Malicious code or software is abbreviated as malware, which is designed to penetrate 
information systems to execute malicious actions without the owner’s consent (Skoudis 
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and Zeltser, 2003). There are various categories of malware. A rootkit (Butler et al., 
2008) is a category of malware in which an attacker utilises the software to maintain 
access to a violated system. A spyware is a category of malware which can be utilised by 
an attacker to gather information about the user. A spyware can be made to secretly 
record the user’s keystrokes of a keyboard, for example. A computer virus is another 
category of malware. A virus is a program that duplicates itself in a computer without the 
owner’s consent or awareness. A virus could damage or erase data on a computer, 
execute an email program to spread itself to other computers, or even delete everything in 
a hard disk. 
Automated attacks are used by attackers trying to find vulnerabilities in information 
systems or gather email addresses for spam. A dictionary attack is an example of an 
automated attack that performs guessing process using words from a dictionary to crack a 
password. Ophcrack v3.4.0 software uses dictionary attack to crack a password with up to 
14 characters with a combination of numbers, small letters, and capital letters (Fisher, 
2013). 
As mentioned earlier, there are threats that originate from inside an organisation. 
Employees can access confidential information through authorised access, unauthorised 
access or accidental access during their daily activities. Employees who have the 
knowledge of information system infrastructure of their organisations are significant 
insider threats. In this thesis, an insider threat is defined as “threats originating from 
people who have been given access rights to an IS and misuse their privileges, thus 
violating the IS security policy of the organisation” (Theoharidou et al., 2005, p.473).  
    
There has been a rapid rise in phishing attacks. According to the BBC there was an 8000 
percent increase in phishing attacks in 2006 (BBC, 2006). A Chinese hosted phishing 
scam targeted Facebook in 2007 (Singel, 2008). A major job search site Monster.com was 
victim to a phishing scam originating in Turkey in July 2008 (Savvas, 2008). A survey by 
Ernst & Young (2009) has indicated that 41% of respondents experienced an increase in 
external attacks and 25% of respondents experienced an increase in internal attacks. Also, 
in the same survey, 19% of respondents experienced external perpetrated crime and 13% 
of respondents experienced internal perpetrated crime.  In 2006 Computer Crime and 
Security Survey by Computer Security Institute/Federal Bureau of Investigation identified 
insider abuses as among the top incidents reported by organisations (CSI, 2006).  
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There has been a large number of IS users who fell for phishing attacks on their systems. 
According to Sheng (2010), 90% of respondents had given information on phishing 
website they had clicked.  In a survey by Computer Security Institute, it was reported that 
67.1% of respondents had experienced malware infection (CSI, 2011). 31% of 
respondents believe that their IT security team had been kept awake by unauthorised 
users (CISCO, 2010). According to survey by PWC (2013) public sector organisations 
are defending yesterday’s threats. In other words, public sector organisations have 
information assurance methods which are not up to date. In the same survey, it has been 
reported that security incidents have increased by 15% while the financial losses caused 
by the same security incidents have drastically increased by 101%. 
2.2.3 Countermeasures against threats 
In order to provide protection, countermeasures must be implemented according to threats 
that organisations are facing. Measures that are implemented to guarantee the protection 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems are called information 
assurances. Some examples of countermeasures that are used to protect against threats are: 
 Training and awareness administered to employees to limit employees’ actions 
that could jeopardise security of information systems.  
 Use of strong passwords in authentication scenarios. 
 Use of backup systems to protect against an act of nature. 
 Use of anti-virus, anti-malware, anti-spam software to protect against virus, 
malware and spam attacks. 
 Use of information security management standards to benchmark the security 
activities in an organisation. 
 Image verification, mod rewrite, black hole, request limitation, hidden field trap, 
and spider trap among others can be used to protect from automated attacks 
(Kadakia, 2013). 
2.3 Information security in developing countries 
Developing countries are those countries which are in a process of industrialisation but 
have limited resources (Odedra and Madon; 1993). According to (United Nations, 2008) 
developed countries are Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and 
European countries, while the remainder are developing countries (which indeed 
classifies apparently wealthy countries such as Saudi Arabia as developing countries).  
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Many developing countries are in an early stage of adopting information systems in their 
government institutions (Karokola and Yngström, 2009). The adoption of information 
systems faces many challenges in many developing countries such as lack of skilled 
personnel (Cheang and Sang, 2009; Mundy and Musa, 2010; Karokola and Yngström, 
2009; Kimwele, Mwangi and Kimani, 2010), financial constraint (Karokola and 
Yngström, 2008; Kimwele, Mwangi and Kimani, 2010), national culture, and inferior 
infrastructures (Cheang and Sang, 2009; Mundy and Musa, 2010; Karokola and 
Yngström, 2009) among others. 
Furthermore, information security programs in many organisations in developing 
countries are not part of strategic plans nor are they operational (Bakari et al., 2005), they 
lack documentation (Bakari et al., 2005; Kimwele, Mwangi and Kimani, 2011), and lack 
benchmarking (Bakari et al., 2005). Lack of user awareness, and culture in security is 
another challenge facing developing countries (Karokola and Yngström, 2008; Kimwele, 
Mwangi and Kimani, 2010). Many organisations in developing countries do not have 
recognised information security strategies (Abu-Musa, 2010). Also, many organisations 
lack backup and business continuity plans (Abu-Musa, 2010; Kimwele, Mwangi and 
Kimani; 2011). 
Training and awareness in information security is expensive, and there is a challenge in 
its delivery (Tarimo et al. 2006).  In the literature, it has been reported that cultural 
aspects, management support, budgetary constraints, lack of national level information 
security policies and guidelines, and lack of motivation to employees are hindrances to 
information security awareness initiatives in organisations (Casmir and Yngström, 2005).  
Many developing countries lack a necessary legal framework at the national level for 
digital information security (Bakari, et al., 2005; Karokola and Yngström 2008), or they 
are at the development stage for legislation that protect e-commerce (Ulanga, 2005). 
There is weak law enforcement in many developing countries on crimes against 
information systems (Ndou, 2004). This is due to lack of skills by law enforcement 
agencies on these types of crimes, corruption and lack of proper legislation. Nour et al. 
(2007) suggested that in an environment of low level of democratisation initiatives and 
low level of ICT preparation; privacy, security, and confidentiality issues would have 
little importance. 
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2.4 Information security management  
There are various practices to manage information security in organisations. The practices 
include the implementation of information security management systems (ISMS) in the 
organisations. Information security management systems emphasise the purpose to 
formalise responsibilities and control prescribed processes (David, 2002). In the next 
sections, a review of information security management systems found in the literature is 
demonstrated.  
2.4.1 ISO/EIC 27001:2005 Standard 
This is an international standard for information security based on British Standard BS 
7799. The standard has adopted a process approach that establishes, implements, operates, 
monitors, reviews, maintains and improves an organisation’s information security 
management system (ISMS) (BS, 2005). The standard implements the Plan-Do-Check-
Act (PDCA) model to all its processes. “Plan” means execute the ISMS; “Do” means 
execute and manage the ISMS; “Check” means scrutinize and reassess the ISMS; and 
“Act” means preserve and enhance the ISMS (BSI, 2005). Compliance with ISO/IEC 
27001:2005 guarantees that an organisation has achieved a certain level of compliance 
level for each of the eleven clauses addressed. The clauses covered are: 
 “Information  security policy” 
 “Organisation of information security”  
 “Asset management”  
 “Physical and environmental security” 
 “Human resources security” 
 “Communications and operations management” 
 “Access control” 
 “Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance” 
 “Information security incident management” 
 “Business continuity management” 
 “Compliance”         (BSI, 
2005, p.13-28)        
2.4.2 ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
This is an internationally accepted best practice for information security based on British 
Standard BS 7799-1. It is a code of practice for information security management (BSI, 
2007). It provides guidelines for implementing the ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard.  
14 
 
2.4.3 ISO/IEC 27005:2008 
This is an internationally accepted standard for information security risk management. 
The standard defines a process to manage risk including establishing the context, 
assessment of risk, treatment of risk, acceptance of risk, communication of risk and 
monitoring and reviewing of risk (BSI, 2008). The process follows the PDCA model. In 
order to understand ISO/IEC 27005:2008 one has to be aware of ISO/IEC 27001 and 
ISO/IEC 27002 standards. According to Singh and Lilja (2009) the standard is unable to 
prioritize controls and to measure the impact of security enhancements. 
2.4.4 NIST 800-14 
It is a United States of America special publication on generally recognized standards and 
customs for security of information technology systems based on OECD’s guidelines for 
information security (NIST, 1996). The publication elaborates eight standards to be met 
by information security program which are: 
 To support the mission of the organisation 
 To be a vital ingredient of robust administration 
 To be financially sustainable 
 To share security responsibilities to external users 
 To make clear security responsibilities and accountability of users 
 To use a comprehensive and integrated approach in design of security program 
 To be reviewed regularly 
 To consider social issues 
Also, the publication elaborates fourteen customs to be met by information security 
program which are: 
 Security policy 
 Organisation of program 
 Organisation of Risk 
 Planning of security 
 Employee/User factors 
 Planning for incidents and disasters 
 Information security incident management 
 User education and awareness 
 Computer security, support and operations 
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 Physical and environmental security 
 Authenticity 
 System access control 
 Audit tracks 
 Encryption 
2.4.5 Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) 
It is a risk based IT governance framework developed by Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA). It is based on the scrutiny and integration of existing IT 
standards and best practices (ITGI, 2007). According to ITGI (2007) the framework 
guarantees IT is aligned with the business; IT permits the business and maximises 
benefits; IT resources are utilized sensibly and IT risks are controlled properly. COBIT 
refers amongst many processes, to information security process. The COBIT framework 
enables administrators to bridge the gap between control requirements, technical 
challenges and operational risks. 
2.4.6 Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) 
OCTAVE is a risk base approach for managing information security that is inclusive, 
systematic, driven by the situation, and self directed.  It was developed at Carnegie 
Mellon University. The approach is organised in three phases which are (i) build asset-
based threat profile; (ii) identify infrastructure vulnerabilities; and (iii) develop security 
strategy and planning. The pillar of OCTAVE is structured interviews at various levels of 
an organisation to identify critical assets, risks on those assets, and design mitigation 
strategies for the assets (Alberts and Dorofee; 2003). OCTAVE approach employs PDCA 
cycle. 
2.4.7 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
HIPAA is a United State of America federal law that provide protection on health 
information stored by organisations that handle personal health information. The act 
identifies a list of administrative, physical and technical guidelines for organisations to 
implement in order to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of digital health 
data (HHS, 2012).  
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2.4.8 Holistic Security Management Framework (HSMF) 
HSMF is a framework base on a holistic model to manage security of electronic 
commerce through efficient interaction among business process, security challenges of 
technology, and societal challenges of security (Zuccato, 2007). 
2.4.9 Information Security Retrieval and Awareness (ISRA) 
This is a holistic model for improving information security awareness on employees. The 
model is centred on social issues because they have always been overlooked (Kritzinger 
and Smith; 2008). 
2.4.10 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
OWASP is a non-profit organisation aimed at enhancing software security. Their 
“mission is to make software security visible, so that individuals and organizations 
worldwide can make informed decisions about true software security risks” (OWASP, 
2010). OWASP develops guidelines for testing software issues under free and open 
source license. The OWASP guidelines have explicitly defined known vulnerabilities and 
also the preventive measures that need to be taken (OWASP, 2010). OWASP made an 
important contribution in creating a secured Web application especially regarding the 
reduction of the number of security weaknesses especially for online university 
application (Sedek, et al., 2009). 
2.4.11 Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 
This is a framework that provides best practices for information technology. It provides 
guidelines on managing IT security using Control, Plan, Implement, Evaluate and 
Maintain steps. ITIL can be adapted to the needs of an organisation. It is used in 
association with other best practices such as ISO/IEC 27002 (Arraj, 2010).   
2.4.12 Discussion 
Some of the above approaches for information security management are country 
or industry specific such as NIST 800-14 and HIPAA. According to Anttila and 
Kajava (2010) the PDCA model adopted in some of the standards is applied in the 
standards rather unsystematically, vaguely, and meagrely for the comprehensive aims of 
information security management. The major limitation of the COBIT framework is the 
reality that it does not offer continuous process improvement (Anthes, 2004). Standards 
and other recognized references for information security management underline the 
significance of senior executives' commitment to information security management 
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(Anttila, 2007). But, according to Anttila and Kajava (2010) senior executives of large 
and small companies are not interested in information security in their own management 
practices and do not understand their managing role for information security. Also, 
information security management puts emphasis on information security policy. However, 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of information 
security policies and the incidence and severity of security breaches (Doherty and Fulford; 
2005). According to Glaser (2009) there exists no security framework that encompasses 
cultural features and indeed NIST 800-14, ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 have 
neglected the role of culture in information security completely. Kritzinger and Smith 
(2008) argue that technical information security issues should not outshine the non-
technical information security issues. Theoharidou et al. (2005) argue that information 
security is evolving into a new paradigm that requires a multi-disciplinary approach and 
Dlamini et al. (2009) concludes that new research endeavours are required that narrow 
the gaps between social and technical issues. Kritzinger and Smith (2008), Zuccato (2007) 
and Anderson (2007) models incorporated both technical and social issues but are either 
too focused on a particular industry sector or have not been grounded through proper 
theoretical investigation. Finally, information security standards and best practices 
provide guidance and framework for best practice but not solutions. They need to be 
tailored to the requirement of the organisation (Siponen, M. and Willison, R., 2009). Also, 
they need to be tailored for institutions in the developed countries. In Principle (5) of the 
OECD stresses the implementation of information security to cater the needs of a 
democratic society (OECD, 2011). However, in many developing countries democracy is 
in confusion or not in the same level as developed countries. 
2.5 Information security strategies 
It is important to provide a long-term plan or strategy for information security. 
Information security strategy is defined as:  
An art of deciding how best to utilise what appropriate defensive information 
security technologies and measures, and of deploying and applying them in a 
coordinated way to defence organisation’s information infrastructure(s) against 
internal and external threats by offering confidentiality, integrity and availability 
at the expense of least efforts and costs while still effective. (Park and Ruighaver; 
2008, p.27) 
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 Two levels of information security strategies can be found in the literature namely 
organisational and national. A Strategy helps to organise security in an organisation. 
Bowen et al. (2006) suggest that information security strategy must be integrated into 
organisational strategy. It is important that an organisation achieves its objectives. It is 
important for information security strategy to be part of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is the means by which an organisation is managed, and to what targets (Coyle, 
2004).  Organisational information security strategy helps to achieve the objectives of 
protecting assets in the organisation. “Information security is direct corporate governance 
responsibility and lies squarely on the shoulders of the Board of the company” (von 
Solms, 2001, p.217).  
2.5.1 National Information Security Strategies  
The United Nations World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) recommended a 
strategy for information security that was adapted by many countries. The strategy has 
policies for  
 protection of critical information infrastructure 
  promotion of a cyber security culture in the world 
 encouragement of harmonisation of national laws and international laws and their 
enforcement 
 defending spam 
 creation of monitoring, cautioning and incident response facilities; national 
framework for information sharing 
 privacy, digital information and customer protection 
The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology of Mauritius in 
consultation with Pricewaterhouse Cooper of India developed Mauritius’s national 
information security strategy based on WSIS recommendations. The strategy is aligned 
with the mission of national ICT policy which aims to “transform Mauritius into an 
information-secure society, which supports the development of a trustworthy and 
competitive information economy” (NISS, 2007, p.176). The main aim of the strategy is 
to establish confidence and security in the utilisation of ICT systems. The aim will be 
achieve through several objectives including adoption of information security standards 
and encouragement of secure electronic services. The strategy lack an objective of 
establishing a research organ that could be use to get insight into success of the measures 
outlined in the strategy.  
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The Japanese information security strategy is designed to protect Japan against large scale 
cyber attack (NISC, 2010). The strategy employs PDCA approach to implement security 
countermeasures dynamically. The strategy proposes policy of developing information 
security policy that adapted to changes in the information security environment. The 
strategy will establish a triadic policy that covers national security, disaster management 
and defend users. Among measures for protection of infrastructure, the strategy will 
ensure IPv6-related information security and benchmarking of cloud computing. 
Zanzibar has no information security strategy at national level. Zanzibar’s Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Communications developed a National ICT Policy in 2011. This policy 
is still in draft format. The policy lack in-depth strategy for information security. Issues of 
encryption, IPv6, and cultural issues influencing security has not been covered at all.   
2.5.2 Organisational Information Security Strategies 
A useful example concerning the research objectives is provided by the University of 
Tennessee’s IT security strategy which has identified the Information Security Office 
(ISO), which is under the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer as the office with all 
responsibility of the information security program which includes: 
 The development of a robust IT security strategy  
 The development of IT security policies and embracing of best practices  
 Supervision and regulatory compliance across the entire university  
 Vulnerability assessment and countermeasures 
 Crisis management  
 Network and systems monitoring  
 Forensic investigation  
 Information security consulting  
 Compliance to policy and best practices  
 Awareness and training in information security  
 Business continuity management 
 
The scope of the strategy is the complete university. The university is responsible for 
safety of its information both digital and non-digital format. The strategy is guided by the 
principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability in relation with information and 
information systems resources. The strategy implements principles of least privilege and 
defence-in-depth (UT, 2007). In least privilege approach, a user is given minimum access 
privileges as necessary to execute a specific function. A defence-in-depth approach 
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combines human, management and technology to initiate multiple levels of protection.  
ISO will ensure that all members of the university have a role in the creation, execution, 
and maintenance of the security plan. ISO will initiate and maintain IT security 
committees that will develop and review policies. Also, ISO will be responsible with all 
the issues of compliance, communication, and exceptions policies. One of the objectives 
of the University of Tennessee is to conduct a risk analysis consisting of vulnerability 
assessment and quantification of consequences of those risks (UT, 2007). 
 
ICT security strategy for Western Cheshire NHS has several objectives for protection of 
their information assets. The strategy includes objectives on responsibility for 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information assets controlled and 
maintained by the Cheshire ICT operations. The strategy will set a benchmark to be 
achieved by organisations and expect the collaborations and contribution of all executives 
and employees. The strategy will guarantee all sectors administered and maintained by 
the Cheshire ICT Operations comply with the strategy. The strategy adopts the 
obligations of the NHS Connecting for Health (CfH), Information Governance Toolkit, 
Code of Practice for Information Security, Healthcare Commission Standards and 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 (NHS Western Cheshire, 2010). According to the strategy, a 
permanent Information Security Officer will be employed with responsibility of 
developing and executing an ICT Security Policy and its maintenance guidelines. In 
addition, an Information Security Officer will manage the communications and training 
programme of the strategy. Also, the Information Security Officer in association with an 
independent assessor will monitor the strategy for compliance. The strategy guarantees 
the continuity of operations in sustaining of clinical and production targets. The strategy 
outlines the development of policies and guidelines to be outsourced to Information 
Governance Group and Cheshire ICT Service business management team. Also, there 
will be periodic reviews of the strategy. 
 
Brigham Young University strategy has objectives that are designed to provide protection 
according to clauses in ISO17799:2005 code of practice. Some of the measures that will 
be taken by Brigham Young University include encrypting classified information, 
establishing a VPN, conducting vulnerability assessment using NESSUS, encouraging the 
use of OWASP guidelines for web application, and not to allow anything from the 
Internet to have direct access to the university’s network (BYU, 2008). 
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2.5.3 Discussion 
The above strategies are unique to each organisation and nation. Each strategy has its own 
vision, aims, objectives, policies and measures to suit its environment. Each country or 
organisation has its own information security needs according to its features (Gerber and 
von Solms; 2005). Developing countries need to protect its information assets, but the 
type of technology they will implement will differ to those from developed countries. 
Strategies that are used in developed countries will not necessary work in the developing 
countries. The common policy among strategies presented above is benchmarking of 
information security practices. 
2.6 Corporate governance 
According to Coyle (2004) corporate governance is the method in which an organisation 
is managed, and to what aim. Also, corporate governance deals with practices and 
procedures that guarantee an organisation is run in a manner that enables it to reach its 
objectives (Coyle, 2004). “Corporate governance may be defined broadly as the study of 
power and influence over decision making within the corporation” (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2010, p.487). According to Blair (1995), corporate governance includes the set of 
legislation, cultural, and institutional agreements that determine what publicly traded 
companies can do, who rule them, how power is executed, and how the risks and returns 
from the actions they assume are assigned.   
A Board of Directors is obliged to effectively direct and control their institution as a 
whole (King Report, 2001; cited in Posthumus and von Solms, 2004, p.644). By directing 
and controlling an organisation they would, therefore, also govern information security 
(Entrust, 2004; cited in Posthumus and von Solms, 2004, p.644). In order to show 
management support to information security, executive management and the Board 
should develop an organisational information security policy (Whitman and Mattford, 
2003; Corporate Governance Task Force, 2004; cited in Posthumus and von Solms, 2004, 
p.644). According to Fourie (2003) top management support is the most influential factor 
in information security management activities in an organisation. Top management are 
responsible for their organisation compliance to laws and regulations. It is vital for 
organisations to be able to evaluate their information security compliance level (Luthy 
and Forcht, 2006; Saleh, Alrabiah and Bakry, 2007). Top management are responsible to 
the risks facing their organisation. Analysis of information security risk presents 
organisations with increased awareness and more depth of understanding regarding their 
anticipated loss due to security breaches (Gerber, von Solms, and Overbeek, 2001). 
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2.7 Culture 
Culture has been identified as an important factor of human behaviour. Culture is 
“a set of shared values and beliefs” (Javidan and House 2001, p.293). Beliefs are the 
perceptions of people on how thing are done in their nations. Values are aspirations of 
people about how things should be done.  Also, Culture can be defined as “the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another” (Hofstede and Hofstede, p.4). The Global Leadership and Organisational 
Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) Project defines culture as “shared motives, 
values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events 
that result from common experiences of members of collectives that are 
transmitted across generations” (House and Javidan, 2004, p.15). Culture can be 
categorised into different levels: national, organisational, regional, religious, gender, and 
group level.  This thesis, will only deal with culture at national and organisational level. 
Organisations are influenced by the communities in which they are surrounded (Dickson 
et al, 2004).  
2.7.1 National Culture 
National culture is manifested mostly in values and less in practices while organisational 
culture resides mostly in practices and less in values (Hofstede, 1997). National culture 
can be measured empirically through dimensions of culture which are relative to other 
culture (Hofstede and Hofstede; 2005, p.4).  Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) identify five 
dimensions of national culture: (1) Power distance is the extent to which power is 
dispersed among members of organisations within a country; (2) Uncertainty avoidance is 
the extent to which the culture feels endangered by unfamiliar happenings; (3) 
Individualism refers to the degree of importance of an individual’s requirements 
compared with the group’s needs as a whole; (4) Masculinity refers to the extent to which 
cultures show evidence of masculine or feminine qualities; and (5) Long-term orientation 
is the extent to which members of organisations promote behaviours inclined toward 
future gains. Hofstede (2010) added another dimension of national culture which is 
Indulgence. Indulgence is defined as “a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of 
basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun” (Hofstede, 2010, 
p. 281).  
According to the GLOBE Project there are nine national culture dimensions (House et al, 
2004). These dimensions are Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Humane 
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Orientation, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Assertiveness, Gender 
Egalitarianism, Future Orientation, and Performance Orientation. These dimensions were 
derived empirically by the Globe Project. Moreover, the theoretical base that grounds the 
GLOBE project is integration of implicit leadership theory (Lord & Maher, 1991), 
value/belief theory of culture (Hofstede, 1980), implicit motivation theory (McClelland, 
1985), and structural contingency theory of organizational form and the effectiveness 
(Donaldson, 1993; Hickson, et al, 1974). House et al (2004) define national culture 
dimensions as follow:  
- Power Distance is the degree in which members of a society expect power to be 
shared equally. 
- Uncertainty Avoidance is the degree to which society, organisation, or group 
depends on social norms, regulations, and processes to ease uncertainty of future 
events.  
- Humane Orientation is the extent to which a society encourages and reward 
individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others. 
- Institutional Collectivism is the extent to which organisational or societal 
practices reward and promote sharing of resources and collective action. 
- In-Group Collectivism is the extent to which people express pride, loyalty, and 
solidness in their organisations or families. 
- Assertiveness is the extent to which people are assertive, confrontational, and 
aggressive in their relationships with others. 
- Gender Egalitarianism is the extent to which a society reduces gender inequality.  
- Future Orientation is the degree to which people engage in future-oriented 
behaviours such as delaying indulgence, planning, and investing in the future. 
- Performance Orientation is the extent to which a society encourages and rewards 
members for performance advancement and brilliance. 
 
This research adopts national culture dimensions proposed by the GLOBE Project 
because it covers much human behaviour through its nine dimensions. In addition, 
GLOBE Project integrates the theory of implicit motivation, theory of implicit leadership, 
theory of culture of value/belief, and theory of structural contingency of organization. By 
grounding many theories in GLOBE Project makes dimensions of much stronger. 
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2.7.2 Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture describes how staff views the organisation. Schein (2004, p.17) 
has defined an organisational culture in term of a group culture as:  
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. 
Also, Schein (2004) categorised organisational culture into three levels: 
 Artifacts in organisations are (i) visible, (ii) tangible, and (iii) perceptible 
outcomes of activities grounded in values and perceptions. Artifacts include but 
not limited to dressing, communications and customs. 
 Espouse beliefs and values in organisations are the social principles, philosophies, 
goals, standards and beliefs considered to have intrinsic worth for members of the 
organisation. Values include the beliefs held by members of the culture. 
 Underlying Assumptions represent taken-for-granted beliefs about reality, 
feelings and human nature. 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) described six dimensions of organisational culture which 
are: 
 Process oriented, where members of the organisation circumvent risks and use 
minimum endeavour in their daily work.  
 Employee oriented, where employees view that their organisation values them 
and vital decisions are made teams.  
 Parochial, where staff gets their identity originated from the organisation.  
 Open system, where members considered their organisation receives anyone. 
 Loose control, an organisation where no strict in cost or work schedules and 
frequency of jokes is a norm.  
 Normative, an organisation where compliance with organisation rule is more 
significant than outcomes.  
According to Cameron and Quinn (2006) organisational culture dimensions are: 
- Dominant Characteristics 
- Organisational Leadership 
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- Management of Employees 
- Organisation Glue 
- Strategic Emphases 
- Criteria of Success 
These dimensions were empirically derived and result in four major types of 
organisational cultures which are Clan, Adhocracy, Market, and Hierarchy (Cameron and 
Quinn; 2006). The dimensions are grounded by Competing Values Framework (Quinn 
and Cameron; 1983) and relate to the effectiveness of an organisation. Cameron and 
Quinn (2006) developed Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) for 
measuring organisational culture. OCAI was used by over 10,000 companies worldwide 
(OCAI, 2010). Cameron and Quinn (2006) define the four cultures as: 
A clan culture is:  
A very friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. It is like an 
extended family. The leaders, or head of the organization, are considered to be 
mentors and, maybe even, parent figures. The organization is held together by 
loyalty or tradition. Commitment is high. The organization emphasizes the long-
term benefit of human resource development and attaches great importance to 
cohesion and morale. Success is defined in terms of sensitivity to customers and 
concern for people. The organization places a premium on teamwork, 
participation, and consensus.    (Cameron and Quinn; 2006, p.66) 
A hierarchy culture is: 
A very formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what people 
do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizers, who 
are efficiency-minded. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is most 
critical. Formal rules and policies hold the organization together. The long-term 
concern is on stability and performance with efficient, smooth operations. 
Success is defined in terms of dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low 
cost. The management of employees is concerned with secure employment and 
predictability.    (Cameron and Quinn; 2006, p.66) 
An adhocracy culture is: 
A dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative place to work. People stick their necks 
out and take risks. The leaders are considered to be innovators and risk takers. 
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The glue that holds the organization together is a commitment to experimentation 
and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. The organization's 
long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means 
gaining unique and new products to services. Being a product or service leader is 
important. The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
          (Cameron and Quinn; 2006, p.66) 
A market culture is:  
A results-oriented organization. The major concern is getting the job done. 
People are competitive and goal-oriented. The leaders are hard drivers, producers, 
and competitors. They are tough and demanding. The glue that holds the 
organization together is an emphasis on winning. Reputation and success are 
common concerns. The long-term focus is on competitive actions and 
achievement of measurable goals and targets. Success is defined in terms of 
market share and penetration. Competitive pricing and market leadership are 
important. The organizational style is hard-driving competitiveness.   
              (Cameron 
and Quinn; 2006, p.66) 
Dominant characteristics are the features that employees view their organisation to be 
such as organisation to be a personal place, a place where employees share things, an 
entrepreneurial place, and a place where employees can take a risk among others 
(Cameron and Quinn; 2006). 
The organisational leadership dimension involves the features of leadership in the 
organisation as viewed by employees. These features include but are not limited to 
mentoring or nurturing, entrepreneurial or innovation, no-non-sense or aggressive, and 
coordinating or smooth-running (Cameron and Quinn; 2006). 
The management of employees dimension has features that employees view their 
organisation to have such as teamwork, freedom, high demands, and security of 
employment among others (Cameron and Quinn; 2006). 
Organisational glue dimension have features that employees view their organisation are 
glued upon such as loyalty and mutual trust; innovation and development; emphasis on 
achievement, and formal rules and policies (Cameron and Quinn; 2006).  
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The strategic emphasis dimension includes features such as human development, 
acquiring new resources, hitting stretch targets, and permanence and stability among 
others (Cameron and Quinn; 2006). 
The criteria for success dimension has features such as teamwork, product leader or 
innovator; outpacing the competition and low-cost production (Cameron and Quinn; 
2006).   
In the GLOBE Project, dimensions of organisational culture and national culture are 
analogous. Handy (1995) categorised organisation culture into four cultures:  
 Club culture describes organisations that have a division of task based on 
purposes and merchandises. 
 Role culture describes organisations where its approach is inclined towards 
defining role or task to be accomplished. 
 Task culture describes organisations where administrators are involved with 
constant and thriving resolution of a crisis.  
 Existential culture described organisations that operate on assumptions that they 
support the individuals of those organisations to do their own stuff. 
This thesis adopts organisational culture based on Cameron and Quinn (2006) because the 
dimensions of culture were grounded by Competing Values Framework that relates to the 
effectiveness of an organisation. Many organisations in Zanzibar are not effective in their 
operations. Many of the organisations are run on public finance or family investment. 
Competing Values Framework is not based on national culture behaviours but more on 
organisational business attitude.  
2.7.3 Information Security Culture 
Schlienger and Teufel (2002) define information security culture as “all socio-cultural 
measures that support technical activity methods, so that information security becomes a 
natural aspect in the daily activity of every employee”. While Dhillon (1995) deﬁnes 
security culture as “the totality of human attributes such as behaviours, attitudes, and 
values that contribute to the protection of all kinds of information in a given organisation”.   
And, Ngo et al (2005) terms information security culture as “how things are done (i.e. 
accepted behaviour and actions) by employees and the organisation as a whole, in relation 
to information security”. Several studies found in the literature investigated information 
security culture in organisations. Chaula et al (2006) investigated information security 
culture in a commercial public organisation. Some studies focus their investigation on the 
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culture of organisation, and concluded that organisations must stress the idea that 
information security is the responsibility of every member (Schlienger and Teufel, 2002; 
Vroom and von Solms, 2004). Chaula et al (2006) based their study on GLOBE project 
while Schlienger and Teufel (2002) based their study on Schein (2004). 
2.7.4 Discussion 
National culture influences the adoption of innovations (van Everdingen and Waarts; 
2003) and how people in certain societies view their responsibilities, interact and convey 
their feelings (Hofstede, 2001). Many developing countries have imported information 
systems innovation from developed countries. Importation of information systems forces 
developing countries to adopt ideas that are not appropriate to their local context 
(Bhatnagar, 2000; Albirini, 2006).  
Hall (1976) finds that in low context cultures, most of the information is contained in the 
message itself in an explicit and detailed way. On the other hand, in high context culture, 
less explicit and detailed information is carried in the message itself and inferences are 
drawn from implicit information. It is accepted that communication is an important facet 
of information security management (von Solms and von Solms, 2004b; Hone and Eloﬀ, 
2002) and effective communication between IT, management and users is challenging 
enough to achieve in organisations even though the culture is relatively homogeneous. 
Consequently, in high context cultures, communication tends to be a key issue related to 
information security. 
Hofstede studies are based on investigation on employees from IBM Corporation. 
GLOBE Project investigated culture by using managers as participants. These two types 
of participants could have influenced the results. IBM’s employees are involved with 
technology and would have good education. Educated people have different culture to 
common people. The same is true for managers who are among the best educated in the 
society. It is important that we have empirical data that reflect the culture in the context of 
Zanzibar. The empirical data that reflect Zanzibar culture will be collected by conducting 
an investigation of employees of organisations in Zanzibar. 
2.8 Organisational semiotics 
Semiotics is the “science of signs”. A sign represents something to someone. All types of 
signs are involved in semiotics including oral language, images, literature, videos, sound, 
body language, plays and texts among others. Semiotics is involved with the life cycle of 
a sign from being produced, through being processed, to its usage, with stress on the 
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impact of signs (Liu, 2000). All signs have meaning (semantics), relationship among 
signs (syntactic), and usage (pragmatics).  In the study by Stamper (1973) noted that there 
are three more features of signs: physics, empirics, and social world. These six features of 
signs collectively are called semiotic ladder or semiotic framework (Liu, 2000). 
Organisational semiotics is the study of organisation using sign systems as 
communication tools between human beings, information, and technology within a social 
reality (Liu, 2000). “Organisational semiotics defines an organisation as a social system 
or a social structure in which people behave in an organised manner by conforming to a 
certain system of social norms” (Rambo, Liu and Nakata; 2009). Norms make members 
of an organisation behave, think, judge, and view the world (Stamper et al., 2000). 
Culture or subculture is made up of shared norms. Norms and signs always go together. 
Therefore, culture or subculture could be represented by all kind of signs. According to 
Gottdiener (1995), a sign is composed of expression and content. Signs are tools that 
facilitate social interactions (Gottdiener, 1995). A sign is a medium for human to 
understand things. People communicate significance, create meanings, and convey 
thoughts and sentiments via signs or sign systems. Signs and norms cannot be separate 
(Stamper, et al., 2000). 
Organisational semiotics can be used to analyse and develop organisations, economic 
transactions and information systems through the use of approaches, models and 
procedures that have been designed as substitutes to conventional approaches (Gazendam, 
2004). Several studies have adapted a semiotics approach to analysing various challenges 
related to information systems. Li et al (2008) used organisational semiotics to develop a 
personalised clinical pathway. French et al (2006) developed e-Service Trust framework 
based on a semiotic framework. Andersen (2001) argued about the function of semiotics 
in the creation of a user interface and declared that semiotics is useful for arranging the 
design of information systems in a wider theoretical and philosophical framework. Liu 
(2002) discussed that as an outcome of the failure of users to recognize the meanings of 
words and the failure of designers to appreciate user requirements, an approach with an 
emphasis on semantics is required to explain meanings to enhance communication 
channels. Sjostrom and Goldkuhl (2003) demonstrated a socio-pragmatic and semiotic 
concept of user interfaces and discusses that conceptualising user interfaces by using the 
semiotic paradigm makes way for understanding IS exploit as social action and 
understanding how IS artefacts can be viewed as communicative tools in such social 
exploit. Also, Dhillon and May (2006) used semiotics to structure an improved 
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understanding of information security in the framework of human computer interaction 
(HCI). 
2.9 Non-profit organisations 
There are several definitions for a non-profit organisation. A non-profit organisation is 
also referred as a not-for-profit organisation. The International Classification of Non-
profit Organisations (ICNPO) defines a non-profit organisation as the organisations with 
the following features (Salamon and Anheier, 1996): 
- “Organized, i.e., institutionalized to some extent” (p.2) 
- “Private, i.e., institutionally separate from government” (p.2) 
- “Self-governing, i.e., equipped to control their own activities.” (p.2) 
- “Non-proﬁt-distributing, i.e., not returning proﬁts generated to their owners or 
directors.” (p.3) 
- “Voluntary, i.e., involving some meaningful degree of voluntary participation.” 
(p.3) 
 
Some studies have categorised a non-profit organisation in terms of a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO). NGO is included in the UN Charter (Martens, 2002). The essential 
defining element of a non-profit organisation is the prohibition to distribute profits in 
which Lyons and Hocking (2000) term as the “non-distribution clause”. This research 
project adopts the definition of non-profit or not-for-profit organisation developed by the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). According to the ACCA (2012) 
non-profit or not-for-profit organisation have the following characteristics: 
- “Do not have external shareholders providing risk capital for the business” 
- “Do not distribute dividends, so any profit (or surplus) that is generated is 
retained by the business as a further source of capital” 
- “Their objectives usually include some social, cultural, philanthropic, welfare or 
environmental dimension, which in their absence, would not be readily provided 
efficiently through the workings of the market system” 
With the above characteristics, some public organisations are non-profit organisations. 
Public organisations that provide services such as identity cards production, health 
services, and education are good examples of non-profit organisations. The solutions 
mentioned in section 2.4 are expensive, complex, need skilled personnel to implement 
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and were designed to cater for large commercial organisations (Simmons and Burgess, 
2000; Brake, 2003, cited in Dimopoulos et al, 2004). 
2.10 The case study (Zanzibar) 
Zanzibar is an archipelago consisting of two major Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. It is a 
semi-autonomous part of the United Republic of Tanzania but has its own Government 
and is led by its own President. The House of Representatives is responsible for passing 
new laws in Zanzibar. Members of the House of Representatives come from two major 
political parties. Figure 2.10.1 shows the map of Zanzibar. The population of Zanzibar is 
1,211,000 (OCGS, 2011). The vast majority of Zanzibaris are Muslims. Although a large 
population of the Zanzibar people are Muslims, the government of Zanzibar is ruled by 
secular laws. Ethnic groups in Zanzibar are Africans, Indians, Arabs and Europeans. The 
national culture of Zanzibar is based on the Swahili culture which is a mix of ethnic 
groups (Vander biesen, 2009). In the study by Hofstede (2010), Zanzibar’s national 
culture dimensions are in the category of Tanzania or East Africa. Table 2.10.1 shows 
Zanzibar’s national culture dimensions.  
 
  Figure 2.10.1 – Map of Zanzibar (Source: MAPAS (2012)) 
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Table 2.10.1 shows that Zanzibar society has inequality in sharing of power; favours 
group’s needs; believes in masculinity qualities; moderation in dealing with unexpected 
events; and not inclined to the future. The public sector forms 3.4% of the Zanzibar 
population (OCGS, 2011). The Zanzibar public sector provides services such as education, 
health, transportation, power, finance, communications, agriculture, legislation and social 
services. In addition, Zanzibar’s Gross Domestic Product per capita is US$561 (POFEDP, 
2012). The Government of Zanzibar has adopted various information systems to facilitate 
the way services are offered to its citizens and improve efficiency in work places. 
Information systems that were adopted include, but are not limited to, the integrated 
financial system, payroll systems, human resources systems, the driving licensing system, 
the road licensing system, tax systems, the Value Added Tax (VAT) system, the car 
registration system, the registration of death and birth system, the citizen registration 
system, voter registration and various websites that offer information about various issues 
and forms for online and offline filling. This adoption is part of a long term development 
strategy called Zanzibar Development Vision 2020 to be achieved by the year 2020. In 
2012 Zanzibar planned to adopt the e-government system (Sultan, 2011). Marine fibre 
optic cable will arrive in Zanzibar in 2013 that will carry high-speed broadband. The 
population of United Republic of Tanzania is 43,188,000 (NBS, 2010). Table 2.10.1 
shows number of internet users increased between 2008 and 2010. Table 2.10.2 shows 
massive gap between Tanzania and USA in the usage of computer and internet. 
Table 2.10.1: Zanzibar’s national culture dimensions (Source: Hofstede (2010)) 
Culture Dimension 
Index 
Zanzibar (Tanzania 
or East Africa) 
Saudi Arabia or 
Arab Countries 
Great Britain 
Long-term orientation 
(LTO) 
34 36 51 
Power Distance (PDI) 64 80 35 
Individualism (IDV) 27 38 89 
Masculinity (MAS) 41 53 66 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAI) 
52 68 35 
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Table 2.10.2 – Internet Usage in Tanzania (Source: TCRA (2010)) 
Access type 2008 2009 2010 
Internet Cafe 126,000 215,640 260,280 
Organisation/Institution 2,444,000 2,588,000 2,663,200 
Household/Individual 993,732 1,574,752 1,932, 816 
TOTAL 3,563, 732 4,378,392 4,856,296 
 
Table 2.10.3 – Computer and Internet usage in 2007 (Source: ITU, 2009) 
Country % of household with computer  % of household with internet 
Tanzania 2.3 0.6 
USA 70 62 
 
Zanzibar was ruled by Oman Arabs in 19 century as a Sultanate of Zanzibar. Then, 
Sultanate of Zanzibar was provided protection by the British and became Zanzibar British 
Protectorate. In 1963, it became independent from the British. In 1964, there was a 
revolution that led to the formation of the current Government. Although Zanzibar is a 
democratic country, all the elections are marred by violence. Members of Civil United 
Front (CUF) who are the main opposition party in Zanzibar believe that they are 
oppressed by the Government of Zanzibar (Brent and Mshigeni; 2004). According to 
Brent and Mshigeni (2004) CUF has formed youth wings called Blue Guard and White 
Guard as party’s security arm. Sadallah (2010) reported that the CUF Presidential 
candidate in Zanzibar has suspicion on vote rigging at the headquarters of the ruling party 
using electronic means. 
2.11 Rationale for the focus on information security in non-profit 
organisations 
This thesis is focused on improving the governance of information security in Zanzibar’s 
non-profit sector. The non-profit organisations make crucial contributions to economic, 
social and political aspects of Zanzibar’s life. Indeed, the non-profit sector is the major 
employer in Zanzibar. The non-profit organisations provide vital services to the 
community including health, education, law enforcement, environmental protection, 
voting, citizen’s registry, social welfare, public finance, and human rights. Employees of 
non-profit organisations in Zanzibar often have a relaxed attitude in doing their daily 
tasks because of lack of fear of losing the jobs; services in these organisations are delayed 
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due to employees’ attitudes toward work. The non-profit sector in Zanzibar depends 
mostly on lowly paid public sector employees and volunteers to be run. This makes the 
non-profit organisations to have low skilled IT workers. 
The practices of information security governance in non-profit organisations have much 
influence not only within the organisations themselves. Many of the non-profit 
organisations have computers that are connected to the Internet. Many of the non-profit 
organisations depend on email services provided by free web-based email services such 
as Yahoo and Hotmail. Confidential information could be passed through untrusted 
networks via emails. Computers connected to the internet can be attacked through 
vulnerabilities in operating systems and application software. Automated attacks can be 
launched remotely to create distributed denial of service attacks, or send a large amount 
of spam that could cripple the network. The distributed denials of service attacks are 
potentially threatening the practicability of the Internet (Sturgeon, 2007). 
The major obstacle of non-profit organisations in contrast to commercial organisations is 
the lack of resources. This lack of resources is evidently found in the level of maturity of 
information systems in these organisations. The non-profit organisations have smaller 
budgets for IT programmes and smaller personnel dedicated to IT department. The lack 
of resources and technological skills in non-profit organisations make them “fall even 
further behind in their quest to support and improve their programs” (Schneider 2003, 
p.383). Hackler and Saxton (2007) find that “the capacity of a non-profit to enlist new 
technologies to deliver services in new ways (e.g., online commerce and databases) is 
missing, and this is the step that would allow nonprofits to embrace IT innovation” and 
Nielsen (2012) added that “a non-profit organization in a developing country cannot 
afford to fail to implement an information system, but this can often be the case because 
of little expertise on the area”. New information systems emerge every day, which make 
it difficult for non-profit organisations to make informed decisions on what security 
measures to implement in their organisation. Also, training employees every time when 
new systems are installed put too much pressure on managers on allocating the few 
resources the organisations have to training schemes. 
The size of a non-profit organisation in most cases tends to be smaller. Some studies 
indicate that the larger the organisation the more likely for them to have implemented an 
information security governance system (Hong, Chi, Chao, and Tang, 2006; Chang and 
Ho, 2006). This implies that the smaller the organisation the more likely it is not to have 
implemented an information security management system. Also, the industrial sector of 
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the organisation is a determining feature in the establishment of an information security 
management system, for example, the banking sector gives a high priority on information 
security governance (Chang and Ho, 2006; Hong et al., 2006). Consequently, the 
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) was established to provide 
protection for cardholder data security worldwide. The USA has a huge profitable 
healthcare industry; therefore HIPAA is a standard that was established to protect 
personal health information in the USA. Research indicates that smaller organisations 
have the following characteristics: 
- Employees find security solutions to be complex and confusing (Blake, 2003) 
- Information security is not a priority (Yildirim et al., 2011) 
- Perceiving that they are not the target of hackers and cyber criminals and only 
need protection from virus  
- Dependence of vendors and consultants for awareness and skills (Suppiah-
Sandre, 2002) 
- Working in a sector that accept risk (Lacey and James, 2010) 
 As mentioned earlier, the importance of the non-profit sector in Zanzibar for socio-
economic and political aspects make it vulnerable to insider threats. According to CERT 
(2010) insider threat remains one of the most expensive threats. Human error constitutes 
for a significant cause of information security threats and often undervalued during the 
risk assessment (Im and Baskerville, 2005). Low pay in Zanzibar’s non-profit sector 
makes them more vulnerable to such risk. 
The academic literature for information security practices in non-profit organisation is 
tremendously rare especially for developing countries. For this reason and in view of the 
above discussions the focus of this thesis on enhancing information security governance 
is on non-profit organisations. 
2.12 Conclusion 
The objective of this review is to look at the area of information security, information 
security management, information security in the developing countries, culture, 
organisational semiotics, Zanzibar and concepts and challenges related to information 
security management. The existing literature was analysed with the aim of gathering 
information on diverse features of information security management. The analysis has 
revealed that information security is one of the main values in the success of any 
organisation. Organisations are influenced by the culture they are surrounded. An 
36 
 
organisation must have long term strategy for information security. Existing strategies are 
country or industry specific and need to be tailored to suit the environment that the 
organisation resides. The literature revealed that social issues are as important as 
technical issues in managing information security. The analysis has identified 
organisational semiotics as a model that could analyse and integrate social and technical 
issues. 
The literature review in Section 2.3 revealed that there is a problem of information 
security in the developing countries. The literature review in Section 2.10 exposed that 
Zanzibar which is a developing country is in the process of adopting various information 
systems in its organisations. But, the review shows that Zanzibar is facing many social, 
economical and political challenges. The literature review in Section 2.5 demonstrated 
that information security strategies are unique to each country and organisation according 
to their needs and feature. This led the researcher into asking the main research question 
RQM which is “What are organisational factors need to be tackled or managed to 
develop and implement effective information security governance in the context of 
Zanzibar?”  
The literature review in Section 2.4 and 2.5 revealed that there are several information 
security management systems and strategies. The review shows that these strategies and 
systems are not perfect, which means should not to be adopted as they are. There are 
many gaps in existing information security management systems and strategies. PDCA 
model adopted by some standards is applied erratically in the model. COBIT framework 
does not offer continuous process improvement. Senior managers in organisations are not 
interested in information security or do not understand their managing role for 
information security. There is no significant correlation between having an information 
security policy and occurrence and severity of security violations. The literature showed 
that information security policy is the backbone of information security management 
systems. The literature review in Section 2.5 disclosed that there are many different types 
of strategies with unique missions and visions. It is important to critical analyse these 
different types of strategies. This led to the research question RQ1. 
The literature in Section 2.2 revealed that there are so many threats that organisation may 
face such as social engineering, automated attacks, insider threats,  phishing, spyware, 
spam, virus among others. The literature review in Section 2.9 revealed that non-profit 
organisations are important in Zanzibar for its contribution in social, economical and 
political aspects. The literature in information security for non-profit organisation in the 
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developing countries is rare. Information systems in non-profit organisations lack 
maturity. Information security standards and best practices were designed for large 
commercial organisations in developed countries. Many non-profit organisations are 
small and do not feel that information security is important to them. It has been revealed 
that non-profit organisation could be a target of a distributed denial of service attack that 
will spread to other organisations. This led the research to the research question RQ2. The 
literature review in Section 2.4 shows that ISO/IEC 27002 is a process based implements 
the PDCA model.  Also, ISO/IEC 27002 is an international accepted best practice in 
information security that provides guidelines for implementing ISO/IEC 27001 standard. 
Section 2.4 demonstrated that ISO/IEC 27005 is an international accepted standard for 
information security risk management that implement PDCA model. The OCTAVE 
approach is a huge and complex method to digest for smaller organisations. The COBIT 
framework does not offer process improvement. 
The literature review in Section 2.10 revealed that Zanzibar is a country with multi-ethnic 
groups. Zanzibar faces social, economical and political challenges. The literature review 
in Section 2.4 demonstrates that information security management is becoming a multi-
disciplinary approach and new research endeavours are required to integrate social and 
technical challenges. In addition, existing security standards and best practices have not 
encompassed cultural features. The literature in Section 2.7 revealed that there are many 
dimensions of culture. There is a lack of research in culture specific for Zanzibar. The 
existing studies show that culture of Zanzibar has been included as part of East Africa 
(Hofstede, 2010) or Tanzania GLOBE study (House et al., 2004). This led to the research 
question RQ3. 
The research question RQ4 was asked in order to achieve the research aim (RQM, 
Section 1.1). Research questions RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 will provide the answer for the 
research question RQ4. The research RQ1 will identify the gaps for the rationale of 
developing a new framework for information security culture. The research question RQ2 
will provide empirical data for information security practices the organisations. The 
research question RQ3 will provide empirical data for the cultural behaviour in the study 
environment. 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, presents a description of methodological selections 
employed in this research project. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the literature that is used to build the theoretical foundation of 
this research was discussed. In this chapter, the research approaches that were considered 
to address the research questions identified in the Chapter 1, the criteria to identify their 
relevance for the project and the reasoning behind their choice will be investigated. This 
chapter describes the approach that will be used to answer the research questions and 
practical details for how the strategy is to be implemented in practice. The chapter will 
begin with a theoretical perspective of research approaches used in this project. Then data 
gathering procedures are outlined. Finally, a data analysis plan and procedure are 
discussed, followed by a discussion of the validity and reliability of data for the research 
questions. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 the main research question that needs investigation for this 
project is “to find organisational factors that can be tackled or managed to develop and 
implement effective information security governance in the context of Zanzibar”. The 
nature of the question here can be best studied through a holistic approach. According to 
Iivari and Hirschheim (1996) a social-technical approach is a vital strategy for addressing 
organisational and social challenges. The mixed methods approach, involving integration 
of qualitative and quantitative data, presents a broad understanding of the research 
question (Creswell, 2009). A case study is an example of qualitative research. The use of 
a case study here will enable us to generalise the results for that case. The case in this 
study is non-profit organisations in Zanzibar. Due to lack of research in information 
security in the Zanzibar context, an interpretive research approach is justified for this 
project. According to Kaplan and Maxwell (1994) an interpretive research approach helps 
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to understand a fact from the outlook of the participants and its particular social and 
organisational context. The interpretive research methods have been discussed to be 
useful in information systems research (Nelson, 2004; Walsham, 1993). Interpretive 
method forms the philosophical foundation of a qualitative research approach. 
3.2 Research design 
This study is steered by a philosophical assumption of interpretive epistemology. 
Epistemology is “the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, 
and scope, and the distinction between justified belief and opinion” (OD, 2011). The 
epistemological assumption of the interpretive investigator is “findings are literally 
created as the investigation proceeds” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 111). Also, they 
clearly identify “understanding social reality requires understanding how practices and 
meanings are formed and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans 
working towards some shared goal” (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991, p. 14). Data 
collection and analysis were informed by qualitative and quantitative approaches. Figure 
1.5.1 on Section 1.5 illustrates the overall research design. As stated in Section 1.1, the 
main research question in the thesis is: “what organisational factors need to be tackled or 
managed to develop and implement effective information security governance in the 
context of Zanzibar?” In the following sections, it is argued that the research design, by 
implementing an interpretive approach, was the most effective method to answer the 
research question. 
3.3 Research approaches 
“Research is one of the ways to find answers to your questions” (Kumar, 2005, p.6). In 
this project qualitative, quantitative and case study approaches are judged suitable to 
perform the research. The reason for this is the research has to be completed within a 
small time frame of three years. The quantitative methods will enable to gather data from 
a large sample much quicker. The research will investigate information security through 
observation of users and their surroundings; and analysed documents. This can be done 
through qualitative methods. Also, qualitative approach can provide quality data from 
smaller sample. The case study approach will enable the researcher to gather data from a 
natural setting of the sample. Case study can be implemented either quantitative or 
qualitative approaches or any mix of both (Doolin, 1996; Stake, 1994; Yin, 2003). I think 
the mix of both qualitative and quantitative approaches is the best method to understand a 
case study. 
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3.3.1 Quantitative approach 
In the approach investigation is carried out systematically based on figures and statistical 
data. The investigators are not part of the research, they are the outsiders. According to 
Kumar (2005), a quantitative approach is structured and stresses on some kind of 
measurement, such as measurement of changes in phenomenon, situation, issue etc. 
Statistics may be used to increase confidence in presenting findings and influence of 
various variables in a quantitative study (Kumar, 2005). Examples of data collection 
methods for quantitative approaches are surveys and experiments (Creswells, 1994).  
There are two types of experiments:  1) True experiment is when participants are selected 
randomly. 2) Quasi experiment is when participants are not selected randomly (Creswells, 
1994). Random selection provides equal opportunity to participants in becoming involved 
with the experiment. Surveys are used to collect data by asking respondents about their 
experiences, attitudes, or knowledge. Data collection in a survey is done through 
questionnaires or structured interviews. Graziano and Raulin (2007) mentioned two types 
of surveys: 1) A status survey which explains the present features of a sample 2) A 
research survey which seeks present features of a sample and relationships among 
variables. Voter choices or employee satisfaction is an example of status survey. A survey 
on people’s culture and its impact on security is an example of survey research. 
Surveys are applied to describe the behaviour of a narrow or wider population (Heiman, 
1998). The outcome of a survey on a sample can be generalised to the whole population 
(Fink, 2002). The outcome will be more accurate if the sample is larger. Also, unbiased 
sampling will increase the accuracy of the outcome. Use of questionnaires in surveys 
allows data collection from a wider population in short duration with less cost 
administering them to participants. With the questionnaires, one of the rationales is the 
respondents are free to answer the questions without being influenced by the researcher 
(Heiman, 1998). Interviews allow a survey to be performed quicker and extra information 
may be obtained from respondents, but the researcher might influence the response. 
According to Graziano and Raulin (2007) there are two types of survey designs: 1) Cross-
sectional design is a survey which is conducted one time to a sample, resulting data on the 
measured features as they present at the point of the survey 2) Longitudinal survey 
designs is a survey which can be repeated to the same subjects at different times. In this 
thesis, cross-sectional survey is employed. The main reason for this is the time limitation 
to complete the research and financial constraint faced by the researcher. Also, the cross-
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sectional survey designs enable to compare the performance of each organisation in the 
study at the same time and no interference with the participants in the research.  
A questionnaire is a list of questions written in a paper or other media where respondents 
record their answers. Advantages of using questionnaires: 
 Questionnaires allow anonymity of the participants.  
 Questionnaires can be mailed to respondents.  
 A researcher may administer questionnaires to a group of people gathered in one 
location. 
 A website can be used as a questionnaire.  
 A questionnaire can be self-administered in which respondents read the 
instructions and write the answers or choose their answers to the questions. 
 Questions in the questionnaires are closed-ended or open-ended. In the closed-ended 
questions, the respondents are given several options to select the best option for the 
answer. In the open-ended questions, the respondents write down the answer in their own 
words. Closed-ended questions are quicker to answer and analyse than open-ended 
questions. More information is gathered through open-ended questions because 
respondents are free to write their own thoughts and feelings. The responses will be 
examined carefully to generate the patterns and trends. Categories of different themes that 
emerge will be developed. Coding categories can be used to separate the material bearing 
on the subject from the data.   
Interviews are another method of gathering information in the surveys. A structured 
interview is the interview in which questions are predetermined by the investigator using 
the same questions in the same order as determined in the schedule of the interview 
(Kumar, 2005). An interview can be done through the phone or face-to-face. A phone 
interview is expensive. Interviews are good for gathering in-depth information on 
challenging issues. Interviews consume a lot of time and investigators may influence the 
response. A structured interview represents a quantitative approach. 
In this thesis, a quantitative approach was used for data collection because of the need to 
gather data from a large sample in a short time. Quasi experiment was used because of 
respondents were few due to their specific skills required which is user of computers, IT 
workers or managers.  The survey used to gather data was the cross-sectional survey 
because of time and financial constraints, and the need to compare the performance of 
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organisations participated in the study. Questionnaires were used with closed-ended 
questions to make data collection process quicker. The questionnaires were distributed 
personal by the researcher and were self-administered by the respondents. Also, a 
structured interview was used to gather data faster. The interview was conducted face-to-
face by the researcher because of financial constraint. 
3.3.2 Qualitative approach 
A qualitative approach is unstructured and allows flexibility in exploring the nature of a 
problem or phenomenon (Kumar, 2005). According to Kumar (2005) a qualitative 
approach has a smaller number of participants and can investigate their experiences, 
meanings and views of a problem under the investigation. Investigators interact with the 
participants in the study. “This means that qualitative researchers study things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln; 2000, p. 3).  
There are several types of qualitative approach found in the literature such as a case study, 
ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenological study, and action research (Creswell, 
1994; Tierney, 1996; Parry, 1998). The approach used in this thesis is based on case 
studies. Data collection in qualitative approaches is interviews, observations, documents 
and audio visual materials (Creswell, 1994). This approach is beneficial where an in-
depth understanding of a phenomenon is needed that means to answer the question in a 
bigger picture. In addition, qualitative methods provide the answer to why question and 
suitable for smaller population of respondents. 
 Interviews can be unstructured or semi-structured. Unstructured interviews allow 
flexibility in the questions. The questions are asked as more issues appear in the context 
of the interview. Semi-structured interviews have both predetermined questions and 
flexible questions that appear as more issues are uncovered.  
Observation is a way in which a researcher watches and listens to dealing or phenomenon 
as it happens. Participant observation is when an investigator, involved in the tasks of the 
group being monitored in a similar approach as its members (Kumar, 2005). Non-
participant observation is when an investigator, does not participate in the tasks of the 
group but remains an inactive witness, watching and listening to its tasks and making 
summarisation from this (Kumar, 2005). Observation can be recorded through narrative, 
scales, categorical recording or mechanically (Kumar, 2005). In this thesis, narrative will 
be used in recording the observations. According to Kumar (2005) narrative recording 
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involving “the researcher records a description of interaction in his/her own words” 
(p.121). Narrative is cheaper and simple to implement.  
“Documents are standardized artifacts, in so far as they typically occur in particular 
formats: as notes, case reports, contracts, drafts, death certificates, remarks, diaries, 
statistics, annual reports, certificates, judgements, letters or expert opinions” (Wolff, 2004, 
p.284). Creswell (1994) added newspapers, meetings’ minutes, and private journals or 
diary as documents for data collection. Audiovisual items for data collections are 
computer programs, still images, videotapes, movie and art materials (Creswell, 1994). 
3.3.3 Case studies approach 
A case study is “an attempt to understand a person, institution, etc from collected 
information” (Allen, 1991, p.173). Oxford Dictionaries defines a case study as “a process 
or record of research into the development of a particular person, group, or situation over 
a period of time” (OD, 2011). Case studies inspect a phenomenon in its natural setting; 
utilizing multiple approaches of data collection to collect information from one or a few 
sources; and there are no clear boundaries between phenomenon and circumstance (Yin, 
2003; Benbasat et al, 1987). In the literature case study approach has been used in 
answering “how” and “why” questions; or if researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour 
of participants in the study (Yin, 2003).  
There are several types of case studies found in the literature including intrinsic, 
exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, multiple-case studies, instrumental and collective 
(Yin, 2003; Stake, 1995). The unit of analysis in a case study could be an individual, a 
community, an organisation, a nation-state or a phenomenon (Yin, 2003; Stake, 1995). 
The unit of analysis in this thesis is non-profit organisations in a developing country. This 
thesis will cover exploratory case study. Exploratory case study aims to explore those 
situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes 
(Yin, 2003). The lack of research in information security in the context of Zanzibar 
rationalises a selection of exploratory case study for this thesis hence this is why this type 
of approach is most relevant. 
3.3.4 Interpretive research 
According to Klein and Myers (1999), the underpinning theory for interpretive research is 
that knowledge is expanded, or at least sieved, through societal creations such as speech, 
consciousness, and shared significances. As far as methodology is concerned, interpretive 
research does not initiate dependent or independent variables, does not embark to 
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examine hypotheses, but intends to generate an understanding of the social perspective of 
the phenomenon and the process whereby the phenomenon influences and is influenced 
by the social environment (Walsham, 1995b). In qualitative and interpretive case studies, 
the researcher is directly engaged in the process of data gathering and analysis (Creswell, 
1998; Klein and Myers, 1999; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Morse, 1994); however, in 
the latter, the investigator, through close contacts with the subjects, becomes a 
“passionate participant” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.115). It offers an opportunity to gain 
a great insight into the issue under investigation because “[a]n interpretive explanation 
documents the [participant’s] point of view and translates it into a form that is intelligible 
to readers” (Neuman, 1997, p. 72). Certainly, interpretive research allows the possibility 
of presenting the researcher’s own creations as well as those of all the participants (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994; Neuman; Walsham, 1995a). The ontological assumption of the 
interpretive researcher is that societal realism is locally and exclusively created (Guba 
and Lincoln; 1994) “by humans through their action and interaction” (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991, p. 14). According to Walsham (1993) the purpose of interpretive research 
in information systems is to provide an awareness of the context of the information 
system, and the process whereby the information system manipulates or is manipulated 
by the context.  
In this research, there was no examination of hypotheses, and any initiation of dependent 
or independent variables. The intention of the research is to understand cultural factors 
that impact the management of information security. Zanzibar has a population of people 
immigrated from different parts of the world, with different culture and ethnicity. The 
researcher was directly involved in the process of data collection and analysis. Also, the 
researcher was in close contact with the respondents. The researcher did develop the 
framework of information security culture with the help of the participants. This justifies 
the selection of the interpretive case study for this thesis. 
3.4 Data collection 
Data was collected through questionnaires, structured interviews, semi-structured 
interviews from members of organisations; through site observations and from 
organisational documents, and public documents.  There were two phases of data 
collection in this study. Phase I involved data collection for investigating the state of 
information security in Zanzibar. The Phase II of data collection investigated complex 
societal issues that impact information security governance in the context of Zanzibar. 
Questionnaires gathered quantitative data; interviews, document reviews and site 
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observations gathered qualitative data. The findings of Phase I determined the extension 
of the research to Phase II. Phase I of the research was conducted between the end of 
February and the middle of March 2011. Phase II of the research was conducted between 
the end of April and the end of June 2012. Participants were allowed five working days to 
complete the questionnaires. Interviews were conducted between 7.30am and 3.30pm 
which are the official working hours in Zanzibar public sector. All the questionnaires 
used in this research are found in Appendix A. Table 3.4.1 presents the summary of the 
research approaches and instruments used in the research based on the four research 
questions which are: 
RQ1. What are the existing information security strategies? 
RQ2. What is the current state of information security governance in non-profit 
organisations in the context of Zanzibar?  
RQ3. What are the cultural factors that impact upon information security governance in 
non-profit organisations in the context of Zanzibar? 
RQ4. How can non-profit organisations improve their information security governance? 
Table 3.4.1: Summary of the research approaches and instruments used 
Researc
h 
Questio
ns 
Research Approaches and Instruments 
Quantitati
ve 
Qualitati
ve 
Case 
Stud
y 
Surve
y 
Questionna
ire 
Intervie
w 
Docume
nt 
Phas
e 
R1  √     √ I 
R2 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ I 
R3 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ I, II 
R4 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ I, II 
 
The research question RQ1 was answered by implementing qualitative methods because 
it involved analysis of the literature on information security management and strategies. 
The research question RQ2 was answered by implementing both qualitative and 
quantitative methods because of the nature of the research question needed to be 
answered in a bigger picture from many respondents in a short time, access large 
collection of documents from different organisations. The same is true for the research 
question RQ3. But, in this case the answer involved finding cultural factors that 
influenced information security in the case study. The research question RQ4 depended 
on answers of research questions RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3.  
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3.4.1 Questionnaires for Phase I 
In Phase I there were four questionnaires with structured questions. Three of them were 
designed with close-ended questions based on ISO27002:2005 code of practice. In this 
research, we used ISO27002:2005 because it has used simple language and has been 
adopted in many countries. The questions were measured on a Likert-scale with five-
points whereby 1 represented “strongly disagree”, 3 represented “undecided” (neither 
agree nor disagree) and 5 represented “strongly agree”. We use Likert-scale in order to 
measure attitudes and feelings of the respondents about information security. 
ISO27002:2005 contains 133 technical and non-technical security controls. 
Questionnaires were distributed to management staff, IT staff and general staff who use 
computers. The questionnaires are available in Appendix A-C. The fourth questionnaire is 
designed to gather information on web security and was designed by consulting OWASP 
and ISO27002:2005 practices. OWASP practices were used because they have been 
successful in creating secure web applications especially regarding the minimising the 
security failures for online applications and they under open source license. This 
questionnaire had closed-ended questions with “Yes”, “No” and “Don’t Know” scales to 
get facts about web security in the organisations. The questionnaire was distributed to IT 
staff responsible for managing their organisation’s website. The questionnaire is available 
in Appendix D.  
3.4.2 Questionnaires for Phase II 
Phase II was designed in response to the outcome of results from Phase I. There were two 
questionnaires in this phase for gathering data on national culture dimensions and 
organisational culture dimensions. The questionnaire for gathering data on national 
culture dimensions adapted a questionnaire from the GLOBE study on societal culture 
dimension (Javidan et al, 2004). The GLOBE study has more cultural dimensions than all 
other studies and it was grounded by integration of implicit leadership theory, value/belief 
theory of culture, implicit motivation theory, and structural contingency theory of 
organisational form and effectiveness. The questionnaire was measured using a 7-point 
Likert scale. The respondents were asked to rank items from 1 (substantially agree) to 7 
(substantially disagree). In this research questionnaire is adapted from GLOBE study 
because they have more dimensions of culture compare to other studies. The second 
questionnaire was Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) adopted from 
Cameron and Quinn (1999). Both questionnaires had closed-ended questions. The 
questionnaire for national culture was analysed using frequencies as suggested by 
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Jamieson (2004). The questionnaire for organisational culture was analysed using method 
proposed by Cameron and Quinn (1999). In this research OCAI is used because many 
organisations used OCAI to measure their culture as mentioned in the literature review. 
The questionnaires are available in Appendix F-G. 
3.4.3 Interviews for Phase I 
There was one structured interview. The interview was structured to gather data on 
threats facing participating organisations. The interview was designed by consulting 
ISO/IEC 27005:2008 guide. This guide has used simple language, which makes it easy to 
follow. This interview targeted IT staff or IT managers. The interview was conducted 
face-to-face with the respondents. The interview contained a mix of closed-ended and 
open-ended questions. The interview last between two to three hours and was recorded in 
an interview guide. 
3.4.4 Interviews for Phase II 
There was a semi-structured interview to gather deep-rooted issues facing information 
security governance in participating organisations. The participants in this interview were 
IT staffs that have good knowledge of their organisations’ operations. The interview was 
conducted in face-to-face with the respondents. The interview contained open-ended 
questions. The interview took three hours and was recorded in a notebook. 
3.4.5 Published documents 
In this research, secondary data sources were used. Yin (2003) recommends the use of 
more than one data source. Triangulation is a method whereby more than one data source 
is used in a research. The secondary data sources that were used in this research were 
newspapers, public documents, employment contracts, policy documents, legal 
documents, newspapers and annual reports. The documents were identified by looking 
into items involving information security in their contents. 
3.4.6 Pilot study 
A pilot study is defined as a preliminary trial of some or all aspects of the instrument to 
ensure that there are no unanticipated difficulties (Alreck and Settle, 1995). In this study, 
the research instruments were pretested in the United Kingdom with four students from 
Zanzibar who are employees of the Zanzibar public sector. Some deficiencies were raised 
during the pilot study such as difficulty in understanding the questions in the cultural 
instrument and the time it took to fill the questionnaires. Also, some typographical issues 
were raised. 
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3.4.7 Case study organisations 
The case study was conducted on non-profit organisations. The researcher selected public 
sector organisations that have adopted information systems of a sufficiently high standard 
to be in a good position to provide relevant data on information security. Permission to 
conduct research in Zanzibar was granted by the Second Vice President’s Office in 
Zanzibar, which enabled access to the organisations that participated in the research. Each 
organisation introduced the researcher to their members who agreed to participate in the 
study. Ten organisations participated in Phase I and nine organisations participated in 
Phase II. The researcher visited each organisation and personally distributed the 
questionnaires to participants. During the visit, the researcher conducted interviews and 
site observations. Participants involved in the Phase I were selected based on their 
availability to participate in the study. Participants involved with cultural study were 
randomly selected using a random number generator (Graziano and Raulin; 2007). Table 
3.4.2 shows the employees who accepted to participate in the research. These employees 
were numbered from 1 to N where N was the total number of potential participants and 
using the random number generator by PS (2012) the participants whose number 
appeared were given questionnaires as shown in the table 3.4.4. Details of the participants 
were stored in the research database. Table 3.4.2, Table 3.4.3, Table 3.4.4 and Table 3.4.5 
presented the distribution of respondents involved in the study. 
The ten organisations involved in the investigations are Marine and Coastal 
Environmental Management Project (MACEMP), Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), 
Zanzibar Revenue Board (ZRB), Ministry of Health (MH), State University of Zanzibar 
(SUZA), Zanzibar Identity Office (ZIO), Zanzibar Social Security Fund (ZSSF), 
Table 3.4.2: Random Selection  
Participating 
Organisations 
Phase II - Willing Participants for 
Randomisation 
Questionnaire V Questionnaire VI 
POFEDP 8 8 
ZSSF 8 8 
ZRB 7 7 
MEVT 7 11 
MH 8 8 
ZEC 5 5 
ZIO 6 6 
RGO 5 7 
SUZA 8 9 
TOTAL 62 69 
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 Table 3.4.3: Number of respondents in the participating organisation in Phase I 
Participating 
Organisations  
 Phase I – Respondents Returned Questionnaires/Respondents Given Questionnaires 
Questionnaire I 
- Management 
Questionnaire 
II – IT Staff 
Questionnaire 
III – Computer 
User 
Questionnaire 
IV – Website 
Manager 
Interview – 
IT Manager 
POFEDP 3/3 5/5 6/7  1/1 
ZSSF 2/2 2/3 3/3 1/1 1/1 
ZRB 1/2 2/3 3/4 1/1 1/1 
MEVT 1/2 2/3 4/6 1/1 1/1 
MH 1/2 2/3 4/5 1/1 1/1 
ZEC 1/2 1/2 3/4 1/1 1/1 
ZIO 2/2 2/3 2/3  1/1 
MACEMP 1/1 2/3 3/5  1/1 
RGO 2/2 2/2 4/6  1/1 
SUZA 2/2 3/3 5/7 1/1 1/1 
TOTAL 16/20 23/30 37/50 6/6 10/10 
  
Table 3.4.4: Number of respondents in the participating organisations in Phase II 
Participating 
Organisations 
Phase II –Respondents Returned Questionnaires/Respondents Given 
Questionnaires 
Questionnaire V – 
National Culture 
Questionnaire VI – 
Organisational Culture 
Interview – Complex 
Societal Issues  
POFEDP 4/6 5/7 2/2 
ZSSF 6/6 6/7 2/2 
ZRB 4/5 4/6 2/2 
MEVT 4/6 8/10 2/2 
MH 5/7 5/7 2/2 
ZEC 4/4 3/4 1/1 
ZIO 5/5 5/5 2/2 
RGO 4/4 4/6 1/1 
SUZA 5/7 5/8 3/3 
TOTAL 41/50 45/60 17/17 
 
Table 3.4.5: Number of employees in the participating organisations 
Participating Organisations Number of Employees 
SUZA 250  
ZRB 170 
ZSSF 75 
MACEMP 160 
MH 3500 
MEVT 13,500 
ZEC 77 
ZIO 130 
POFEDP 752 
RGO 64 
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President Office Finance, Economics and Development Planning (POFEDP), Registrar 
General Office (RGO) and Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MEVT). The 
organisations were chosen base on availability of major information systems in their 
organisations. After Phase I, MACEMP had its activities terminated after a project that 
established it ended. The service provided by each organisation is described as follows: 
 MACEMP – a public organisation responsible for management of rural coastal 
population. It provides assistance on agricultural and fisheries issues to people 
living in the coastal area. 
 ZEC – a public organisation responsible for managing elections. It provides 
services that involve the registration of voters and administration of the voting 
process. 
 ZRB – a public organisation responsible for revenue collection. It provides 
services involving administration of taxes and tax payers. 
 MH – a government ministry responsible for management of health services. It 
provides administration of hospitals, health workers and patients. 
 SUZA – a publicly owned institution of higher education. 
 ZIO – a public organisation responsible for administration of registration of 
Zanzibaris and issuing of Zanzibari identity card. 
 ZSSF – a public organisation responsible for administration of pension funds. 
 POFEDP – a government ministry responsible for administration of public finance. 
 RGO – a public organisation responsible for registration of vital events, 
businesses, marriage/divorce, properties, and birth/death. It provides 
administration of inheritance and insolvency. In addition, it keeps registers and 
index books. 
 MEVT – a government ministry responsible for administration of education 
services. It manages schools, teachers and teacher training colleges. 
3.4.8 Analysis of data 
According to Yin (2003) analysing qualitative data is about examining, categorising, 
tabulating and recombining the empirical data to address the initial relationships as 
identified in the theoretical framework and to further identify new concepts and 
relationships. Case study generates a vast amount of data that require to be analysed with 
appropriate tools in order to be meaningful. The data collected in this research was 
analysed using SPSS software and interviews were manually analysed by the researcher 
or with the use of Excel software if needed. Documents such as newspapers, public 
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documents, employment contracts, policy documents, legal documents, and annual 
reports were manually analysed by the researcher. In this research, both deductive and 
inductive approaches are used in the analysis of data. Inductive approach is used when a 
researcher has a loose research question rather than a strict hypothesis. Deductive 
approach leads investigators to measure relative attainment of predetermined, clear and 
specific objectives. Inductive reasoning leads investigators to focus more on a program or 
a product impacts and consequences. In this research, deductive approach was applied 
when analysing quantitative data because the researcher has not hypothesis but research 
questions. The inductive approach was used in analysing qualitative data because the 
researcher focused on the impacts and consequences of culture in the governance of 
information security. In addition, Jamieson (2004) was consulted concerning the analysis 
of data. SPSS software was used to provide frequencies of responses for each question for 
questionnaires in Appendices A-D. The questionnaires in Appendices A-C were tested to 
find significant differences among organisations in their responses for each question 
using non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test provided by the SPSS software. Non-parametric 
test is used for a sample that has ranked order such as Likert-scale data.  
3.4.9 Research validity and reliability 
According to Yin (2003) the quality of case study research depends on the satisfaction of 
numerous criteria that have to be taken into account. These criteria are: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability. Construct validity is “the degree to 
which the theory or theories behind the research study provide(s) the best explanation for 
the results observed” (Graziano and Raulin; 2007, p. 181). In this study, multiple source 
of data collection were used which are questionnaires, interviews, documents and site 
investigations. The sources were moulded according to already known theories as 
explained in the previous sections. Also, several organisations were measured in the study. 
 Internal validity is concerned with cause-effect or causality relationship. Eisenhardt 
(1989) suggested that linking the emergent theoretical propositions to the existing 
literature enhances the internal validity of theory building from case study research as 
applied in this study. Also, this experiment was conducted in the field. “External validity 
refers to the degree to which researchers are able to generalise the results of a study to 
other participants, conditions, times, and places” (Graziano and Raulin; 2007, p. 182). In 
this study, a comparative study among organisations involved in the study during 
answering of the research question on the state of information security was performed. 
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Also, a comparative study was performed to compare the findings in this study and 
findings in the literature. 
Reliability is the extent in which measurements remain consistent when the experiment is 
repeated. Yin (2003) suggests the development of the case study designs and database to 
ensure reliability in the case study research. In this research, a case study design has been 
developed and employed. The research can be repeated in non-profit organisations in the 
developing countries because the experiment was conducted in a bigger picture where all 
the components derived from the case study were inserted into the picture to provide a 
solution to the main research problem.  
3.5 Reasons behind the choice of methodology 
In this project qualitative, quantitative and case study approaches are combined together 
to perform the research. The quantitative methods enabled to gather data from a large 
sample quickly. In the next stage information security was investigated through 
observation of users and their surroundings; and analysed documents. In that stage 
qualitative methods were deployed. This provides quality data even from a smaller 
sample. The case study approach enabled the researcher to gather data from a natural 
setting of the sample. 
In Phase I of this thesis, a cross-sectional survey was deployed. The cross-sectional 
survey enabled to compare the performance of each organisation in the study and at the 
same time avoided interference with the participants in the research. 
In this thesis, a quantitative approach was used for data collection because of the need to 
gather data from a large sample in a short time. Quasi experiment was used because of 
respondents were few due to their specific skills required which is user of computers, IT 
workers or managers.  The survey used to gather data was a cross-sectional survey 
because of the available resource to the researcher, and the need to compare the 
performance of organisations participated in the study. Questionnaires were used with 
closed-ended questions to make the data collection process quicker. The questionnaires 
were distributed personally by the researcher and were self-administered by the 
respondents. Also, a structured, face to face interview was used to gather data in an 
efficient way. 
In both phases of the project, a qualitative approach was used which suited the small 
sample size. It was used to study the participants’ experiences, meanings and views of the 
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problem under the investigation. This approach is beneficial where an in-depth 
understanding of a phenomenon is needed that means to answer the question in a bigger 
picture. In addition, qualitative methods provide the answer to the “why question” and are 
suitable for smaller population of respondents. Case studies were utilised as well as a 
methodology. This is because case studies inspect a phenomenon in its natural setting; 
utilizing multiple approaches of data collection to collect information from one or a few 
sources; and there are no clear boundaries between phenomenon and circumstance; they 
can be used in answering questions of “how” and “why”; or if an investigator cannot 
manipulate the behaviour of participants in the research (Yin, 2003). The unit of analysis 
in this thesis is non-profit organisations in a developing country because of scarcity of 
research in information security for this unit. This thesis will cover an exploratory case 
study. The lack of research in information security in the context of Zanzibar rationalises 
a selection of exploratory case study for this thesis hence this is why this type of approach 
is most relevant.  
In this thesis, there was no examination of hypotheses, and any initiation of dependent or 
independent variables. The intention of the investigator is to understand cultural factors 
that influence the management of information security. Zanzibar has a population of 
people immigrated from different parts of the world, with different culture and ethnicity. 
The researcher was directly involved in the process of data collection and analysis. Also, 
the researcher was in close contact with the respondents. The researcher did develop the 
framework of information security culture with the help of the participants. This justifies 
the selection of the interpretive case study for this thesis. 
In this thesis, the data was collected through questionnaires, structured interviews, semi-
structured interviews from members of organisations; through site observations and from 
organisational documents, and public documents. There were two phases of data 
collection in this study. Phase I involved data collection for answering the research 
question RQ2. The Phase II of data collection investigated the answer for the research 
question RQ3. Both phases were used in answering the research question RQ4. 
Questionnaires gathered quantitative data; interviews, document reviews and site 
observations gathered qualitative data. 
In this project, questionnaires were designed with structured questions and close-ended 
questions based on ISO27002:2005 code of practice, OWASP guidelines, OCAI guide, 
and GLOBE study. ISO27002:2005 was used because it has used simple language and 
has been adopted in many countries. OWASP practices were used because they have been 
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successful in creating secure web applications especially regarding the minimising the 
security failures for online applications. OCAI guide was used because it was used by 
many organisations to measure their culture. GLOBE study questionnaire was used 
because it has more dimensions of culture than other studies, and grounded by many 
theories. Some of the questionnaires were measured on a Likert-scale with five-points and 
seven-points to measure perception of the participants. The other questionnaires were 
measured using “Yes/No”, “Don’t Know”, “Now/Preferred” scales to get facts from the 
participants in the organisations.  
In this thesis, there were two interviews. There was a structured interview with both open 
and closed-ended questions. This is because the researcher wanted to get facts and 
opinions from respondents. The other interview was semi-structured with open-ended 
questions designed to measure opinions of the participants. The structured interview was 
based on ISO 27005:2008 guidelines. ISO27005:2008 was used because it has used 
simple language and has been adopted in many countries for risk assessment. The semi-
structure interview was used to capture deep-seated issues facing information security 
governance in Zanzibar. 
In this research, the participants in Phase I of the research were no selected randomly but 
based on their availability, skills and role. The participants of cultural study in Phase II of 
the study were selected randomly. This random selection helps to reduce biasness. In 
addition, the organisations that participated in the study were selected based on 
availability of information systems of significant high quality in their organisations.  
In this thesis, construct validity was ensured by using multiple sources of data gathering. 
The internal validity was guaranteed by employing a case study, and data collection was 
done in the field. Also, a comparative study was done among organisations in the case 
study. The external validity was ensured, by performing a comparative study of findings 
in this study and studies in the literature. The reliability of the study was guaranteed by 
the focus to a case study, which is a non-profit organisation in Zanzibar. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the research approach of this study. Starting from the 
philosophical approach of the researcher the explorative, interpretive case study 
approaches have been developed and used for this research project. Data was collected 
through quantitative and qualitative methods. Also, there was data from a secondary 
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source. Data gathering procedures ensured validity and reliability of the results. Finally, 
the reasons for the choice of the methodology have been presented. 
The next chapter, Chapter 4, presented the findings from Phase I of the research. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS (PHASE I) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected to investigate the state of 
information security in Zanzibar. Section 4.2 provides a detailed analysis of data 
collected to form a view of the state of information security in the public sector. The 
findings presented in Section 4.2 are derived from questionnaires; face to face interviews, 
documents review, and site observation (see Section 3.4). The research aims at improving 
information security management by identifying the current state of information security 
in the studied environment, and developing a framework for improving information 
security culture. The findings presented here provide the answer for the research question 
RQ2. Anonymity for study organisations in the publication of findings is very important. 
Consequently the organisations in the study will be referred to using pseudonyms (O1, 
O2, O3, O4, O5, O6, O7, O8, O9 and O10) where the information is sensitive.  
Phase I involved a comprehensive overview of the general state of information security in 
the public sector. Ten organisations were involved in the study from the Zanzibar public 
sector. The organisation selected for this research had better adoption of IT infrastructure 
than others. In this part, there were four structured questionnaires and one structured face 
to face interview. Three of the questionnaires were measured on 5-points Likert-scale, 
where 1 represents strongly disagree to 5 which represent strongly agree. The 
questionnaires I-IV and interview guide used in this research are found in Appendix A. 
The respondents were general staff who are computer users, management staff and IT 
staff. 20 questionnaires were distributed to management staff and 16 were returned and 
analysed. 30 questionnaires were distributed to IT staff and 23 were returned and used for 
analysis. Also, 50 questionnaires were distributed to computer users in which 37 were 
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returned and analysed (see Table 4.1.1). One of the questionnaires was used to gather data 
on website security and was designed using Yes/No type questions and targeted IT staff 
whose responsibility involves managing their organisation’s website. Six questionnaires 
were distributed to the respondents responsible for managing six websites that were 
operational at the time of conducting this study, and all six questionnaires were returned 
and analysed. The face to face structured interview involved ten IT staff. In addition, a 
document review and site observations were conducted to investigate information 
security practices. The document review included acts of the House of Representatives, 
law documents, policy documents, employee contracts, organisational documents, 
government’s annual reports and newspapers. This multitude of approaches used to 
collect primary data allowed a triangulation of data which increases the reliability and 
validity of research. The results are discussed in the section 4.2. 
Table 4.1.1: Questionnaire Distribution and Return 
Staff Type Questionnaires 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Returned  
% 
Management Staff 20 16 80 
IT Staff 30 23 77 
General  Staff (Computer 
Users) 
50 37 74 
 
4.2 Results of state of information security 
This section gives a detailed analysis of data collected to form a view of the state of 
information security in the non-profit organisations in the public sector. The analysis 
involved clauses on security policy, organisation of information security, asset 
management, human resources security, physical and environmental security; 
communications and operations management; access control, information systems 
acquisition, development and maintenance; information security incident management, 
business continuity management, and compliance as recommended by ISO/IEC 27002 
best practice. Also, other issues including website security, information assurance, 
security breaches and legal framework will be investigated. 
Using SPSS version 17, an analysis of variance was conducted using the non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test. This test will provide analysis of how the respondents from each 
organisation respond to each question. Here, the responses with significant different 
(p<0.05) will be reported. The higher the Mean Ranking (MR) means the respondents for 
that organisation tend toward agreeing with the statement. Also, the lower the MR means 
the respondents for that organisation tend toward disagreeing with the statement. 
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4.2.1 Information security policy 
 This section presents findings of the implementation of the organisations’ information 
security policy including perceptions of it by organisations’ members. The 
implementation of the information security policy and how organisations members 
perceived it provides essential data for understanding information security management 
practices in the organisations. Data sources for this section are questionnaires, informal 
discussions and documents review. Table 4.2.1.1 shows the results on this section. The 
results show that 56% of management staff agreed on the presence of information 
security policies in their organisations, but 84% of general staff were undecided or 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. There were significant differences on 
this statement among respondents in different organisations, where ZIO has the highest 
Mean Ranking while RGO has the lowest Mean Ranking. That was backed up by 69% of 
management staff who strongly disagreed or disagreed or were undecided that 
information security policies are communicated to employees, and 92% of general staff 
strongly disagreed or disagreed or were undecided that they read the policy. There were 
significant differences on this statement among respondents in different organisations 
where POFEDP has the highest Mean Ranking while RGO has the lowest Mean Ranking. 
In addition, 56% of management and 38% general staff acknowledged that the policies 
are not reviewed periodically. 
Table 4.2.1.1: Information security policy (Questionnaires I-III in Appendix A) 
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%
 Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  p<0.05 
and their mean 
rank (MR) 
There is an information security 
policy for the organisation. 
Management 
staff  (16) 
6.3 25.0 12.5 31.3 25.0 - 
There is an information security 
policy in place. 
General staff 
(37) 
16.2 16.2 51.4 13.5 2.7 p =0.003, MRmin = 5.0 
(RGO), MRmax = 35.5 
(ZIO) 
I have read the Information 
security policy. 
General staff 
(37) 
35.1 32.4 24.3 8.1  p =0.008, MRmin = 7.0 
(RGO), MRmax = 31.0 
(POFEDP) 
Information security policy is 
conveyed to all the employees. 
Management 
staff (16) 
12.5 43.8 12.5 25.0 6.3 - 
Information security policy is 
periodically reviewed. 
Management 
staff (16) 
31.3 25.0 12.5 31.3  - 
Information security policy is 
periodically reviewed. 
General staff 
(37) 
18.9 18.9 54.1 5.4 2.7 - 
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It was observed that many policies are not documented properly. At present, a main 
method of delivering the policy to employees is through a letter that is circulated in an 
organisation. Employees who could not have access to the letter may lack awareness on 
the existence of the policy. The letter is then filed and stored in a document room out of 
reach of general staff. In a notable example, the information security policy document for 
organisation O8 has been marked with the word “Confidential” in its front page. This 
policy was developed by a contractor who supplied software to the organisation O8.  
4.2.2 Organisation of information security 
This section presents findings of organisation of information security clauses including 
perceptions of it by an organisation’s members. The organisation of information security 
provides important data for understanding information security management practices in 
the organisation. Data sources for this section are questionnaires, informal discussion and 
documents review. 
The results in this section are shown in the Table 4.2.2.1. The results show that the 
majority of the organisations in the study do not have departments that coordinate 
information security. Organisation of information security is left to IT technicians to 
manage. The majority of organisations do not have a specific budget for an information 
security program and are not capable of implementing an awareness program as 56% of 
respondents disagreed or were undecided that there is a budget for information security 
program in their organisations, and 63% disagreed or were undecided to the statement 
that their organisations are capable of implementing information security awareness 
program. The researcher learned through informal discussion with some respondents that 
the budget for information security is integrated into the ICT budget by their 
organisations. In the study environment, there are organisations that have not defined and 
documented information security roles for their employees as 50% of respondents 
disagreed or were undecided on the statement that their organisations defined and 
documented information security roles. In addition, 50% of respondents feel that 
organisations in the study have no confidential or non-disclosure agreement and 68% of 
the respondents feel that they have not signed them. Also, 69% of the respondents in the 
study feel that their organisations do not conduct security reviews but have procedures in 
place to contact the authority. The analysis shows that there were no significant 
differences among the organisations in this clause. 
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Table 4.2.2.1 - Organisation of Information Security (Questionnaires I-III) 
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There is an information security committee in 
place. 
Management staff  
(16) 
25 37.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
There is a budget for information security 
program. 
Management staff  
(16) 
31.3 12.5 12.5 37.5 6.3 
The organisation is capable of implements 
information security awareness program. 
Management staff  
(16) 
6.3 37.5 18.8 18.8 18.8 
The organisation defined and documented all 
information security roles. 
Management staff 
(16) 
6.3 18.8 25.0 43.8 6.3 
There is some confidentiality or non-disclosure 
agreement for protection of information asset. 
Management staff 
(16) 
6.3 31.3 12.5 31.3 18.8 
I have signed confidentiality or non-disclosure 
agreement for protection of organisation's 
information assets. 
General staff (37) 24.3 37.8 5.4 29.7 2.7 
There is some procedure in place that specifies 
how to contact authority (e.g police) 
Management staff 
(16) 
 18.8 18.8 43.8 18.8 
The organisation conducts independent 
information security review.  
Management staff 
(16) 
6.3 43.8 18.8 25.0 6.3 
 
Table 4.2.3.1: Asset Management (Questionnaires I-III)  
 Figure 4.2.3.1: Sharing of 
Computer (Interview I)    
 
4.2.3 Asset Management 
This section presents findings of management of assets including perceptions of it by an 
organisation’s members. The management of assets provides important data for 
understanding information security management practices in the organisations. Data 
sources for this section are questionnaires, site observations and informal discussion. 
Assets belonging to the organisations in the study include but are not limited to financial 
assets such as pension funds, payroll, custom duties and taxes; equipment, furniture, 
firearms; educational assets such examination records, and educational certificate; and 
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%
 
There is an 
inventory of 
assets. 
Management 
staff  (16) 
 12.5  43.8 43.8 
The inventory of 
assets includes 
software assets. 
Management 
staff  (16) 
 18.8 18.8 37.5 25 
There is 
information 
classification in 
the organisation. 
Management 
staff  (16) 
6.3 6.3 6.3 56.3 25 
Yes 
50% 
No 
50% 
Have you ever allowed your 
organisation's computer to be 
used by your relative?       
Respondents = 10 IT Staff    
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information assets such as birth and death records, health records and employees records. 
This clause was in place before the introduction of ICT in the study environment. The 
result shows that many controls are in place as shown in the Table 4.2.3.1. The Table 
4.2.3.1 shows that there is 37% of respondents who have not included software as among 
the assets, and 19% of the respondents have not classified their organisations’ information. 
Observational data revealed that computers and other equipment have labels for 
identifying their ownership. The researcher observed that there were a number of  
   
Table 4.2.4.1: Human resources security (Questionnaires I-III) 
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 Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  
p<0.05 and 
their mean 
rank (MR) 
There is a periodically 
awareness and training 
program in information 
security. 
Management 
staff  (16) 
18.8 37.5 6.3 18.8 18.8 - 
There is a periodically 
awareness and training 
program in information 
security. 
General staff 
(37) 
13.5 40.5 35.1 8.1 2.7 - 
I receive information 
security awareness training 
regularly.  
 
General staff 
(37) 
29.7 56.8 2.7 5.4 5.4 - 
There are qualified network 
and system administrators.  
 
IT Staff (23)  30.4 8.7 47.8 13.0 - 
There is a disciplinary action 
against the non-compliant 
employee. 
Management 
staff (16) 
6.3 12.5 18.8 43.8 18.8 - 
There is a disciplinary action 
against the non-compliant 
employee. 
General Staff 
(37) 
5.4 8.1 18.9 45.9 21.6 - 
There is a background 
verification check for 
candidates of employment 
and third party. 
Management 
Staff (16) 
 25.0 18.8 31.3 25 - 
My background has been 
verified. 
General Staff 
(37) 
8.1 10.8 40.5 29.7 10.8 - 
Terms and conditions of 
employment include an item 
about information security.  
 
Management 
Staff (16) 
 12.5 31.3 37.5 18.8 - 
I agreed and signed terms 
and conditions of 
employment that includes 
responsibilities for 
information security 
General Staff 
(37) 
21.6 27.0 8.1 35.1 8.1 p =0.038, MRmin = 
10.5 (MACEMP), 
MRmax = 32.0 (ZIO) 
I was provided with 
information security 
expectation of my position. 
General Staff 
(37) 
18.9 35.1 24.3 13.5 8.1 p =0.004, MRmin = 
6.5 (RGO), MRmax = 
34.0 (ZIO) 
Security roles and 
responsibilities are defined, 
documented, and conveyed 
to would be employees. 
Management 
Staff (16) 
6.3 18.8 18.8 50.0 6.3 - 
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instances where employees who have not been assigned computers used them with the 
permission of fellow users and using users’ accounts. Also, the interview data show that 
some employees   would allow their relatives access to organisations’ computers as 
shown in the Figure 4.2.3.1. 
4.2.4 Human resources security  
This section presents findings of human resources security including perceptions of it by 
an organisation’s members. The security of human resources provides important data for 
understanding information security management practices in the organisation. Data 
sources for this section are questionnaires, face to face interviews, and document review. 
The results in this section are shown in the Table 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4.2. The results show 
that many respondents feel that their organisations do not provide information security 
training and awareness regularly. Also, many of the respondents have not received 
training and awareness in information security on a regular basis. Table 4.2.4.2 shows the 
qualifications of IT staff in the case study. The case study lacks qualified professional 
information security personnel.  
The results show that many respondents agreed that there is disciplinary action against 
non-compliance. The statute (Zanzibar, Public Service Act 2010) stipulates that a breach 
of public service and professional code of conduct will trigger disciplinary proceedings. 
The act defines the public service code of conduct to include the preservation of 
confidentiality about official dealings, conflict of interest, use of inside information and 
compliance with the law. The Act was introduced in Zanzibar to comply with 
Table 4.2.4.2: IT Staff Qualifications – (Interview I) 
Organisati
on 
Diploma/Advan
ce Diploma 
IT/Computing 
BSc 
IT/Computi
ng 
Post-
Graduat
e 
Diplom
a 
MSc 
IT/Computi
ng 
CISSP/SSCP/CISM/Ot
her security 
professional 
certification 
POFEDP 0 3 3 3 0 
RGO 2 1 0 0 0 
MEVT 2 6 1 1 0 
MACEMP 2 1 0 0 0 
ZEC 2 2 1 0 0 
ZRB 0 3 0 2 0 
MH 2 1 0 0 0 
SUZA 2 4 0 1 0 
ZIO 5 1 0 0 0 
ZSSF 1 2 2 0 0 
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requirements of adoption of the multi-party democratic system. The Act does not 
specifically include terms and condition of employment that reflect information security. 
Also, the Act does not include how to deal with third party and contractors accessing 
public organisations. Furthermore, the Act does not stipulate how to administer public 
sector’s equipment that is handed to employees.  In addition, the researcher noted that the 
contracts signed by public sector employees do not specifically include terms and 
conditions of employment that include information security although they include 
compliance to Zanzibar laws as one of its terms. 
The results show that backgrounds of many employees are not checked  as 59% of the 
respondents disagreed or were undecided that their background were checked although 
56%  of management respondents agreed that there are background checks for employees. 
Furthermore, 57% of management respondents agreed that terms and conditions of 
employments include an item about information security. In addition, 57% of general 
staff respondents have not signed terms and conditions of employment that include 
responsibilities for information security. There were significant differences among 
organisations in the study about employees signing the terms and conditions of 
employment that include information security. ZIO has the maximum mean ranking of 32 
while MACEMP has the minimum mean ranking of 10.5. 
The results show that 56% of management respondents agreed that security roles are 
defined, documented, and communicated to employees. In addition, 78% of general staff 
respondents disagreed or were undecided that they were provided the information security 
expectation of their position. In this case, there are significant differences among 
organisations in the study, where ZIO has maximum mean ranking of 34 while RGO has 
minimum mean ranking of 6.5. 
4.2.5 Physical and environmental security 
This section presents findings of physical and environmental security including 
perceptions of it by an organisation’s members. The security of building and its 
environment provides important data for understanding information security management 
practices in the organisations. Data sources for this section are questionnaires, face to face 
interviews, and site observation. 
Table 4.2.5.1 shows the results in this section. The results show that the majority of the 
controls in this clause have been implemented. 41% of the respondents disagreed on 
wearing their identity cards all the time in their workplaces. There is a significant  
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Table 4.2.5.1: Physical and environmental security (Questionnaires I-III) 
Statement Typ
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Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  p<0.05 
and their mean rank 
(MR) 
I wear employee identity card 
all the time inside the 
organisation's building 
General Staff 
(37) 
13.5 27.0  18.9 40.5 p =0.003, MRmin = 
8.63 (MH), MRmax = 
30.0 (ZRB, ZEC, ZIO) 
Access to my office is through 
a door that has a lock.  
General Staff 
(37) 
5.4 2.7 5.4 40.5 45.9 - 
There is a guideline on 
removal of equipment, 
information and software 
IT Staff (23) 13.0 26.1 4.3 52.2 4.3 - 
There is a guideline on ICT 
equipment disposal or re-use.  
Management 
staff (16) 
 12.5 12.5 56.3 18.8 - 
There is organisation’s 
guideline on working off-site 
premises with organisation’s 
equipment. 
Management 
staff (16) 
 18.8 50.0 25.0 6.3 - 
There is an emergency 
generator. 
Management 
Staff (16) 
   18.8 81.3 - 
There is a security perimeter 
to protect area that contains 
information and information 
processing facilities. 
Management 
Staff (16) 
6.3 25.0 12.5 37.5 18.8 - 
 
difference among organisations on this statement with ZRB, ZEC and ZIO has the highest 
Mean Rankings of 30 while MH has the lowest Mean Ranking of 8.6. Also, 69% 
respondents were undecided or disagreed on availability of guidelines for working on off-
site premises. Table 4.2.5.1 show the results on this clause. In addition, as already 
mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the researcher noted that some of the respondents had given 
access to organisations’ computers to their relatives.  
The researcher observed that some organisations in the study environment have 
reinforced their security by introducing armed security guards, closed-circuit television 
and electronic locks. In some of the organisations customers can only talk to employees 
through glass barriers. The researcher observed that computers were not physically 
locked in all organisations in the study environment. Although there were emergency 
generators in all organisations in the study, there is a frequent shortage of fuel in Zanzibar. 
The researcher observed that some of the organisations in the study do not keep records 
of visitors or serious in recording the visitors in their organisations. In one of the 
organisations visitors are screened through a metal detector. In addition, the researcher 
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observed that security personnel are not checking the validity of visitor’s identity in the 
study environment. 
4.2.6 Communications and operations management 
This section presents findings of communications and operations management including 
perceptions of it by an organisation’s members. The communications and operations 
management provide critical data for understanding information security management 
practices in the organisations. Data sources for this section are questionnaires, site 
observations and face to face interviews. 
The results show that many controls in this section were not implemented (refer to Table 
4.2.6.1). These controls are technical in nature. 78% of the respondents disagreed or were 
undecided that there are guidelines for acceptance of new information systems. Also, 
83% of the respondents disagreed or were undecided that there is a separation of 
development, test, and operational facilities in their organisations. 87% of the respondents 
disagreed or were undecided that their organisations have policies for protecting 
electronic messages. Also, 73% of the respondents disagreed or were undecided that their 
organisations have rules for usage of email and access of internet. There is a significant 
difference among organisation on this issue where MH has the lowest Mean Ranking of 
8.5 and POFEDP has the highest Mean Ranking of 31.8. Furthermore, 83% of the 
respondents disagreed or were undecided that their organisations have guidelines for 
network operations and 65% of the respondents disagreed that there are guidelines to 
keep audit logs recording user activities, exceptions, and information security events. In 
addition, 61% of the respondents disagreed that their organisations identify and document 
security features, service levels, and management requirements of all network service. 
75% of the respondents agreed that their organisations have backup policy for 
information and software.  However, 57% of the respondents disagreed or were 
undecided that they had only one role in their employment. There is a significant 
difference among organisations on this statement where MEVT has the lowest Mean 
Ranking of 10.9 while ZRB has the highest Mean Ranking of 28.5. 78% of the 
respondents feel that their organisations lack guidelines on removable media. 
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Table 4.2.6.1: Communications and operations management (Questionnaires I-III) 
Statement Typ
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 Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  
p<0.05 and their 
mean rank (MR) 
There is a guideline for 
acceptance of new 
information systems. 
IT Staff (23) 8.7 47.8 21.7 8.7 13.0 - 
There is a policy to protect 
electronic messaging. 
IT Staff (23) 39.1 43.5 4.3 13.0  - 
There is a separation of 
development, test, and 
operational facilities. 
IT Staff (23) 17.4 52.2 13.0 8.7 8.7 - 
There is a policy for 
prohibiting use of 
unauthorised software 
IT Staff (23) 17.4 60.9  8.7 13.0 - 
There is a network 
operational guideline. 
IT Staff (23) 21.7 39.1 21.7 17.4  - 
There is a backup policy for 
information and software 
IT Staff (23)  12.5 12.5 56.3 18.8 - 
The security features, service 
levels, and management 
requirements of all network 
services have been identified 
and documented. 
IT Staff (23) 26.1 34.8 8.7 26.1 4.3 - 
There are rules for using 
electronic mail and Internet. 
General Staff 
(37) 
24.3 27.0 21.6 16.2 10.8 p =0.013, MRmin = 8.5 
(MH), MRmax = 31.8 
(POFEDP) 
I have only one role in my 
employment. 
General Staff 
(37) 
8.1 40.5 8.1 37.8 5.4 p =0.035, MRmin = 
10.9 (MEVT), MRmax = 
28.5 (ZRB) 
System administrator and 
system operator activities are 
logged.  
 
IT Staff (23) 4.3 21.7 13.0 39.1 21.7 - 
There is a guideline to keep 
audit logs recording user 
activities, exceptions, and 
information security events.  
 
IT Staff (23) 26.1 39.1 8.7 4.3 21.7 - 
There is a removable media 
guideline. 
IT Staff (23) 34.8 43.5  17.4 4.3 - 
  
4.2.7 Access control  
This section presents findings of access control including perceptions of it by 
organisations’ members. The access management provides important data for 
understanding information security management practices in the organisations. Data 
sources for this section are questionnaires and face to face interviews. Table 4.2.7.1 and 
Figure 4.2.7.1 show the results. The results show that 56% of management staff’s 
respondents agreed the presence of access control policies in their organisation. However, 
57% of IT staff’s respondents disagreed with the same statement. 70% of the respondents 
disagreed or were undecided that access rights are reviewed, and 70% of the respondents 
disagreed or were undecided that routing implementation is used to enforce the access  
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Table 4.2.7.1 – Access Control (Questionnaires I-III) 
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 Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  
p<0.05 and their 
mean rank (MR) 
There is an access control 
policy. 
Management 
Staff (16) 
 18.8 25.0 50.0 6.3 - 
There is an access control 
policy. 
IT Staff (23) 26.1 30.4  34.8 8.7 - 
There is routing 
implementation to enforce 
access control policy. 
IT Staff (23) 13.0 39.1 17.4 26.1 4.3 - 
There is a review of user 
access rights periodically.  
 
IT Staff (23) 13.0 34.8 21.7 26.1 4.3 - 
There is a system to 
manage passwords. 
IT Staff (23) 17.4 39.1 4.3 30.4 8.7 - 
There is a user password 
guideline. 
IT Staff (23) 13.0 52.2 4.3 17.4 13.0 - 
There is a clear desk and 
clear screen policy.  
IT Staff (23) 56.5 17.4 17.4 4.3 4.3 - 
I have read clear desk and 
clear screen policy. 
General Staff 
(37) 
43.2 24.3 21.6 10.8  p =0.012, MRmin = 8.5 
(MACEMP), MRmax = 
35.5 (ZIO) 
I use a screen saver that is 
password protected.  
General Staff 
(37) 
13.5 13.5 10.8 37.8 24.3 - 
My password contains 
alphabets and numbers 
characters.  
 
General Staff 
(37) 
8.1 8.1 10.8 37.8 35.1 - 
I am the only person who 
knows my password for 
access to organisation's 
information system. 
General Staff 
(37) 
13.5 13.5 13.5 24.3 35.1 - 
There is a policy for use of 
network services.  
IT Staff (23) 47.8 17.4 17.4 13.0 4.3 p =0.028, MRmin = 6.0 
(MACEMP, ZRB, MH), 
MRmax = 22.0 (ZIO) 
There is a guideline for 
system utilities usage 
IT Staff (23) 26.1 34.8 26.1 8.7 4.3 - 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.7.1: Sharing of Password (Interview I) 
 
 
Yes 
40% 
No 
60% 
Do you share your password of any system with 
someone else?       Respondents = 10 IT Staff    
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control policy. Also, 70% of the respondents disagreed or were undecided that their 
organisations have guidelines for user passwords and 61% of the respondents disagreed 
or were undecided that there is a system to manage passwords in their organisations. 
Moreover, 91% of the respondents disagreed or were undecided that their organisations 
have policies for clear screen and clear desk. In addition, 89% respondents have not read 
existing policies and there is a significant difference among organisations on this 
statement. ZIO has the highest Mean Ranking of 35.5 while MACEMP has the lowest 
Mean Ranking of 8.5. The results show that 62% of the respondents have awareness on 
usage of screensaver passwords, and 73% of the respondents create passwords that have 
combination of alphabets and numbers characters. Also, 40% of the respondents share 
their passwords with other employees. Moreover, 83% of the respondents disagreed or 
were undecided that their organisations have policies for use of network services and 87% 
of the respondents disagreed or were undecided that their organisations have guidelines 
for usage of system utilities. There are significant differences among organisations on the 
existence of policies for use of network services as p=0.028. ZIO has the highest Mean 
Ranking of 22.0 and MACEMP and ZRB have lowest mean ranking of 6.0. 
4.2.8 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance 
This section presents findings of information systems acquisition, development and 
maintenance clause including perceptions of it by an organisation’s members. This clause 
provides important data for understanding information security management practices in 
the organisations. Data sources for this section are questionnaires. 
The results for this section are shown in the Table 4.2.8.1. The results show that 94% of 
the respondents disagreed or were undecided that their organisations have policies for the 
use of cryptographic controls. Also, 57% of the respondents disagreed that they use 
encryption when sending sensitive information. This is true for both IT and general staff. 
There are significant differences among organisations on the use of encryption when 
sending sensitive information by general staff. In this statement ZIO has the highest Mean 
Ranking of 35 and MACEMP and RGO have the lowest Mean Ranking of 7. In addition, 
61% of the respondents disagreed that their organisations have procedures for managing 
software installation on running systems. 65% of the respondents disagreed that their 
organisations conduct security risk assessment for message integrity. Also, 61% of 
respondents disagreed that their organisations carry out technical vulnerability 
assessments periodically. 58% of the respondents agreed that data output from their 
organisation’s information systems are validated. There is a significant difference 
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Table 4.2.8.1 – Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance (Questionnaires 
I-III) 
Statement Typ
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%
 Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  
p<0.05 and their 
mean rank (MR) 
There is a policy on 
the use of 
cryptographic control.  
 
Management 
Staff (16) 
31.3 25.0 37.5 6.3  - 
I use encryption when 
sending sensitive 
information. 
General Staff 
(37) 
35.1 18.9 29.7 10.8 5.4 p =0.002, MRmin = 7.0 
(MACEMP, ZRB), MRmax 
= 35.0 (ZIO) 
Encryption is used to 
protect sensitive 
information assets.  
 
IT Staff (23) 26.1 30.4  34.8 8.7 - 
There are procedures 
for managing 
software installation 
on running systems. 
IT Staff (23) 13.0 47.8 4.3 30.4 4.3 p =0.019, MRmin = 5.5  
(MEVT), MRmax = 21.0 
(ZIO) 
Security risk 
assessment is applied 
to ensure message 
integrity.  
 
IT Staff (23) 30.4 34.8 4.3 17.4 13.0 - 
Periodical technical 
vulnerabilities 
assessment is carried 
out and actions are 
taken to address any 
found. 
IT Staff (23) 21.7 39.1  30.4 8.7 - 
Data input to 
organisation's 
information systems 
were validated. 
IT Staff (23) 13.0  21.7 47.8 17.4 - 
There is a validation 
of data output from 
organisation's 
information systems 
IT Staff (23) 13.0 8.7 30.4 34.8 13.0 p =0.028, MRmin = 2.83 
(SUZA), MRmax = 22.0 
(ZEC) 
 
 
among organisations regarding validation of the output data. 
4.2.9 Information security incident management 
This section presents findings of management of information security incidents including 
perceptions of it by an organisation’s members. The management of information security 
incidents provides important data for understanding information security management 
practices in the organisations. Data sources for this section are questionnaires and face to 
face interviews. 
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Table 4.2.9.1 – Iinformation security incidents management (Questionnaires I-III) 
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 Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  
p<0.05 and their 
mean rank (MR) 
There is reporting 
mechanism for 
information 
security incidents 
IT Staff (23) 8.7 26.1 8.7 26.1 30.4 p =0.025, MRmin = 5.5 
(MACEMP, MEVT), 
MRmax = 20.0 (ZIO) 
There is a reporting 
mechanism for 
information 
security incidents.  
 
Management 
Staff (16) 
 6.3 12.5 56.3 25.0 - 
I know where to 
report information 
security incidents 
General Staff 
(37) 
16.2 5.4 13.5 45.9 18.9 - 
There is a guideline 
for quantifying and 
monitoring 
information 
security incidents. 
IT Staff (23) 39.1 34.8  4.3 21.7 - 
 
 
 Table 4.2.10.1 –Business Continuity Management (Questionnaires I-III) 
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There is a business continuity 
plan in the event of a 
disaster.  
Management 
Staff (16) 
 31.3 18.8 50.0  
I am aware of organisation’s 
business continuity plans 
General Staff (37) 29.7 27.0 29.7 13.5  
Business continuity plans 
include information security 
Management 
Staff (16) 
 25.0 37.5 37.5  
Business continuity plans are 
tested in a regular basis 
IT Staff (23) 43.5 30.4 17.4 4.3 4.3 
  
The results are shown in Table 4.2.9.1 and Table 4.2.13.1. 81% of the management 
respondents feel that their organisations have reporting systems for information security 
incidents. Although 44% of IT staff respondents disagreed or were undecided about the 
existence of this system. There is a significant difference among organisations on 
availability of reporting mechanism from IT staff respondents. Also, 65% of general staff 
are aware of where to report information security incidents. However, 74% of the 
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respondents disagreed that their organisations have guidelines on quantifying and monitor 
information security incidents. 
4.2.10 Business continuity management 
This section presents findings of management of business continuity including 
perceptions of it by an organisation’s members. The administration of business continuity 
provides important data for understanding information security management practices in 
the organisations. Data sources for this section are questionnaires. 
The results are shown in Table 4.2.10.1. 50% of the management respondents agreed that 
their organisations have business continuity plans in the event of a disaster. However, 
86% of general staff respondents disagreed or were undecided that they are aware of the 
plans. Also, 63% of respondents disagreed or were undecided that the plans include 
information security and 74% of the respondents disagreed that the plans are tested in a 
regular basis. 
4.2.11 Compliance 
This section presents findings of compliance clause including perceptions of it by 
organisations’ members. The clause provides important data for understanding 
information security management practices in the organisations. Data sources for this 
section are questionnaires and interviews. 
The results are shown in Table 4.2.11.1. 50% of the management respondents agreed that 
their organisations have guidelines on intellectual property rights. Also, 95% of the 
respondents among general staff disagreed or were undecided that they are aware of 
existence of policies on intellectual property rights. In addition, 75% of respondents 
among management staff feel that their organisations have guidelines on data protection 
and privacy of personal information. But, 73% of respondents among general staff 
disagreed or were undecided that their organisations have policies on data protection and 
privacy. Furthermore, 74% of the respondents disagreed that their organisations have 
regular checks on technical compliance, and 70% of the respondents disagreed that there 
is a guideline on information systems audit. There is a significant difference among 
organisations concerning availability of data protection and privacy policy in their 
organisations. Also, there is a significant difference among organisations on availability 
of guideline on information systems audit. 
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  Table 4.2.11.1 – Compliance (Questionnaires I-III) 
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 Organisation 
responsible for 
probability  
p<0.05 and their 
mean rank (MR) 
There is a guideline to 
ensure intellectual 
properties rights. 
Management 
Staff (16) 
6.3 6.3 37.5 31.3 18.8 - 
I am aware of 
organisation’s intellectual 
property policy. 
General Staff (37) 21.6 29.7 43.2  5.4 - 
There is a guideline to 
ensure data protection and 
privacy of personal 
information. 
Management 
Staff (16) 
 12.5 12.5 50.0 25.0 - 
There is an organisation’s 
data protection and 
privacy policy 
General Staff (37) 29.7 13.5 29.7 16.2 10.8 p =0.001, MRmin = 8.6 
(MACEMP,ZRB), 
MRmax = 31.56 
(POFEDP) 
There is a regular check on 
technical compliance. 
IT Staff (23) 43.5 30.4 8.7 17.4  - 
There is a guideline for 
information systems audit. 
IT Staff (23) 26.1 43.5  30.4  p =0.036, MRmin = 3.5 
(MEVT), MRmax = 20.0 
(ZEC, ZIO) 
 
   Table 4.2.12.1: Website Security (Questionnaires IV)       
STATEMENT YES  NO  DON’T  
Does the organisation host the website in-house? 4 2 0 
Is there the organisation’s guideline for displaying user data in the website? 1 5 0 
Does the organisation has guidelines on web application that involves in data 
collection or transmission? 
2 4 0 
Does the organisation implement the current Open Web Application Security 
Project guidelines to protect her website? 
0 4 2 
Does the organisation in compliance with any web application security standard? 1 3 2 
Do you test your web application for security vulnerabilities? 1 3 2 
Is there any periodic training in secure coding to organisation’s developers? 0 6 0 
6 Respondents 
 
4.2.12 Website security 
This section presents findings of website security. Data sources for this section are 
questionnaires and informal discussion. 
The results are shown in the Table 4.2.12.1. The results show that the majority of studied 
websites are hosted in-house. Most of the organisations in the study do not have 
guidelines on displaying user data in their website. Also, the organisations lack guidelines 
on website that involves in data collection or transmission. Furthermore, organisations do 
not currently implement guidelines from OWASP to protect their website. And many of 
the organisations are not in compliance with any web application security standard. In 
addition, websites in the study are not tested for security vulnerabilities. Also, 
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organisations in the study environment are not providing training in secure coding to their 
developers in a regular basis. Some respondents commented that their websites depend on 
security features provided by content management systems they use. According to Kaaya 
(2004) the websites in the study fall into two categories which are advanced and 
intermediate level of e-Government. 
4.2.13 Security breaches 
This section presents findings of security breaches that occurred in the study environment. 
This section provides essential data for understanding the type of threats facing the 
organisations in the study. Data sources for this section are interview guide I and informal 
discussion. 
The results are shown in the Table 4.2.13.1. This table shows that a large majority of the 
organisations in the study have suffered a virus attack. Also, there were few organisations 
that reported theft of IT equipment. Furthermore, a website belonging to ZEC was 
defaced during the 2010 elections. The researcher was informed through informal 
discussions that the virus problem was due to lack of funds for procurement of anti-virus 
software. Table 4.2.13.2 shows the IT usage in the study environment. The results show 
that IT usage in the study environment varies depending organisation services. 
4.2.14 Information assurance  
This section presents findings of information assurance that have been implemented in 
the study environment. This section provides important data for understanding the type of 
countermeasure that are offered by the organisations in the study. Data sources for this 
section are interviews and site observations. Table 4.2.13.1 shows the existing measures 
implemented in the study environment. The results show that almost all the organisations 
in the study implemented anti-virus and firewall software. ZIO and ZEC have 
implemented biometric authentication and encrypted their data. POFEDP has 
implemented virtual private network (VPN). ZIO and POFEDP have implemented access 
control card and Personal Identification Numbers (PINs). Also, MH has encrypted its 
wireless local area network. Unfortunately, there is no organisation that has implemented 
intrusion detection system or intrusion protection system. 
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Table 4.2.13.1: Assurance and Breaches (Interview Guide I) 
Organisation Information Systems Assurance Technology Breaches 
SUZA Student Information System, Human 
Resource System, Payroll, Website 
Firewall, Anti-virus Virus, theft 
ZRB Value Added Tax System, Central Motor 
Vehicles Registration System, 
Integrated Tax Administration System 
Firewall, Anti-virus  
ZSSF Fund Management Information System, 
Human Resource  System 
Firewall, Anti-virus Virus 
MACEMP Marine Biodiversity Information System Firewall, anti-virus Virus 
MH District Health Management 
Information System, Integrated Human 
Resource System 
Firewall, anti-virus, encrypted WLAN Virus, theft 
MEVT Education Management information 
System, Human Resource System 
Firewall, anti-virus Virus 
ZEC Voter Registration System Firewall, anti-virus, data encryption, 
biometric aunthentication, Armed Guards 
Website 
defacement 
ZIO Zanzibar ID Registration System Firewall, anti-virus, data encryption, 
biometric aunthentication, Armed Guards, 
Access Control Card, Codelock, CCTV 
Virus 
POFEDP Integrated Financial Information 
System, Payroll System 
Firewall, Anti-virus,VPN, Access Control 
Card, Codelock, CCTV 
Virus 
RGO Zanzibar Vital Registration System, 
Intellectual Properties Automated 
System 
Anti-virus Virus 
 
  
Table 4.2.13.2: IT usage (Interview Guide I) 
Organisation Number of 
Computers 
% of Service 
Computerised 
Number of 
Employees 
Services 
SUZA 80 20 250  Provide university education 
ZRB 120 65 170 Managing tax collection 
ZSSF 60 70 75 Managing pension and 
contributions 
MACEMP 40 60 160 Management of rural coastal 
population 
MH 200 60 3500 Treatment and prevention of 
diseases 
MEVT 400 5 13,500 Provide primary, secondary 
and tertiary education 
ZEC 45 20 77 Managing national election 
ZIO 40 100 130 Provide identity card to 
residents of Zanzibar 
POFEDP 120 30 752 Managing public finance 
RGO 13 10 64 Registration of birth, death, 
and companies; and 
administration of 
inheritance. 
Zanzibar GDP US$561 (POFEDP, 2012) 
Population 1,211,000 (OCGS, 2010) 
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4.2.15 Legal framework  
This section presents findings of the legal framework that protect the study environment. 
This section provides important data for understanding the type of legislation that 
provides protection for the organisations in the study. Data sources for this section are 
documents. 
Zanzibar has several laws that provide protection to information. These laws are:  the 
Laws of Zanzibar, Industrial Property Act 2008, Copyright Act 2003, Zanzibar 
Broadcasting Act 1997 and Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority Act 2003. 
4.2.15.1 The Zanzibar Penal Decree Act 6 2004 
This act criminalises offences against intellectual property, computer equipment or 
supplies, destruction of computer equipment, interfering with data, interfering with a 
computer system, illegal interception of data, illegal devices, computer users, and fraud 
and related activities on government computers.  
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 373 defines offences of 
intellectual property which are modifying or damaging or revealing data, programmes or 
supporting documentation located internally or externally to a computer, computer system, 
or computer network. This felony is punishable to the maximum of ten years 
imprisonment. 
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 374 defines the offence of 
computer equipment and supplies which involve unauthorised modification of equipment 
or supplies used or aimed to be used in a computer, computer system, or computer 
network. This felony is punishable to the maximum of five years imprisonment. If the 
offence aimed to defraud then the punishment is the maximum of ten years imprisonment. 
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 375 defines offence of 
destruction of computer equipment as  
Any person who wilfully, knowingly, and without authorization destroys, takes, 
injures, or damages equipment or supplies used or intended to be used in a 
computer, computer system, or computer network; or whoever wilfully, 
knowingly, and without authorization destroys, injures, or damages any computer, 
computer system, or computer network commits an offence against computer 
equipment or supplies, and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding ten years.  
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The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 376 defines offences of 
interfering with data as destroying or modify data, make data worthless or ineffective; 
disrupt by the lawful usage of data; or denies access to data to any lawful user. This 
offence is punishable to the maximum of five years imprisonment or a fine or both.  
 The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 377 defines offence of 
interfering with a computer system as obstructs or impedes with the working of a 
computer system; or obstructs or impedes a user endorsed in using or operating a 
computer system. This offence is punishable to the maximum of five years imprisonment 
or a fine or both. 
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 378 defines offences of 
illegal interception of data as unlawful interception by technical means of any non-public 
transmission to or within a computer system; or by electromagnetic emission from a 
computer system that are carrying computer data. 
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 379 defines offences of 
illegal devices as illegal sale, procurement, production or distribution of a device 
including software made for the aim of committing a felony; a computer password, access 
code or similar data that can access the whole or any part of a computer system. 
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 380 defines offences 
against computer users as:  
Any person who wilfully, knowingly, and without authorization accesses or 
causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network; or 
whoever wilfully, knowingly, and without authorization denies or causes the 
denial of computer system services to an authorized user of such computer 
system services, which, in whole or part, is owned by, under contract to, or 
operated for, on behalf of, or in conjunction with another commits an offence 
against computer users, and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years.   
If the offence is committed for the objective to defraud then the punishment is the 
maximum of ten year imprisonment. 
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 381 defines offences of 
fraud and related activity on government computers as unlawful access a computer or 
exceeding lawful privileges and by that obtained information that is classified for the 
reason of national defence or foreign relation, or any reason to believe that such 
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information if obtained could be used to hurt Zanzibar. Unlawful access or excess 
privileges and thereby acquires financial records of financial institution; information from 
any government institution; information from any protected computer if the action 
involves an interstate or foreign communication; unlawful access to non public computer 
of a government institution; or unlawful access with intent to defraud. These offences are 
punishable to the maximum of fifteen year imprisonment. 
The statute (Zanzibar, Penal Decree Act 6 of 2004) in section 179 (1) (f) criminalises 
internet café owner of misdemeanour if “in any internet centre opened to the public, being 
the owner allows any person to display any obscene materials from the internet, or being 
the user displays obscene materials from the internet.”  This offence is punishable to the 
maximum of two year imprisonment or a fine. 
4.2.15.2 Zanzibar Criminal Procedure Decree   
 The statute (Zanzibar, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2004) in sections 111D to 
111M have given the magistrate power to authorise police or any authorised person to 
search computer data or electronic communication for evidence. 
4.2.15.3 Zanzibar Industrial Property Act 2008 
The statute (Zanzibar, Industrial Property Act, 2008) in section 2 covers patents for 
computer related inventions. 
4.2.15.4 Zanzibar Copyright Act 2003 
The statute (Zanzibar, Copyright Act, 2003) in sections 3 and 15 provides protection for 
original work involving a computer program. 
4.2.15.5 Zanzibar Censorship and Cinematographic Exhibition Act 2009 
The statute (Zanzibar, Censorship and Cinematographic Exhibition Act, 2009) in section 
19 criminalises any person who “make an exhibition by using cinematographic, video 
cassette, stage play, computer games, entertainment advertisement on poster, motor 
vehicle with public address system, banners, television or newspaper” without a permit. 
This offence is punishable to the maximum of six months imprisonment, or a fine, or both.  
4.2.15.6 Zanzibar Broadcasting Commission Act 1997 
The statute (Zanzibar, Broadcasting Commission Act, 1997) regulates and supervises 
broadcasting activities including radio, television and video broadcastings from Zanzibar 
or to Zanzibar. 
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4.2.15.7 Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority Act 2003 
The statute (Tanzania, Communication Regulatory Authority Act 2003) is defined as:  
The purpose of regulation of telecommunications, broadcasting, postal services; 
to provide for allocation and management of radio spectrum, covering electronic 
technologies and other Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
applications and to provide for its operation in place of former authorities and for 
related matters. 
This act will not cover broadcasting and contents matters in Zanzibar.  
4.3 Discussion on research findings 
Findings from the case study as presented in the previous section showed that information 
security governance is an ad hoc practice, lacks planning and lacks management support. 
There were different security levels of organisation in the study. Also, the findings show 
that culture has influenced the governance of information security in the case study. The 
five major levels of concern in the findings are henceforth identified as (i) top 
management support; (ii) information system structure; (iii) information security controls; 
(iv) IT usage, information assurance, and security breaches; and (v) legal framework.  
These five levels will be discussed below in detailed. 
4.3.1 Top management support 
Findings in Section 4.2.2 showed that information security program lacks a budget, and if 
there is a budget, then distribution of the available funds face societal challenges. In 
addition, the information security programmes in the case study lack strategy. Section 
4.2.1 revealed that information security policies in the case study are not available; if 
available they are not reviewed or communicated. These findings are consistent with the 
one identified by Abu-Musa (2010). 
In the literature, it is recommended that management support is crucial for the success of 
information security program (Ruighaver et al., 2007; Knapp Kenneth and Ford, 2006; 
Chia et al., 2002). Management must set rules and develop policies for information 
security. 
4.3.2 Information system’s structure 
The findings in Section 4.2 showed that levels of information systems’ structure on 
organisations in the case study varied. Organisations involved with elections, registration 
of citizens, and finances have strong security compare to others. This shows that 
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information security in the case study depends on the criticality of information system in 
the organisation. 
These findings are consistent with the one about information security in financial 
institutions in the literature (Kankanhalli et al, 2003; NISS, 2007).  
4.3.3 Information security controls 
The findings in Section 4.2.1 showed that some organisations lacked information security 
policies; existing policies are not communicated or reviewed. Information security 
programmes lacked budget. Findings in Section 4.2.2 showed that the organisations 
lacked the capability to conduct information security awareness training. In addition, 
Section 4.2.4 showed that many employees lacked information security awareness 
training and existing training programs are not provided periodically. Also, organisations 
lacked qualified information security professionals. The findings in Section 4.2.4 showed 
that policies and disciplinary actions are weakly enforced. These finding are consistent 
with findings in the literature (Abu-Musa, 2010; Cheang and Sang, 2009; Karokola and 
Yngström, 2009; Khalfan and Ashawaf, 2003; Kimwele, Mwangi and Kimani, 2010; 
Mundy and Musa, 2010; Ndou, 2004). 
In addition, Section 4.2.8 showed that technical vulnerability assessment is not carried out 
regularly. Findings in Section 4.2.9 suggested that there are employees who have no 
awareness of reporting system for information security incidents. In addition 
organisations lack guidelines on quantifying and monitoring information security 
incidents. The findings in Section 4.2.10 suggested that business continuity plans are not 
conveyed to employees, or do not included information security or are not tested 
regularly. These findings are consistent with findings in the literature (Abu-Musa, 2010). 
The findings in section 4.2.11 showed that employees are unaware of existing policies 
and guidelines such as the policy on data protection and privacy, policy on information 
security, guidelines on acceptance of new information systems, policy on protection of 
electronic messages, guidelines on network operations, guidelines on keeping audit logs 
for user’s activities, policy on back-up of software, guidelines for intellectual property 
rights, guidelines on system audits, and policy on the use of network service. Also, there 
are employees who are unaware of business continuity plans in their organisations. 
Information security awareness is very important for employees for an organisation to 
achieve an effective information security strategy. 
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The findings in Section 4.2.6 suggested that organisations lack guidelines, policies and 
rules on various controls such as email, access of internet, network operations; audits logs 
of users; exceptions and removable media. In Section 4.2.7, respondents felt that access 
rights policies are not reviewed, and there is lack of guidelines for user passwords. There 
are respondents who shared their passwords with other employees. The findings in 
Section 4.2.8 suggested that there is lack of policies for cryptographic controls, and many 
users do not use encryption. Also, findings in Section 4.2.11 showed that organisations 
did not provide regular checks on technical compliance and lacked guidelines on 
information system audits. Findings in Section 4.2.12 suggested that websites use ad hoc 
practices on security. A lack of policies and benchmarking on information security 
controls lead employees to use cultural influenced practices that could jeopardise the 
security of an organisation.   
4.3.4 IT usage, assurance, and security Breaches 
The findings in Section 4.2.14 suggested that there is low usage of IT in the case study. 
Also, Section 4.2.13 showed that the measures to protect the organisations that were 
implemented include anti-virus software, firewall, biometric, encryption, access control 
cards and Personal Identification Numbers (PINs); and VPN. No organisation in the case 
study has implemented intrusion detection or prevention systems. Findings suggested that 
breaches of security were not severe which include theft, virus and website defacing. 
More measures and breaches of security have been reported in this literature (CLUSIF, 
2008; and CSI, 2011; PWC, 2008). Also, the lack of security policies and severity of 
breaches was consistent with findings by Doherty and Fulford (2005). 
4.3.5 Legal framework 
Findings in Section 4.2.15 suggested that the case study has various legislations to protect 
information security. The present legislation include offences against intellectual property, 
computer users, computer equipment or supplies, destruction of computer equipment, 
interfering with data, interfering with the computer system, illegal interception of data, 
illegal devices, computer users, and fraud and related activities on government computers. 
In addition, there are legislations on: offence against misdemeanour by Internet café 
owners involving display of obscene material in their premises; power to authorised 
search computer data or electronic communication for evidence; patents for computer 
related inventions; copyright protection for original work involving a computer program; 
regulating and supervising broadcast activities; censorship of exhibition; regulation on 
telecommunication and postal services.  Findings suggested lack of employees’ contract 
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that reflects information security. Also, the present legislation on public service did not 
specifically include the terms that reflect information security. More legislation for 
protecting information has been reported in the literature (Bharvada, 2002; Blythe, 2005; 
Chaturvedi et al, 2008; Moustakas et al, 2005). 
4.4 Conclusion of Findings 
Overall, an analysis of the study environment revealed that the level of information 
security can be described by two ways:  before computerisation and after computerisation. 
Also, the analysis revealed that information security can be explained through social and 
technical perspectives. Table 4.4.1 summarises the findings. 
The information security governance seemed to be ad hoc, lack planning and lack 
management support. Various information security controls lacked policies and 
guidelines. Many policies are not communicated to employees or reviewed. Although the 
organisations have qualified IT personnel, they lack professional information security 
personnel. Physical security employees seemed to be computer illiterate. Organisations 
are strongly secured physically, although IT equipment is not physically locked and 
visitors’ records are not properly kept. Security levels among the organisations appeared 
to be different. Technical controls such as access controls, cryptographic controls, 
network controls among others seemed to be weakly managed. Web applications use ad 
hoc security. The existing assurance methods include anti-virus, firewall, biometric 
authentication and electronic locks. However, there is a lack of implementation of 
intrusion detection and prevention systems. It seems that security breaches are not 
recorded. And, those recorded have not caused major loss of assets. 
Although the legal framework has some legislation that provides information assurance, it 
lacks legislation on electronic transactions and cybercrimes. It seemed that contracts lack 
items that specifically identify information security.  
As a consequence, the findings appear to suggest that the level of security from the old 
manual systems is stronger than the new IT systems. At the technical level, information 
security is weak. Also, the organisations in the study have varied information security 
level. Many policies and guidelines for various information security controls are 
nonexistent. The information security governance seemed to be improvised. To 
understand information security better, the societal context needs to be considered. For 
example, issues of lack of policies or policies not conveyed to employees need to be 
investigated. Phase II of data collection was conducted in order to understand the impact 
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of culture in the governance of information security. Next chapter, chapter 5 presents the 
analysis and findings on data collected in Phase II of the research. 
 
Table 4.4.1: Overview of study findings 
Data Construct Findings 
Information  security policy Not available, if available not communicated or not 
reviewed 
Organisation of 
Information Security 
Lack strategy, information security governance is ad hoc 
and poorly planned 
Asset Management Well organised, not adapted to new technology 
Human Resource Security Lack strategy for training and awareness in information 
security 
Physical and environmental 
security 
Good organisation inherited from manual system; not 
adapted to new technological environment; poor 
recording of visitors   
Communication and 
Operations Management 
Poorly managed, ad hoc practices, lack guidelines and 
policies for technical controls; lack strategy, lack 
benchmarking 
Access Control Poorly managed, lack strategy, lack policies and guidelines 
for technical controls; lack benchmarking 
Information systems 
acquisition, development 
and maintenance 
Poorly managed, lack policies and guidelines for technical 
controls; technical vulnerabilities assessment are not 
carried out; lack strategy, lack benchmarking 
Information Security 
Incidents Management 
Ad hoc practices; lack guidelines for monitoring and 
quantifying information security incidents; lack inclusion 
of forensic analysis; lack strategy 
Business continuity 
management 
Poorly managed, ad hoc practices, lack plans, lack testing; 
lack strategy 
Compliance Lack of awareness on policies and guidelines; lack checks 
on technical compliance; lack guidelines on information 
system audit; lack strategy   
Website Security Poorly managed, ad hoc practices, no bench marking; lack 
strategy 
Security Breaches Not severe with little financial impact 
Legal Framework Lack in-depth legislation to combat crimes of the digital 
age  
Information Assurance Not advance, poorly planned; depends on organisation’s 
services; lack strategy 
Organisations Security level is high for organisations that provide 
services for finance, managing voting and identity 
registration; policy on adapting to working with new 
technology has not been implemented 
Employees There is a gap between management and employees in 
conveying decisions and policies. Management structure 
lacks integration of information security strategy. 
 
83 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 5 
5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS (PHASE II) 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected to investigate the societal and 
organisational issues that impact the governance of information security in Zanzibar. The 
chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.2 presents an analysis of data collected to 
form a view of complex societal issues that affect information security governance in 
Zanzibar. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 give a detailed analysis of data gathered in order to form a 
view of the national and organisational culture of public organisations respectively. 
Section 5.5 presents a cross analysis of information security values and issues identified 
in the study environment. The final section, section 5.6, provides the conclusion of the 
chapter. The findings presented here were used to answer the research question RQ3. 
The findings presented in this chapter are derived from questionnaires, face to face semi-
structured interviews and documents review. Here, the document reviewed included 
reports, websites and newspapers. The research aims at improving information security 
management by identifying the organisational and national cultural values and factors that 
have influenced the implementation of information security management and developing 
a process model for information security governance based on semiotics. Anonymity for 
study organisations and participants in the publication of findings is very important for 
the type of data gathered in this phase. Consequently the organisations and respondents in 
the study will be referred using pseudonyms if the information is deemed sensitive. Phase 
II of the research involved two questionnaires, a semi-structured face to face interview 
and document review. Respondents were from nine public organisations. One of the 
organisations in Phase I was dissolved by the time we conducted Phase II data collection. 
The results of the survey are discussed in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. 
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5.2 Complex societal issues facing information security 
This section presents findings of complex issues that impact the management of 
information security in the study environment. The section provides important data for 
understanding the management of information security. Data sources for this section were 
semi-structured interviews and documents reviews.  The interview is found in Appendix 
A as interview guide II. The interview aim was to discover complex societal issues that 
affect information security governance in the public sector. 17 senior IT staffs 
participated in this interview. The main themes here were trust, IT usage, availability of 
resource, confidentiality of information, enforcement of policies and disciplinary actions, 
communication among employees and political situation in Zanzibar. The themes are 
important in understanding the impact of complex societal issues to information security. 
The results are discussed in the next subsections. 
5.2.1 Trust 
Trust among employees is important in the organisation. The results show that trust varies 
among organisations. Respondent [DR3] said:  
“There is no trust involving logging out of computer systems, everybody tries his 
best to logout. We do loan each other money without contracts.”  
Respondent [DR14] said: 
“We trust each other here because there are not many employees, this make us 
know each other. I can leave my computer without logging out. I can loan money 
to my fellow employee without signing a contract. Some bias is normal when 
dealing with trust based on nepotism or even people who hailed from the same 
region.” 
Respondent [DR13] added:  
“We trust each other here; even we leave our phones in the office. Also, I can 
leave my computer without logging out in my office.”   
[DR1] added:  
“I trust my fellow employees; theft among employees is not possible. I trust my 
fellow employees in such a way I could loan them money without signing a 
contract. I will leave my computer without logging out; I will let the screensaver 
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do the work for me. When dealing with repairing computers belonging to big 
bosses I do not trust other employees to do the job, I will do it myself.” 
Respondent [DR8] added: 
“We trust each other here, I can loan my fellow employee money without 
contract. I can leave my computer in the office without logging out, but I logout 
as a policy.” 
The results show that trust among employees has an impact on information security. In 
the study environment, trust lead to people not using security features available for them 
to protect information. 
5.2.2 IT usage 
The results show that IT usage varied according to organisations in the study. Many 
employees share few computers available in the study environment. Respondent [DR1] 
said:   
“We do not have enough computers for everyone, but [employees with position 
XXX] have their own laptops which they do not share, but other employees do 
share the computers.” 
Respondent [DR4] said:  
“There is low usage of computers and internet especially the internet. Employees 
share few computers. Our internet bandwidth is very low and sometimes not 
available.” 
 
Respondents [DR10] said:  
“Basically usage of computers depends on the individual departments. Not all 
employee have their own computers, those who do not have direct job description 
regarding usage of computer are sharing with others. Connectivity is not stable, 
and employees are not satisfied. Sometimes internet connection is not available. 
We have two ISP, but there are a lot of complaints about their services. Our 
bandwidth is a shared 512kbps.” 
And respondent [DR11] added:  
“Usage of computer is low due to lack of IT awareness, and fear of computers. 
We have high availability of computers but are not used effectively. Internet 
connection is poor, too many complaints about the internet service.” 
Respondent [DR17] said:  
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“Our internet service has been disconnected due to lack of payment, poor service 
from ISP and breach of contract on ISP part. We bought dedicated bandwidth, 
and we were provided with shared bandwidth. Only 70% of employees have their 
own computers provided by the organisation. Management employees have 
laptops and other employees have desktops. Management employees get an 
annual subscription of anti-virus software but other employees may get if there 
are adequate funds.” 
The results show that IT usage faces challenges such as few computers, low bandwidth, 
lack of training, and uneven distribution of resources available among others.   
5.2.3 Availability of funds 
Availability of funds varies according to organisations in the study. Respondent [DR2] 
said:  
“Funds availability is very poor; sometimes we only get funds for 10% of the 
budget. Sometimes we get funds when the activity involves a bigwig.” 
Respondent [DR15] said: 
“There are problems in getting funds for implementing our daily tasks. If we 
want to aim high, funds are not available.”  
Respondent [DR14] added:   
“Availability of funds is very a big issue. We have a budget, but funds are delay 
or not available at all. There is bureaucracy and corruption in dealing with funds.”  
Respondent [DR11] said:  
“Funds availability is very slow. There is no budget for IT. Delay is sometimes 
caused by the person who signs the check; he/she may bias to some people by 
favouring his/her friends.” 
And respondent [DR3] said:  
“Availability of funds in the department is a big problem. You may ask for funds 
to implement an important activity and may not get them. Sometimes there is 
unequal treatment of employees when it comes to distribution of funds. There is 
bribery and favouritism based on family, region of birth, even political affiliation.” 
The results show that availability of fund in the study environment is bounded. 
Distribution of funds faces issues such as corruption and favouritism.  
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5.2.4 Collaboration between security and IT personnel 
It is very important to have good working relationship between physical security 
personnel and IT personnel. The results show that physical security personnel have low 
education and low IT literacy. Also, they are not involved in any other area of 
information security. Respondent [DR8] said: 
“We have little cooperation with security personnel. Security personnel deal with 
physical security only. Security personnel do not know anything about login 
details of any system. We do not consult them during the procurement process of 
IT equipment or involve them in any other way. Majority of our security 
personnel are IT illiterate, with low education.” 
And respondent [DR13] added:  
“We have good cooperation with security staff as our fellow employees. We do 
not cooperate with them in terms of IT. Security personnel guard our offices only. 
Their awareness of IT is very little or none at all.  However, at [section XXX] the 
security personnel have some IT awareness because they did attend seminars and 
training.”  
The results show that physical security personnel lack IT skills and are not involved in the 
IT issues. 
5.2.5 Confidentiality of information 
Confidentiality of information is very important in an organisation. The results show that 
confidentiality of information varies among organisations in the study. Respondent [DR2] 
said:  
“There are gossips of information that was not released officially. For example, 
there was an incident when a student came to me with full information involving 
the list of sponsored students by the ministry, this information was not released to 
public, only people who are in the meeting knew about it. So there is leakage of 
information in this organisation. There are groups of people that gossip for 
confidential information, for example people who come from Makunduchi, 
Pemba, and Donge they will gossip among themselves about leaked information. 
Members of political parties also will gossip among themselves on leaked 
information especial members of opposition parties.” 
Respondent [DR7] added: 
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“Confidentiality of information is low here. For example, management decisions 
are leaked before the official release. Some members of management staff do 
leak confidential information to their friends and families. This is because of the 
delay of the official release of information concerning important decision.” 
Respondent [DR10] said:  
“There is some leakage of confidential information. However, anyone leaked 
information will be disciplined. Three times we have disciplined employees since 
I was here.” 
And respondents [DR11] said:  
“Confidentiality is not high, some people may mention about the content of your 
letter without you giving to them.” 
The results show that confidentiality is broken by employees to friends and family. 
5.2.6 Enforcement of policies and disciplinary actions 
Enforcement of policy and disciplinary action is very important in an organisation. The 
researcher observed that there is a challenge in implementing the existing policies. The 
results show that policy enforcement and disciplinary action vary among organisations in 
the study. As respondent [DR1] said:  
“There is a lot of hesitation in implementing policies. Employees are afraid of 
each other when implementing policies. They Fear of being label a bad or unkind 
boss. We have guidelines here that we try to implement, but employees are not 
complying with them, so we do not see the need to update them. Enforcement of 
disciplinary action is low. For example, we do not have employees’ attendance 
records.” 
Respondent [DR12] added:  
“Enforcement of policies is very weak here especially those involving finance are 
difficult to be implemented. There is bias in implementing policies among groups 
of people who works here especially those who hailed from the same district.” 
And respondent [DR3] said:  
“I think we lack important policies. There is weak enforcement of policies; 
people know that they can do anything without being punished. For example, in 
the past anyone who enters our building will be asked for an identity card, but not 
anymore. Anybody from outside the [organisation XXX] can come and use the 
facilities without being questioned. Only administrative employees such as 
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cleaners are made to comply with policies. There is no bias in implementing 
policies in the last six months but before there was bias based on political interest 
although they were done in underground without noticing.” 
The results show that policies and disciplinary actions are not enforced and face issues of 
bias. 
5.2.7 Communication during problems 
Communication among employees when there is a problem is very important in an 
organisation. Communication is good among employees in the study environment, but 
there are few cultural issues. As respondent [DR12] said:  
“When dealing with IT problems there are no good communications. However, 
when dealing with theft, we have good cooperation. There is no good 
communication between certain groups of people such as those with different 
political ideology.” 
And respondent [DR12] said: 
“Communication between employees depends on which part of organisation and 
section, there is some hesitation in solving a problem so no good communication, 
if the problem involves a bigwig then the communication will be good in order to 
solve the problem quicker.” 
The results show that communication faces prejudice.  
5.2.8 Political situation in Zanzibar 
It is very important to look at the situation during civil unrest. Since the start of multi-
party democracy in 1992 Zanzibar has been marred with violence during elections. 
Zanzibar has two main political parties which are Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and 
Civic United Front (CUF). The results in the Table 5.2.8.1 and 5.2.8.2 show that Zanzibar 
is divided into two political camps. There is mistrust on the way votes are counted. As the 
CUF Presidential Candidate Maalim Seif Sharif said:  
“There are two people hidden at Kisiwandui trying to forge election results 
electronically. We are very careful this time. We would be very careful this time. 
We wouldn’t allow such a thing to happen again. They did in 1995 and cause a 
lot of problems; they won’t be able to do it again this time” (Sadallah, 2010). 
Members of CUF believe that they are oppressed by the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar (Brent and Mshigeni; 2004). This leads to a formation of an Islamic religious  
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Table 5.2.8.1: 2010 Zanzibar General Election Source: (HOR, 2011) 
Party Number of seats Island of Constituent 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM) 
28 Zanzibar 
Civil United Front (CUF) 18 Pemba 
Civic United Front (CUF) 3 Zanzibar 
 
 
Table 5.2.8.2: 2010 Zanzibar Presidential Election (Source: (CS, 2010)) 
Party Number of Votes 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 179,809 
Civil United Front (CUF) 176,338 
Others 8,777 
 
 awakening organisation call UAMSHO which has been manoeuvred in order to 
accomplish political objectives (NL-Aid, 2012). CCM has accused UAMSHO of 
campaigns of violence including “massive destruction of properties and death of an 
innocent policeman” (Sadallah, 2012). The investigation revealed that the political 
situation in Zanzibar is not stable, and violence does happen. This could impact 
information security. 
5.3 National culture survey results 
The survey was conducted using a structured questionnaire measured by 7-points Likert- 
scale. Likert-scale was design with 1 representing substantially agree to 7 which represent 
substantially disagree. The questionnaire was adapted from House et al. (2004, p.30). The 
questionnaire is found in Appendix F as Questionnaire V. 50 respondents were randomly 
selected from employees of nine public organisations in Zanzibar. Participants were 
selected from each organisation based on random selection from a pool of employees 
willing to participate in the research as shown in the Table 3.4.3. Using the random 
number generator by PS (2012) the participants were given questionnaires as shown in 
the Table 3.4.4. 41 questionnaires were returned, and all were suitable for analysis. The 
results are discussed in the next subsections. 
5.3.1 Power distance 
The results are shown in the Table 5.3.1. The results show that 61% of respondents 
agreed that power is shared unequally in practice (“As is”).  However, 61% of the 
respondents disagreed or were undecided that power should be shared unequally (“Should 
be”). The results show that the majority of respondents feel that power is shared unequal, 
but they will prefer to be shared equally. 
91 
 
Table 5.3.1: Results of national culture survey (Questionnaire V – Adapted from House et 
al (2004)) 
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Power 
Distance 
Followers are expected to obey their leaders 
without question. (As is) 
  61 22 17   3.56 
Followers should be expected to obey their 
leaders without question. (Should be) 
10 20 10 7 10 33 10 4.26 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Most people lead highly structured lives with 
few unexpected events. (As is) 
2 20 20 32 10 16  3.76 
Most people should lead highly structured 
lives with few unexpected events. (Should 
be) 
7 12 22 34 10 5 10 3.83 
Humane 
Orientation 
People are generally very tolerant of 
mistakes. (As is) 
7 10 17 15 19 12 20 4.45 
People should be generally very tolerant of 
mistakes. (Should be) 
17 12 20 21 15 10 5 3.55 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
Leaders encourage group loyalty even if 
individual goals suffer. (As is) 
17 7 26 20 10 10 10 3.69 
Leaders should encourage group loyalty even 
if individual goals suffer. (Should be) 
27 12 17 12 15 17  3.27 
In-group 
Collectivism 
Employees feel great loyalty toward this 
organisation. (As is) 
17 28 15 10 15 10 5 3.28 
Employees should feel great loyalty toward 
this organisation. (Should be) 
20 15 20 15 20 10  3.30 
Assertiveness People are generally dominant in their 
relationship with each other.  (As is) 
2 5 35 14 20 12 12 4.29 
People should be generally dominant in their 
relationships with each other. (Should be) 
2 12 22 17 15 12 20 4.47 
Gender 
Egalitarianis
m 
Boys are encouraged more than girls to 
attain a higher education. (As is) 
15 24 17 7 12 20 5 3.57 
Boys should be encouraged more than girls 
to attain a higher education. (Should be) 
7 12 7 10 10 12 42 5.08 
Future 
Orientation 
More people live for the present rather than 
for the future. (As is)  
20 28 24 17 2 2 7 2.87 
More people should live for the present than 
for the future. (Should be)  
5 8 29 12 5 7 34 4.61 
Performance 
Orientation 
Students are encouraged to strive for 
continuously improved performance. (As is) 
17 37 17 15 2 7 5 2.89 
Students should be encouraged to strive for 
continuously improved performance. (Should 
be) 
44 24 22 2 5  2 2.05 
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5.3.2 Uncertainty avoidance 
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1. 42% of the respondents agreed that members of 
society seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formalised procedures, and laws to cover 
situations in their daily lives.  There were 58% respondents who were undecided or 
disagreed with the previous statement. Also, 41% of respondents agreed that members of 
society should seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formalised procedures, and laws to 
cover situations in their daily lives. There are 59% respondents who were undecided or 
disagreed with the previous statement. The results show that a majority disagreed or were 
undecided that there is orderliness, consistency, structure, and laws to cover their daily 
lives in practice and would prefer that way in value. 
5.3.3 Humane orientation 
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1. 51% of the respondents disagreed that society 
values and rewards altruism, caring, fairness, friendliness, generosity, and kindness in 
practice. However, 49% of the respondents agreed that society should value and reward 
altruism, caring, fairness, friendliness, generosity, and kindness. The results show that the 
society is not humane oriented but would prefer to be humane. 
5.3.4 Institutional collectivism  
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1. 50% of respondents agreed that society practices 
favour to reward collective distribution of resources and collective actions.  There were 
50% of respondents who either undecided or disagreed with the previous statement. Also, 
56% of respondents agreed that society should favour to reward collective distribution of 
resources and collective actions.  
 5.3.5 In-group collectivism  
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1. 60% of respondents agreed that in practice, this 
society takes pride in their families or organisations. Also, 55% of the respondents agreed 
that the values of the society are to take pride in their families or organisations.  
5.3.6 Assertiveness 
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2. The results show that 44% of the 
respondents disagreed that people are assertive and confrontational in practice. However, 
there are 56% of the respondents who either agreed or were undecided about the previous 
statement. Also, there are 47% of the respondents disagreed that people should be 
assertive and confrontational. There are 53% of the respondents who were either agreed 
or undecided with the previous statement.  
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5.3.7 Gender egalitarianism  
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1. The results show that 56% of the respondents 
agreed that in practice, there is gender inequality in study environment. However, in 
values 64% of the respondents disagreed that society should have gender inequality.  
5.3.8 Future orientation 
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2. The results show that 72% of the 
respondents agreed that in the study environment, people are not planning for the future. 
However, 46% of respondents prefer to plan for the future.  
5.3.9 Performance orientation 
The results are shown in Table 5.3.1. The results show that 71% of the respondents 
agreed that in the study environment society rewards members for performance 
progression and brilliance. Also, in the study environment, society 90% of the 
respondents agreed that values of the society are to reward members for performance 
progression and brilliance. 
5.3.10 Comparison between Zanzibar national culture and other countries  
Table 5.3.2 show the comparison of findings on national culture from this research and 
the GLOBE Project. Zanzibar results are compared with results from Kuwait, USA and 
Sweden. Kuwait has a majority of its population as Muslims. USA is a developed country 
with Capitalist doctrine. Sweden is a developed country and welfare state with market  
Table 5.3.2: Comparison of national culture (Source: House et al (2004)) 
Dimension of Culture  Zanzibar  Kuwait Sweden United States of America  
Power Distance (Practice) 3.56 5.12 4.85 4.88 
Power Distance (Values) 4.26 3.17 2.70 2.85 
Uncertainty Avoidance(Practice) 3.76 4.21 5.32 4.15 
Uncertainty Avoidance (Values) 3.83 4.77 3.60 4.00 
Humane Orientation (Practice) 4.45 4.52 4.10 4.17 
Humane Orientation (Values) 3.55 5.06 5.65 5.53 
Institutional Collectivism (Practice)  3.69 4.49 5.22 4.20 
Institutional Collectivism (Values) 3.27 5.15 3.94 4.17 
In-Group Collectivism (Practice) 3.28 5.80 3.66 4.25 
In-Group Collectivism (Values) 3.30 5.43 6.04 5.77 
Assertiveness (Practice) 4.29 3.63 3.38 4.55 
Assertiveness (Values) 4.47 3.76 3.61 4.32 
Gender Egalitarianism (Practice) 3.57 2.58 3.84 3.34 
Gender Egalitarianism (Values) 5.08 3.45 5.15 5.06 
Future Orientation (Practice) 2.87 3.26 4.39 4.15 
Future Orientation (Values) 4.61 5.74 4.89 5.31 
Performance Orientation (Practice) 2.89 3.95 3.72 4.49 
Performance Orientation (Values) 2.05 6.03 5.80 6.14 
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economy. The results show that Zanzibar has a lower average value for the Power 
Distance compare to Kuwait, Sweden and USA in terms of societal practices. The 
average value for Power Distance in terms of societal values is higher for Zanzibar 
compare to Kuwait, Sweden and USA. Zanzibar has lower average value for Uncertainty 
Avoidance compares with Kuwait, Sweden and USA in terms of societal practices. 
Zanzibar has a higher average value for Humane Orientation in comparison to USA and 
Sweden at societal practices, but, has a lower average value in terms of societal values. 
Zanzibar has lower average value for Institution Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, 
Performance Orientation, and Future Orientation at both societal practices and values in 
comparison to USA, Kuwait and Sweden. Gender Egalitarianism is higher for Zanzibar at 
both societal practices and value in comparison to Kuwait and USA. 
5.3.11 Conclusion 
The results show that the study environment majority feels that power is not shared 
equally. The majority feels that there are orderliness and laws to protect them. In the 
study environment, a majority feels that the society is not caring or kind. The results show 
that society values collective distribution of resources and values family or organisations. 
A majority feels that society in the study is not confrontational. A majority feels that there 
is gender inequality in the study environment. In the study environment, a majority feels 
that society is not planning for the future. Finally, progression and brilliance is rewarded 
in the study environment.   
5.4 Organisational culture survey results 
The survey was conducted using an OCAI questionnaire adopted from Cameron and 
Quinn (1999, p.20-25). 60 questionnaires were distributed to randomly selected 
respondents from nine public organisations in Zanzibar. Participants were selected from 
each organisation based on random selection from a pool of employees willing to 
participate in the research as shown in the Table 3.4.3. Using the random number 
generator by PS (2012) the participants were given questionnaires as shown in the table 
3.4.4. 45 questionnaires were returned, and all were suitable for analysis. The 
questionnaire is found at Appendix G. The results of the survey on each dimension of 
organisation culture are shown in the Figure 5.4.1 to Figure 5.4.7, Table 5.4.1 and Table 
5.4.2. The figures show mean score of each culture. The analysis of data is adopted from 
Cameron and Quinn (1999). 
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5.4.1 Dominant characteristics 
Table 5.4.1 and Figure 5.4.1 show that hierarchy culture dominates the firms’ 
characteristics in the study. This shows that the study environment is formalised and 
structured where procedures govern what people do. There are gaps on the clan and 
market cultures between current and preferred culture. These points need some attentions 
to reduce the gap. 
5.4.2 Organisational leadership 
Table 5.4.1 and Figure 5.4.2 show the mean score on organisational leadership dimension. 
This dimension is dominated by hierarchy culture where employees considered their 
leaders to be coordinators and organisers. The employees preferred higher scores on this 
dimension. 
5.4.3 Management of employees 
Table 5.4.1 and Figure 5.4.3 show the mean score on management of employees’ 
dimension. This dimension is dominated by the clan culture where teamwork, consensus 
and participation are the norms. In this culture “people share a lot of themselves” 
(Cameron and Quinn; 2006, p.66). The respondents preferred higher score on this 
dimension. 
5.4.4 Organisational glue 
Table 5.4.1 and Figure 5.4.4 shows the mean score on organisational glue dimension. 
This dimension is dominated by hierarchy culture. The glue that holds organisations is 
formal rules and policies. The respondents would prefer a higher value on this dimension. 
5.4.5 Strategic emphases 
In the Figure 5.4.5.1 shows the scores on strategic emphases dimension. This dimension 
is dominated by hierarchy culture where emphases are on permanence and stability. 
Respondents would prefer higher value on this dimension. 
5.4.6 Criteria for success 
Finally, the dimension for criteria of success is shown in Table 5.4.1 and Figure 5.4.6.1 
Clan culture dominates this dimension where success is determined based on 
development of human resources, teamwork, employee commitment and concern for 
people. The respondents would prefer higher score on this dimension. 
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5.4.7 Overall organisational culture 
Table 5.4.2 and Figure 5.4.7.1 show the overall score on organisational culture.  Overall 
culture that dominants the study environment is hierarchy culture type where the work 
place is formalised and structured, heads of organisations view themselves as organisers 
and coordinators. Also, formal rules and policies hold the organisations together.  
Stability is a long-term concern where success is defined in terms of smooth scheduling 
and low cost. Moreover, the concern for management of employees is secure employment 
and predictability. Also, hierarchy culture is a preferred culture in the case study. 
5.4.8 Conclusion 
The results show that at the study environment overall the present organisational culture 
is hierarchy culture which scored 34.7%. Also, hierarchy culture is preferred by the 
respondents with the score of 36.8%. All the dimensions of organisational culture are 
dominated by hierarchy culture except the Criteria for Success and Management of 
Employees which are dominated by the Clan culture.  According to Clan culture the 
Criteria for Success is express in terms of concern to people. In addition, Clan culture 
treats employees as members of extended family and a manager as parent figure. In 
Hierarchy culture Dominant Characteristics are express in terms of work place being 
formalised and structured; Organisational Leadership is viewed as coordinator and 
organisers; Organisational Glue is expressed in terms of rules and policies; and Strategic 
Emphasis is express in terms of stability and effectiveness. 
 
Figure 5.4.1: Dominant characteristics profile of Zanzibar public sector (45 respondents)  
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Figure 5.4.2: Organisational leadership profile of Zanzibar public sector (45 respondents) 
 
 
Figure 5.4.3: Management of employees’ profile of Zanzibar public sector (45 
respondents). 
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Figure 5.4.4: Organisational glue profile of Zanzibar public sector (45 respondents) 
  
 
Figure 5.4.5: Strategic emphases profile for Zanzibar public sector (45 respondents) 
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Figure 5.4.6: Criteria of success profile for Zanzibar public sector (45 respondents) 
 
 
 Figure 5.4.7: Overall organisation Cultural Profile (45 respondents) 
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Table 5.4.1:  Results of each dimension of organisation culture (45 respondents) 
Dimension Culture Type NOW (Mean) PREFER (Mean) 
Criteria of Success Clan 31.3 34.3 
Adhocracy 17.1 17.3 
Market 22.2 19.9 
Hierarchy 29.1 28.9 
Strategic Emphases Clan 20.8 23.8 
Adhocracy 24 21.1 
Market 19.8 18.1 
Hierarchy 35.6 37.7 
Organisational Glue Clan 20.7 19.9 
Adhocracy 17 15.3 
Market 27.4 26.3 
Hierarchy 35.2 38.7 
Management of Employees Clan 34.7 36.6 
Adhocracy 17.4 14 
Market 18.6 18.7 
Hierarchy 30 31.1 
Organisational Leadership Clan 24.4 21.6 
Adhocracy 16.2 18 
Market 21.2 16 
Hierarchy 38.1 44.4 
Dominant Characteristics Clan 22 17.7 
Adhocracy 13.2 13.8 
Market 24.7 28.9 
Hierarchy 40 40.1 
 
Table 5.4.2: Overall profile of organisational culture for Zanzibar public sector (45 respondents) 
Culture Type NOW PREFER 
Clan 25.6 25.6 
Adhocracy 17.5 16.6 
Market 22.3 21.3 
Hierarchy 34.7 36.8 
 
5.5 Cross Survey Analysis 
This section presents the cross analysis of the surveys in sections 4.2, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 to 
identify correlation between information security practices and culture in the study 
environment.  
5.5.1 Power distance 
The results in section 5.3 show that the majority of respondents believe that power is 
shared unequally in the study environment, but they would prefer the power to be shared 
equally. In section 4.2.4 it was reported that many employees do not receive information 
security awareness training. Also, in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.10 it was reported that 
information security policies and business continuity plans are not conveyed to 
employees. Respondent [DR1] said:  “We do not have enough computers for everyone, 
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but XXX have their own laptops which they do not share, but other employees do share 
the computers.” Respondent [DR1] added: “When dealing with repairing computers 
belonging to bigwigs, I don't trust other employees to do the job, I do it myself.” And 
respondent [DR14] commented: “There is bureaucracy and corruption in dealing with 
funds.” According to Carl, Gupta, and Javidan (2004, p.536) these findings are 
characteristics of a high Power Distance society. 
5.5.2 Uncertainty avoidance 
The results in Section 5.3.2 show that the majority of the respondents agreed that 
members of society both in practice and value seek orderliness, consistency, structure, 
formalised procedures, and laws to cover situations in their daily lives. In Section 4.2 it 
was reported that there is lack of documented information security policies, 
confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements, employment contracts which specifies 
terms that include information security, information security organs in the organisations, 
network operation guidelines, rules for using email and internet, data protection and 
privacy guidelines, business continuity plans and guideline for information system audit 
in the study environment. Also, many respondents feel that policies are not reviewed 
regularly. In addition, respondent [DR1] said: 
“There is a lot of hesitation in implementing policies. Employees are afraid of 
each other when implementing policies. They Fear of being label a bad or unkind 
boss. We have guidelines here that we try to implement but employees are not 
complying with them so we do not see the need to update them. Enforcement of 
disciplinary action is low. For example we do not have employees’ attendance 
records.” 
And respondent [DR14] said:  “There is a policy from the government which give priority 
to IT training but is not enforced here”. Respondent [DR14] said: 
“We trust each other here because there are not many employees, this make us 
know each other. I can leave my computer without logging out. I can loan money 
to my fellow employee without signing a contract. Some bias is normal when 
dealing with trust base on nepotism or even people who hailed from same region.”  
Respondent [DR13] added: “We trust each other here, even we leave our phones in the 
office, and also I can leave my computer without logging out in my office”. According to 
De Luque and Javidan (2004) these are characteristics of society with low Uncertainty 
Avoidance.  
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5.5.3 In-Group collectivism 
The results in the section 5.3 show that the majority of the respondents agreed that both in 
practice and value this society takes pride in their families or organisations. Respondent 
[DR14] said: 
“We trust each other here because there are not many employees, this make us 
know each other. I can leave my computer without logging out. I can loan money 
to my fellow employee without signing a contract. Some bias is normal when 
dealing with trust base on nepotism or even people who hailed from same region.”  
Respondent [DR13] added:  
“We trust each other here, even we leave our phones in the office, and also I can 
leave my computer without logging out in my office.” 
Respondent [DR12] added:  
“Enforcement of policies is very weak here especially those involving finance are 
difficulty to be implemented. There is bias in implementing policies among 
groups of people who works here especially those who hailed from same district.” 
Respondent [DR3] said: 
“There is no bias in implementing policies in the last six months but before that 
there was bias based on political interest although they were done in the secrecy.” 
 The results show that there are employees who allowed a relative to use their 
organisations’ computers. Also, there are employees who shared a password with 
someone else. According to Gelfand at al. (2004, p.454) these findings are characteristics 
of a society with high In-Group Collectivism. 
5.5.4 Future orientation 
The results in the section 5.3 show that the majority of respondents agreed that in the 
study environment people are not planning for the future. However, the majority of 
respondents prefer to plan for the future. In the study organisations we note that none had 
information security strategy. Also, in section 4.2.10 it was reported that there is lack of 
Business Continuity Plans in many organisations in the study environment. We noted in 
Section 4.2.2 that information security has not been integrated into corporate governance 
in many of studied organisations. Also, there are no qualified professional information 
security employees in the study environment. In addition, there are no guidelines for 
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quantifying and monitor information security incidents. According to Ashkanasy et al. 
(2004, p.302) these are characteristics of a society with a low Future Orientation. 
5.5.5 Organisation culture 
The results in the section 5.4 show that the overall organisation culture that dominants 
public organisations in Zanzibar is hierarchy culture type where the work place is 
formalised and structured, heads of organisations view themselves as organisers and 
coordinators. Also, formal rules and policies hold the organisations together.  Stability is 
a long-term concern where success is defined in terms of smooth scheduling and low cost. 
Moreover, the concern for management of employees is secure employment and 
predictability. 
The results in Section 4.2.2 show that the majority of respondents did disagree or were 
undecided that there is a budget for information security program. Also, the majority of 
the respondents disagreed that their organisations are capable of implementing 
information security awareness programs. And, in Section 4.2.4 it was reported that there 
are lacks of regular training on information security awareness in the study organisations. 
Respondent [DR2] said:  “Funds availability is very poor; sometimes we only get funds 
for 10% of the budget”. Respondent [DR15] said: “There are problems in getting funds 
for implementing our daily tasks. If we want to aim high funds are not available”. This 
shows that the study organisations avoid costly activities. According to Cameron and 
Quinn (2006) in a hierarchy culture, success is defined in terms of low cost.  
5.6 Discussion on research findings 
Findings suggested that in the case study power is shared unequally; there is no 
orderliness, consistency, structure and laws to cover daily lives; there is in-group 
collectivism; and society is not future oriented. These findings suggested that these 
societal issues affected the effectiveness of information security in the case study.  
Power distance is the one of the reason of inequality in level of security in the 
organisations in the case study. Organisations that provide services involve finance, 
voting and citizen registration are viewed as important hence their security is higher than 
others. New policies are not communicated to employees and there is unequal distribution 
of IT equipment. If policies are not communicated there could be compromise of the IT 
systems in the organisation. An employee who is not aware of policy for downloading 
software into organisation’s computer could spread virus into the organisation. As 
reported in chapter 4, 80% of study organisations suffered virus attacks. Lack of IT 
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equipment in certain areas of an organisation may compromise the security of the whole 
organisation. Installing anti-virus to the organisation’s bigwigs alone could create a virus 
scare to other systems in the organisation. Findings in this study suggested that in the case 
study there is lack of skilled information security professionals. Findings in the literature 
suggested that unequal sharing of power causes corruption, few employees have access to 
resources; few skilled employees; information is not shared and low human development 
(Carl, Gupta and Javidan; 2004). 
Uncertainty Avoidance influences the information security as we have shown that the 
study environment does not seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formalised 
procedures, and laws to cover situations in their daily lives. This has been shown due to 
lack of policies, laws, guidelines, and procedures that govern information security in the 
study environment. When policies are not reviewed they jeopardise the IT systems to new 
threats. Laws, policies, guidelines and procedures deter humans from committing acts 
that could compromise the IT infrastructures. Findings show that contracts signed by 
employees did not include information security. Findings suggested that employees broke 
rules without being punished. Findings in literature suggested that society with lower 
uncertainty avoidance tends to be informal; tolerate to break of rules; rely on trust and 
less likely to establish rules (De Luque and Javidan, 2004).  
In-Group Collectivism did influence the information security governance in the case 
study. The study environment believes in taking pride in their families or organisation. 
This may compromise the IT infrastructure especially sensitive information that is needed 
by a political group. Findings suggested that employees were ready to break rules in order 
to allow their relative access to equipment; employees shared their passwords. In 
literature it is suggested that society that take pride in their family or organisation, 
employees tend to value group activities more (Gelfand at al., 2004). 
Future orientation has influenced the information security governance as we have shown 
that the study environment does not plan for the future. Information security is still not 
part of corporate governance in the study environment. Also, there is a lack of business 
continuity plans, lack of guidelines for monitoring information security incidents and lack 
of training strategy for employees.  
Furthermore, findings suggested that organisations in the case study are dominated by 
hierarchy culture. The findings are consistent with findings in the literature on public 
organisation (OCAI, 2010). Findings suggested that hierarchy culture has minor influence 
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on effectiveness of information security governance. As mentioned in the section 2.6.2, in 
hierarchy culture procedures control what employees do. But, findings in the chapter 4 
suggested that information security governance in the case study implement ad hoc 
practices. Hierarchy culture is one of the reasons for lack of funds for information 
security project in the case study. 
5.7 Conclusion of findings 
The investigation provided a wide range of views on understanding the complex societal 
issues that influence the management of information security in the context of Zanzibar.  
Overall, the analysis of the study environment in section 5.3 revealed that in the study 
environment power is shared unequally. There are a significant number of members of 
society who do not seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formalised procedures, and 
laws to cover situations in their daily lives. Society is not humane orientated; rewards 
collective distribution of resources; takes pride in their family or organisations; has 
significant element of assertiveness and confrontation; has gender inequality; is not 
planning for the future; and rewards members for performance progression and brilliance. 
In addition, the findings show that the overall organisation culture is hierarchy. 
The cross analysis in section 5.5 demonstrated that some cultural dimensions have 
influenced the state of information security in the study environment. National culture 
dimensions that impact the management of information security appeared to be future 
orientation, power distance, in-group collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. 
Organisation culture dimensions appeared to have little impact on governance of 
information security. All the dimensions are dominated by hierarchy culture except the 
criteria for success dimension which is dominated by the clan culture. In a hierarchy 
culture, an organisation is “a very formalised and structured place to work. Procedures 
govern what people do” (Cameron and Quinn; 2006, p.66). In this culture the dimension 
that influenced information security is criteria for success. In this dimension has 
influenced information security by controlling availability of funds. Public sector has 
rules and procedures adapted from colonial ruler. Information security governance is new 
area that did not exist during that time. This explains why information security 
governance is in ad hoc practices. 
The next chapter, Chapter 6, will provide a framework for information security culture. 
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Table 5.6.1: Overview of study findings 
Data Construct Findings 
Power Distance Power is shared unequal in Zanzibar and affects the governance of 
information security. 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Society does not seek orderliness or laws to cover daily lives and affect 
the governance of information security. 
In-group 
Collectivism 
Society in Zanzibar takes pride in their family or organisation and affects 
the governance of information security. 
Future orientation Society in Zanzibar does not plan for the future and affects the 
governance of information security. 
Institution 
Collectivism 
Society in Zanzibar rewards collective distribution of resources but does 
not affect information security governance. 
Gender 
Egalitarianism 
There is gender inequality in Zanzibar but does not affect the governance 
of information security. 
Human Orientation Society in Zanzibar is not caring or kind but does not affect the 
governance of information security. 
Assertiveness Society in Zanzibar is not confrontational but does not affect the 
governance of information security. 
Performance 
Orientation 
Progression and brilliance is rewarded in Zanzibar but does not affect the 
governance of information security. 
Organisational 
Culture 
The overall culture is hierarchy with little impact on information security 
governance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6 A FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION 
SECURITY CULTURE   
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a framework for information security culture in non-profit 
organisations in the context of Zanzibar.  The main objective of this research is to 
improve the quality of information security governance in non-profit organisations in the 
context of Zanzibar. The study investigated information security governance, and cultural 
factors that influenced the management of information security. The findings in Chapter 4 
and 5 together with literature reviewed in Chapter 2 are used to recommend a framework 
for information security culture in non-profit organisations. The framework helped to 
answer the research question RQ4. 
6.2 Proposed framework for information security culture  
In Figure 6.3.1, a framework for information security culture in the context of Zanzibar 
for non-profit organisations is proposed, developed from the two phases of the study as 
presented in Section 4.2, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. In this section, the individual elements of the 
framework are discussed in detail. 
6.2.1 National culture 
 The findings in Section 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 were used for recommendation of this 
framework. National cultures influence the governance of information security in the 
context of Zanzibar and should be considered in the developing of information security 
culture. Organisations should be aware of dimensions of national culture that could 
jeopardise the information security. Appropriate policies should be developed to control 
108 
 
threats caused by national culture influenced behaviour. Training and awareness should 
be provided to employees on acceptable good behaviour for information security culture. 
Organisations should start sharing power policy by introducing transparency and 
employees’ participation in decision making. Organisations should find the way to raise 
the salary of their employees. Organisations should be aware of culture of loyalty to a 
group or family by their employees. Organisations should provide awareness training to 
their employees on law enforcement process and work planning. 
6.2.2 Organisational culture  
The findings in Section 5.4 and 5.5 were used for recommendation in this framework. 
Organisational culture influences the governance of information security. Organisations 
should ensure availability of funds for an information security program. This could be 
achieved by making information security as part of corporate governance of non-profit 
organisations. This will enable information security to be monitored by top management 
and various policies and guidelines developed for information security. Also, top 
management will ensure policies are enforced and reviewed in a regular basis. Non-profit 
organisations could establish information security committees in the organisations to 
monitor information security governance. Non-profit organisations should develop and 
test business sustainability plans to ensure continuity. Organisations should ensure that 
their employees are in compliance with national laws and organisation’s policies. 
Organisations should ensure that any non-compliance is reported to police or activates a 
disciplinary action.  
6.2.3 Government responsibility  
The findings in Section 4.2 and 5.2 were used for recommendation for this section. 
Government has an important role to play in ensuring good information security culture is 
achieved. Government has a duty to establish and enforce laws, regulations, strategies and 
policies for protecting information. In addition, the government has a duty to ensure 
organisations have well trained employees. This could be done through establishing 
education and skills training for information security at higher education institutions. 
Government should establish awareness program for information security for all. Public 
owned radio station, television station and newspapers can be used in providing 
information security awareness. The Ministry of Education and Vocational Training can 
help to ensure this program is established in the context of Zanzibar. Government should 
ensure availability and distribution of resources for information security program.  
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Figure 6.3.1: Proposed Framework for Information Security Culture 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
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(G2) Policy Creation and Implementation  
(N1) Cultural Influenced Behaviour  
(N2) Education and Awareness  
(O1) Corporate Governance 
(O2) Policy Creation and Enforcement 
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(T2) Training and Awareness Section 6.2.5 
(C7) Control of Data Security Disaster Section 6.2.13 
(C5) Regulatory Conformity Section 6.2.11 
(C6) Access Management Section 6.2.12 
(C4) Vulnerability Assessment Section 6.2.10 
(C9) Cryptography Sec 6.2.15 
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(C2) Internet and E-mail Section 6.2.8 
(C8) Security of Building Sec 6.2.14 
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(T3) Adopting Open Source Assurance Tools Section 6.2.6 
KEY 
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Black 
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Various governmental strategies are available in the literature (NISC, 2010; NISS, 2007; 
Cabinet Office, 2009; ITU, 2005) and were discussed in detail in Section 2.5. Legislation 
should be strengthened in areas such as content filtering, protection of children online, 
digital evidence, digital signature, electronic document and privacy. The government 
should ensure that there is strong law enforcement and due process. The government 
should establish Computer Emergency Response Team which will be responsible for 
handling information security incidents. Activities of this team could be monitored by one 
of government ministries. In the context of Zanzibar, this could be done by the Ministry 
of Communications and Transportation. The statute (Zanzibar, Public Service Act 2010) 
should be reviewed to add terms and conditions of employment that specify information 
security. Also, the review should include third party and contractor accessing 
organisations. Finally, the Government must take responsibility to ensure non-profit 
organisations implement a benchmarking policy on information security. The government 
should seek help from the United Nations and other development partners in 
accomplishing this objective. 
6.2.4 Benchmarking of information security governance  
The findings in Sections 4.2 were used for recommendation in this framework. 
Information security practices in organisations must be benchmarked to the appropriate 
international standards. Organisations should train their employees to be able to 
implement adapted standards and best practices based on their organisations’ 
requirements. Care must be taken on the controls that could be affected by national 
cultural behaviour. Top management must provide support to the benchmarking process 
in the form of budgets, training of existing employees and hiring skilled information 
security personnel. 
6.2.5 Training and awareness  
The findings in Section 4.2 were used for recommendation in this framework. Training 
and awareness are essential for developing desired information security culture in an 
organisation. Organisations should conduct training and awareness in information 
security regularly. Web-based training and awareness are cost-effective and improve 
security awareness level (Shaw et al, 2009; Whelan and Wright; 1999). Web-based 
training is available all times which facilitates the training of employees. Emails and wall 
posters can be used in raising information security awareness in an organisation. NIST 
(1998) can be used to benchmark information security awareness training in an 
111 
 
organisation. For example, the game Anti-phishing Phil is a web-based security 
awareness game that raises awareness on phishing attacks (Sheng et al, 2007). 
6.2.6 Adopting open source assurance tools  
The findings in Section 4.2 and 5.2 were used for recommendation in this framework. 
According to OSI (2012) Open Source Software is the software whose source code is 
available to the public and it can be used, modified and redistributed along with the 
original rights as described by Open Source Initiative (OSI).  An open source software is 
inexpensive and save development time (Nishimura and Sato; 2009). There are many 
open source frameworks available in the literatures that provide information assurance. 
The on-the-fly encryption software is open source software used for creating and 
retaining an on-the-fly-encrypted volume where data is automatically encrypted right 
from before it is saved and decrypted right after it is loaded (Truecrypt, 2012). The 
Password Complexity Filter is an open source software developed using Perl that is made 
freely available under Perl artistic license and is designed to illustrate various ways in 
which organizations can integrate password complexity checks into their internally 
developed applications, in particular applications that are network or cloud based (In 
Silico Biotechnologies,  2012). The Password Complexity Filter can be customised to 
concur with organisational password policies. The Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) 
open source edition is a fully-fledged application consisting of messaging and 
collaborative solutions that include emails, address book, calendaring, tasks, and Web 
document authoring (Zimbra, 2012a). It is designed to offer an end-to-end mail solution 
that is scalable and reliable. The suite has been bundled with Clam Anti-Virus and 
SpamAssassin software (Zimbra, 2013b). Clam Anti-Virus provides virus protection by 
putting in quarantine messages that contain viruses. The life time for these messages is 7 
days.  SpamAssassin provides a filter for unsolicited commercial emails with learned data 
stored in either the Berkeley DB database or MySQL database. Predefined rules as well 
as Bayes database are utilised in SpamAssassin to score messages (Zimbra, 2013b). The 
score is used to determine whether a message is spam or not. Port scanner is software that 
is used to investigate exploits at ports (transport layer). Port scanner can be used for 
investigating network inventory, network optimization, finding spyware, Trojan horses 
and worms; and looking for unauthorised or illicit services (Howlett, 2005). NMAP is an 
open source version of port scanner (Insecure.org, 2012). Vulnerability scanner is 
software that is used to find security holes in applications on the information system that 
are exploitable. Source of vulnerabilities could be buffer overflows, router or firewall 
weaknesses, web server weaknesses, mail server holes, DNS servers, databases 
112 
 
weaknesses, user and file system; default accounts, blank or weak passwords; unwanted 
services; leakage of information among others (Howlett, 2005). NESSUS is an open 
source software version of vulnerability scanner (Tenable Network Security, 2013). 
Network intrusion detection system is used to listen to packets at the physical layer. 
Tcpdump is an open source software version of an intrusion detection system which 
comes with Linux distribution. Snort is an open source software version of intrusion 
detection system and intrusion prevention system (Snort, 2013). Logfiles can be analysed 
for security vulnerabilities using open source software called Swatch (SWATCH, 2013). 
Training will be needed to technical staff in order to implement these tools.  
6.2.7 Policy for data security  
The findings in Section 4.2, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 were used for the recommendation in this 
framework. Organisations must establish a data security policy. The policy must be 
communicated to employees, reviewed regularly and documented. Employees must 
comply with the policy and any non-compliance must activate disciplinary actions. 
Organisations should ensure cultural behaviours such as corruption, nepotism, political 
party affiliation and religious extremism are countered for effective enforcement of 
policies. 
6.2.8 Internet and e-mail  
The findings in the Section 4.2.6 and 5.2 were used for recommendation in this 
framework. Organisations must establish a policy for internet usage and e-mail 
communications. Non-compliance of this policy must activate disciplinary actions. 
Organisations should encourage the implementation of e-mail server with encryption 
capabilities. Organisation should install filters to protect internet users from obscene 
materials. DansGurdian is an example of open source web content filtering software 
which can be adapted to the needs of an organisation (Dansguardian, 2013). 
6.2.9 Technical controls 
The findings in Section 4.2.6, 4.2.7, 4.2.8, and 4.2.12 were used for recommendation in 
this framework. Organisations should establish procedures, guidelines and policies on 
technical controls according to their requirements. Technical controls including but not 
limited to software back-up, network operations, system auditing, system acceptability, 
user logs, web hosting, exception handling, and removal of media. Organisations should 
introduce the implementation of intrusion detection/prevention systems. Also, should 
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establish a policy on the use of unauthorised software. Benchmarking of information 
security process and training of employees for skills is very important in this part.  
6.2.10 Vulnerability assessment  
The findings in Section 4.2.8 were used for recommendation in this framework. 
Organisations must conduct vulnerability assessments to all systems regularly. 
Organisations must provide skills training to technical staff so that they can carry out the 
assessments. Open source software such as NESSUS should be recommended for use in 
vulnerability assessment. 
6.2.11 Regulatory conformity  
The findings in Section 4.2.11, 4.2.12, 5.2 and 5.5 were used for recommendation in this 
framework. Organisations must ensure that their employees comply with the country’s 
laws and regulations. Organisations should ensure that their employees comply with 
policies of their organisations. Organisations have to ensure that their organisations are in 
compliance with all technical requirements according to their systems. Organisations 
should audit their information systems regularly. Organisations should develop a strategy 
to deal with cultural influenced non-compliance behaviours such as corruption, nepotism, 
political party affiliation and religious extremism. 
6.2.12 Access management  
The findings in Section 4.2.7, 5.2 and 5.5 were used for recommendation in this 
framework. Organisations must establish access control policy. Organisations must 
provide every employee with unique access to information systems. Organisations must 
record all shared access to information systems. Organisations should make full use of 
authentication mechanisms provided by operating systems such as Active Directory 
Domain Services for Windows operating system; and Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP) and Kerberos for Linux operating system. Organisations should 
encourage the use of biometric authentication. 
 6.2.13 Control of data security disaster  
The findings in Section 4.2.9 were used for recommendation in this framework. 
Organisations should record and financially quantify all security incidents. Organisations 
must provide awareness to employees about reporting security incidents. Organisations 
must have clear policies on reporting security incidents. 
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6.2.14 Security of building  
The finding in Section 4.2.5 and 5.2 were used for recommendation in this framework.  
Organisations must provide IT literacy training to building security employees. Building 
security employees must be integrated into information security department. 
Organisations must physically lock their computers. Organisations must record and check 
the identity of visitors in their premises. Organisations must enforce policy for employees 
to wear identification cards. Organisations should install electronic locks at their premises. 
Armed security guards should be provided to organisations that have critical information 
assets. Organisations should establish and enforce a policy on equipment handed to 
employees. 
 6.2.15 Cryptography 
The findings in Section 4.2.7, 4.2.8, 5.2 and 5.4 were used for recommendation in this 
framework. Organisations should establish policy on adopting cryptographic technology 
for their operations. Technical staff must be trained in cryptographic technology skills. 
Organisations must provide awareness on the use of encryption to employees. 
6.2.16 Personnel security  
The findings in Section 4.2.4, Organisations must ensure employees’ backgrounds are 
checked. Organisations must review their employment contracts to include terms that 
reflect information security. Organisations must ensure that employees are provided with 
information security expectation of their roles. Organisations must establish policies that 
will protect organisations from cultural behaviours that endanger the security of 
organisations. Information security awareness training should be provided in a regular 
basis to all employees. Posters should be used to provide employees with awareness on 
laws and policy on information security. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter began with the discussion of the findings in the study. Next a detailed 
explanation of the proposed framework of information security culture for non-profit 
organisations in the context of Zanzibar was provided. This framework was developed by 
considering social and technical issues facing the case study. The researcher’s 
contributions for this thesis are found in Section 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.2.7, 6.2.10, 
6.2.11, and 6.2.16. Section 6.2.5, 6.2.6, 6.2.8, 6.2.9, 6.2.12, 6.2.13, 6.2.14 and 6.2.15 are 
found in the literature. See Figure 6.3.1 for details. 
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The next chapter, Chapter 7, discusses a process model for improving information security 
governance in non-profit organisations that evaluated the proposed information security 
cultural framework. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7 EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
INFORMATION SECURITY CULTURE USING 
SEMIOTICS  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the framework for information security culture in non-profit 
organisations in the context of Zanzibar using techniques adapted from the organisational 
semiotics. A process model for information security governance will be developed in 
order to evaluate the framework proposed in Chapter 6. This model is grounded by the 
theory of semiotics. It integrates social and technical issues in order to enhance 
information security governance. A brief literature review on organisational semiotics was 
presented in Section 2.8. This chapter builds on this by developing a semiotic process 
model. This model uses the issues identified in Chapter 6 as well as the data collected in 
Phase I and Phase II of the research (Chapter 4 and 5) as a point of reference and in doing 
so evaluates the framework for information security culture in Figure 6.3.1. The 
framework helped to answer the research question RQ4 and the main research question 
RQM. 
7.2 Semiotics framework 
Semiotics is a study of signs in which a sign represents something to someone for 
something else (Liu, 2000). According to Gottdiener (1995), a sign is composed of 
expression and content. Signs are tools that facilitate social interactions (Gottdiener, 1995). 
A sign is a medium for human to understand things. People communicate significance, 
create meanings, and convey thoughts and sentiments via signs or sign systems. Signs and 
norms cannot be separate (Stamper et al., 2000) and work together. Culture or subculture 
117 
 
is defined by shared norms. Therefore, the notion of culture is an important aspect within 
organisational semiotics. Organisational semiotics provides approaches, frameworks, and 
methods to both analyse and design organisations (Liu, 2000; Stamper et al, 2000). 
“Organisational semiotics defines an organisation as a social system or a social structure 
in which people behave in an organised manner by conforming to a certain system of 
social norms” (Rambo, Liu and Nakata; 2009). Culture is formed by shared norms. In 
Zanzibar, it is a norm to help a relative even if it involves breaking the law. 
Stamper et al (2000) divided signs into six layers that have their own layers of norms. 
These layers are social world, pragmatics, semantics, syntactics, empirics and physical 
world. These six layers of signs collectively are called semiotic ladder or semiotic 
framework (Liu, 2000). These layers then allow the analysis of any information system 
depth. Figure 7.2.1 shows the semiotic framework for analysing information systems. We 
will discuss the layers of semiotic framework in the following sub-sections. In this chapter, 
the semiotic framework is applied to analyse and design the process model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2.1: The semiotic framework (Adopted from (Liu, 2000)) 
 
SOCIAL WORLD: beliefs, expectations, 
functions, commitments, contracts, law, 
culture, … 
PRAGMATICS: intentions, communications, 
conversations, negotiations, … 
SEMANTICS: meanings, propositions, validity, 
truth, signification, denotations, … 
Human 
information 
function 
The IT 
platform 
SYNTACTICS: formal structure, language, logic, 
data, records deduction, software, files, … 
EMPIRICS: pattern, variety, noise, entropy, channel 
capacity, redundancy, efficiency, codes, … 
PHYSICAL WORLD: signals, traces, physical distinctions, 
hardware, components density, speed, economics, … 
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7.2.1 Social world 
The social world layer presents analysis and design requirements that influence the social 
world of the information technology user. The analysis works on the effects or outcomes 
of pragmatic communication. That is, when a meaningful declaration has arisen, the 
social layer is employed to discover the social norms that would be transformed, changed, 
or influenced in some way. Some of the examples of these social norms might include 
beliefs, expectations, functions, commitment, contract, law, and culture. Here is where 
social norms that influence culture are interpreted by individuals. Liu (2000) categorised 
norms as follows: 
 Perceptual – accepted ways of viewing the world  
 Cognitive – measured beliefs and knowledge possessed by a community 
 Evaluative – guide the community towards common courses 
 Behavioural – control members so that they behave in a correct manner 
The culture of the organisation is important because signs are used upon the culture in 
which they belong.  
7.2.2 Pragmatics 
According to the semiotic framework here is found intentions, communications, 
conversations, and negotiations. Here is where one can understand the purpose and 
relationship among cultural behaviours. Organisations with pragmatic problems are in a 
state of confusion (Liu, 2000). Communication is considered successful if a message is 
passed by a sender is interpreted by a receiver as intended by the sender. Here is where 
one can understand the purpose and relationship among cultural behaviours.  
7.2.3 Semantics 
In the view of the semiotic framework here is found meaning, propositions, validity, truth, 
signification, and denotations. Here is where one can understand the meaning of cultural 
behaviour. Employees from different backgrounds need to understand each other in order 
to work together. Semantic problems that an organisation may encounter are a new 
market notion, new technology, and a new organisational notion among others (Liu, 
2000).  
7.2.4 Syntactic 
In the opinion of the semiotic framework here is found formal structure, language, logic, 
data, records deduction, software, and files. Here is where one can compose cultural 
behaviour from simple behaviours. Culture can be coded following a certain design. In an 
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organisational environment activities are often in disorder and issues of interest is how to 
bring order and structure in the organisation (Liu, 2000).  
7.2.5 Empirics 
On the empirical level culture meets technology.  Physical phenomena are organised into 
predictable and recognised patterns. In an organisation events are loaded with 
randomness. Business matters are managed in uncertainty (Liu, 2000). According to 
semiotic framework here is found pattern, variety, noise, entropy, channel capacity, 
redundancy, efficiency, and codes.  
 
7.2.6 Physical world 
Here is where the culture meets the hardware. Physical issues deal with the media for 
storing and transporting signals. Business issues occur due to the economics of the 
physical resources. According to the semiotic framework here is found signals, traces, 
physical distinctions, hardware, component density, speed, and economics.  
 
7.3 Mapping between semiotic framework and national cultural 
dimensions 
As mentioned in the section 3.4.2, this research has adopted national cultural dimensions 
derived from the GLOBE Project. The descriptions of the dimensions were provided in 
section 2.7.1. Table 7.3.1 shows the mapping between organisational semiotics to cultural 
dimensions. In this research, cultural dimensions represent semiotic of culture. The 
purpose of this table is to show how each layer is influenced by the national culture. 
Social world, pragmatics and semantics levels are influenced by all the dimensions of 
culture. However, the layers of Syntactics, Empirics, physical world are influenced by 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, future orientation and performance orientation 
only. Also, the physical world is influenced by in-group collectivism and humane 
orientation. Every society will have different cultural dimensions affecting their 
information security governance. In Zanzibar, for example, it is a norm for an employee 
to allow a relative to access internet through the employee organisation’s computer. The 
impact of culture on semiotic layer could be high, medium, low or not there at all as 
shown in the Table 7.3.1.  
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Table 7.3.1: Mapping between organisational semiotics and cultural dimensions. 
 SEMIOTICS LAYERS 
CULTURAL 
DIMENSIONS 
Social 
World 
Pragmatics Semantics Syntactics Empirics Physical 
World 
Power Distance High High High High Low Medium 
In-Group 
Collectivism 
High High High Not there Not there Low 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
High High High High Low Medium 
Gender 
Egalitarianism 
Medium Low Low Not there Not there Not there 
Future 
Orientation 
High Medium Medium High Medium Low 
Institution 
Collectivism 
High High High Not there Not there Not there 
Performance 
Orientation 
Low Low Low High High High 
Assertiveness Low Low Low Not there Not there Not there 
Humane 
Orientation 
Low Low Low Not there Not there Low 
 
7.4 Towards a semiotics process model  
The term ‘process’ here denotes a set of interrelated activities, which transforms inputs 
into outputs as defined in ISO/IEC 15504 (2004). According to Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) a model is a simplification of reality. Therefore, a model might be an 
equation, a diagram, a physical model, a piece of text or any verbal description. A process 
can be written down to take a form such as a standard, a procedure, a set of guidelines or 
work instructions. An international standard is a very high-level process while guidelines 
and work instructions are very low-level processes (Holt, 2005). Table 7.4.1 shows the 
proposed semiotic framework for analysing information security governance in the 
organisation. From the discussions in the section 7.2, and mapping in the section 7.3, a 
semiotic diagnostic framework for information security governance is proposed in the 
Table 7.4.1. The description of each layer of the semiotic diagnostic is provided in the 
following sub-sections. 
7.4.1 Social world 
In the perspective of information security, social world analysis necessitates that the 
dedication of the organisation is expressed and supported with a feasible information 
security strategy. Analysis of national culture dimensions that impact this layer can be 
done here. The analysis of information security policy, legal framework, employee’s 
contract, corporate governance, education, training and awareness belong to this layer. 
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7.4.2 Pragmatics 
In the context of information security communication and negotiation, it is important at 
various level of an organisation in order to implement security strategy. Issues at this 
level have to be resolved at the highest level in the strategic planning and micro-level in 
the design of information security strategy. Analysis of email policy, encryption policy, 
network policy, access control policy, a national culture dimensions that influence this 
layer should be done here.  
Table 7.4.1: A semiotic diagnosis for information security governance design requirement (Adapted from: Liu, 2000; 
ISO/IEC 27002) 
Semiotics 
Layer  
Information Security Issues 
Social 
World 
Information security strategy, information security policy, legal compliance, information 
security standards and best practices; education, training and awareness; employment 
contract, corporate governance, national culture dimensions that influence security 
Pragmatics Email policy, encryption policy, network policy, access control policy, leakage of confidential 
information, national culture dimensions that influence this layer 
Semantics Review of policies, testing of business continuity plan, screening of employees, assigning role 
and responsibilities, reviewing access rights, national culture dimensions that influence this 
layer 
Syntactics Penetration test, virus protection, data backup, data encryption, intrusion detection, firewall, 
file permission, authentication, software usage, auditing of systems, national culture 
dimensions that influence this layer   
Empirics Internet bandwidth, recording of security breaches, national culture dimensions that 
influence this layer. 
Physical 
World 
Penetration of hardware in the organisation, physical security, and national culture 
dimensions that influence this layer. 
 
7.4.3 Semantics 
In the perspective of information security, semantic layer analysis necessitates that senses 
and outcomes of various security design problems be examined. Through this kind of 
analysis, problems such as the outcomes of misinterpreting data or misuse of regulations 
are determined that leads to the creation of accountability structures. Review of policies, 
auditing of systems, testing of business continuity plan, screening of employees, 
assigning role and responsibilities, reviewing access rights, national culture dimensions 
that influence this layer should be analysed in this layer. 
7.4.4 Syntactic 
In the perspective of information security, the analysis of the syntactic layer entails that 
the appropriate processes such as penetration test, virus protection, data backup, data 
encryption, intrusion detection, firewall, file permission, authentication, and national 
culture dimensions that influence this layer to be analysed. 
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7.4.5 Empirics 
In the perspective of information security, the empirics’ layer analysis necessitates that 
suitable telecommunication equipment and network strategies to be determined to 
correctly handle the security requirements of an organisation. In Addition, internet 
bandwidth, recording of security breaches and national culture dimensions that influence 
this layer can be analysed here. 
7.4.6 Physical world 
In the perspective of information security, physical world analysis necessitates that the 
suitable hardware to be determined to offer both precise information and physical security 
of assets. Penetration of hardware in the organisation should be considered here.  
Additionally, national culture dimensions that influence each layer should be analysed at 
this layer. 
In the next section, semiotic diagnostic framework will be implemented to develop the 
process model for information security governance in non-profit organisations. 
7.5 Proposed semiotic process model  
The findings in the chapters 4 and 5 are used to develop the process model presented in 
Table 7.5.1. 
7.5.1 Analysis of the social world layer 
Table 7.5.1 presents the analysis and solutions of the findings in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
grounded by the social world analysis. We can group the problems into skill, culture, and 
corporate governance. In the skill group, there is lack of qualified information security 
experts and lack of training and awareness in information security. In the culture group, 
there are several issues here. The issues are the existing policies are not communicated to 
employees; issues of corruption; employees not signing confidentiality agreements; not 
including information security clause into the employment contract; and lack of 
benchmarks in information security management. In the corporate governance group, 
there are two issues which are a lack of strategy for integrating information security into 
corporate governance and a lack of budgets for a thorough and relevant information 
security program. 
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  Table 7.5.1: Proposed Semiotic Process Model  
Semiotic 
Layer 
Issues Faced (INPUT) Solution (OUTPUT) 
Social 
World 
Lack of qualified information security 
professionals and lack of regular information 
security training and awareness. 
Education, Training and Awareness 
Policy 
Information security policy not conveyed to 
employees. 
Education, Training and Awareness 
Policy 
Lack of benchmarks in information security 
management. 
Standards and Best Practices 
Adaption Policy 
Issues of favouritism and corruption. Compliance Policy 
Employees are not signing confidentiality 
agreements and terms of employment lack 
information security item. 
Employee Security Policy 
Lack of budgets for information security program. Corporate Governance 
Pragmatics Lack of policy for email, internet usage, network 
service and encryption. 
Communication and Web Policy 
Lack of documentation for security features, 
service levels, and management requirements of 
all network services 
Documentation Policy 
Issues of employees sharing passwords and lack of 
systems to manage password. 
Access Control Policy 
Issues of employees leaking confidential 
information to their affiliated political parties. 
Confidential Information Policy 
Semantics Information security policies are not reviewed 
regularly 
Review and Evaluation  Policy 
Business continuity plans are not tested Business Continuity Policy 
Employees’ backgrounds are not checked Employees Security Policy 
Employees unaware of information security 
expectations of their positions 
Employees Security Policy  
Syntactics Lack of policy for use of unauthorised software Use of Unauthorised Software Policy 
Lack of guidelines for acceptance of new systems New Systems Acceptance Policy 
Lack of intrusion detection systems Assurance Policy 
Lack of assessment for security vulnerabilities Vulnerability Assessment Policy 
Lack of guidelines for systems audit Systems Auditing Policy 
Empirics Lack of guidelines for recording and quantifying 
security breaches 
Security Incidence Policy  
Internet bandwidth is very limited and expensive Corporate Governance 
Physical 
World 
Security guards are illiterate and cannot use IT 
equipment 
Education, training and awareness 
Policy 
Fewer employees have access to computers Corporate Governance 
Employees allow relatives to use computers 
belong to their organisation 
Employees Security Policy 
Computers are not physically locked Equipment Policy  
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7.5.2 Analysis of pragmatic layer 
As shown in Table 7.5.1, the case study presented several issues that needed an initial 
examination at the pragmatics layer. The problems can be grouped into two, technical and 
culture. The technical problems were that the lack of policies for email and internet usage, 
use of network services, and encryption. Also, there is a lack of systems to manage 
passwords, lack of guidelines for network operations, and lack of documentation for 
security features, service levels, and management requirements of all network services. 
The cultural problems are employees sharing their password and leakage of confidential 
information to political parties. 
7.5.3 Analysis of semantic layer 
As shown in Table 7.5.1, the case study presented several issues that needed an initial 
examination at the semantic layer. The problems are all cultural in nature. They are: not 
reviewing information security policies; business continuity plans are not tested; 
employees’ backgrounds are not checked; and employees unaware of information 
security expectations of their positions. 
7.5.4 Analysis of syntactic layer 
As shown in Table 7.5.1, the case study presented several issues that needed an initial 
examination at the syntactic level. All the issues found in this level are technical in nature. 
The issues are lack of policy for use of unauthorised software; lack of guidelines for 
acceptance of new systems; lack of intrusion detection systems; lack of assessment for 
security vulnerabilities; lack of guidelines for systems audit.  
7.5.5 Analysis of empiric layer 
As shown in Table 7.5.1, the case study presented two issues that needed an initial 
examination at the empiric level. First, there is lack of guidelines for recording and 
quantifying security breaches. Second, internet bandwidth is small and expensive.  
7.5.6 Analysis of the physical world layer 
As shown in Table 7.5.1, the case study presented four issues that needed an initial 
analysis at the physical level. First, Security guards are illiterate and cannot use IT 
equipment. Second, fewer employees have access to computers. Third, employees allow 
relatives to use computers belong to their organisation. Fourth, computers are not 
physically locked.  
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7.6 Using the semiotic process model to evaluate the framework 
for information security culture  
In this section, the findings from Section 7.5 were used to evaluate the proposed 
framework for information security culture from Section 6.2. This is done as follows: In 
Figure 7.6.1 the semiotic based framework for information security culture was presented 
developed in Section 7.4. Based on these semiotic layers the solutions identified in 
Section 7.5 were matched against the recommendations in Section 6.2. This provides the 
triangulation necessary to validate the information security culture framework. Table 
7.6.1 shows the matching of the solutions against the recommendations. Figure 7.6.2 
shows the link between Figures 7.6.1 and 6.3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7.6.1: The Semiotic Based Framework for Information Security Culture 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Social World Recommendations 
Pragmatic Recommendations 
Semantics Recommendations 
Syntactic Recommendations 
Empirics Recommendations 
Social World Recommendations 
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Table 7.6.1: Mapping Solution in Section 7.5 to Recommendations in Section 6.2 
Semiotic Layer Solution (Section 7.5) Recommendations (Section 6.2) 
Social World Education, Training and Awareness Policy (N1) Education and Awareness 
Standards and Best Practices Adaption 
Policy 
(T1) Benchmarking Information Security 
Governance 
Compliance Policy (C5) Regulatory Conformity 
Employee Security Policy (C10) Personnel Security 
Corporate Governance (O1) Corporate Governance 
Pragmatics Communication and Web Policy (C2) Internet and E-mail 
Documentation Policy (C1) Policy for Data Security 
Access Control Policy (C6) Access Management 
Confidential Information Policy (C10) Personnel Security 
Semantics Review and Evaluation  Policy (O2) Policy Creation and Enforcement 
Business Continuity Policy (O3) Business Sustainability  
 
Employees Security Policy (C10) Personnel Security 
Syntactics Use of Unauthorised Software Policy (T1) Benchmarking Information Security 
Governance 
New Systems Acceptance Policy (C3) Technical Controls 
Assurance Policy (T3) Adopting Open Source Assurance 
Tools 
Vulnerability Assessment Policy (C4) Vulnerability Assessment 
Systems Auditing Policy (C5) Regulatory Conformity 
Empirics Security Incidence Policy  (C7) Control of Data Security Disaster 
Corporate Governance (O1) Corporate Governance 
Physical World Education, training and awareness Policy (N1) Education and Awareness 
Corporate Governance (O1) Corporate Governance 
Employees Security Policy (C10) Personnel Security 
Equipment Policy  (C8) Security of Building 
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SOCIAL WORLD RECOMMENDATION 
National Culture Organisational Culture 
Government Responsibility 
PRAGMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
National Culture Internet and Email 
Cryptography Access Management Organisation Culture 
Government Responsibility 
Regulatory Conformity 
Policy for Data Security 
SEMANTIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Organisational Culture National Culture 
Personnel Security 
SYNTACTIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Technical Controls Training and Awareness 
Benchmarking of Information Security Governance 
National Culture 
EMPIRIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Control of Data Security Disaster National Culture 
Organisational Culture Government Responsibility 
Adopting Open Source Assurance Tools 
Vulnerability Assessment 
PHYSICAL WORLD RECOMMENDATIONS 
Security of Building Personnel Security 
Training and Awareness Organisational Culture 
National Culture 
Regulatory Conformity 
Regulatory Conformity 
Figure 7.6.2: Linking Figure 6.3.1 to Figure 7.6.1 
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began with the explanation of the semiotic framework. Next, the semiotic 
framework was mapped against the national culture dimensions based on the GLOBE 
Project. Then, a semiotic diagnostic framework was proposed. Furthermore, a semiotic 
process model for improving information security governance was presented. The process 
model was then used for evaluation of the proposed framework of information security 
culture in Chapter 6. The semiotic based evaluation of the information security culture 
framework ensured a creation of a robust framework and integrated both social and 
technical solutions due to being grounded by the framework of organisational semiotics. 
The semiotic based framework for information security culture has enabled to find 
solutions for problems found in other layers by iterating through the layers. This was 
evidently seen by the use of cultural solutions in different layers. Therefore this chapter 
answer the research questions RQ4 and RQM.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 8, presents the conclusion of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It discusses the questions addressed in this research. 
Next it gives a summary of contributions. Then it provides the implications for academia 
and organisational practice. Next it provides the limitation of research and finally 
provides recommendation for future research. 
8.2 Questions addressed in this research 
This thesis addresses the following research question: 
What organisational factors need to be tackled or managed to develop and implement 
effective information security governance in the context of Zanzibar?  
To address this question, an in-depth investigation of information security practices and 
complex societal issues facing information security governance in Zanzibar was 
conducted in the context of an interpretive case study. Data collection and analysis was 
guided by both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Two recommendations were 
made through a framework for information security culture and a semiotic process model 
for enhancement of information security governance. 
The research question was examined by addressing the four very specific sub-questions 
below: 
RQ1. What are the existing information security strategies in literature? 
This question was addressed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Various strategies and approaches 
currently suggested in literature were reviewed, and it was revealed that strategy and 
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approach are country or organisation specific. Organisations must tailor an adapted 
strategy or approach to suit their requirement and culture. It was recommended that a new 
taxonomy is needed that incorporates social and technical issues in information security 
governance. 
RQ2. What is the current state of information security governance in non-profit 
organisations in the context of Zanzibar? 
This question was addressed in Chapter 4, which presented the findings of the data 
presenting the state of information security governance in ten public organisations in 
Zanzibar. It was revealed that: 
 The organisations had varied level of security. 
 Information security management is ad hoc and poorly governed.  
 Organisations lack skilled personnel in information security.  
 Policies are not reviewed or communicated to employees.  
 Various controls such as vulnerability assessment and business continuity 
planning are not carried out or tested. 
  Various controls such as monitoring and quantification of security incidents and 
network operations lack guidelines and policies. 
 Contracts of employees lacked item specific to information security.  
 Organisations have not implemented intrusion detection/protection systems.  
 Employees lack regular training and awareness in information security.  
 Security breaches were not severe and had little financial impact. 
RQ3. What are the cultural factors that impact upon information security governance 
in non-profit organisations in the context of Zanzibar? 
This question was addressed in Chapter 5, which presented the findings of the data 
demonstrating the cultural factors that impact upon information security management in 
non-profit organisations.  Findings revealed that the cultural factors that influenced the 
governance of information security in the context of Zanzibar. Dimensions of national 
culture that influence the management of information security are Power Distance, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, In-Group Collectivism, and Future Orientation. In the case study, 
power is not shared equally; society does not seek orderliness or laws to cover situations 
in their daily lives; society take pride in their family or organisations; and society is not 
planning for the future. Organisational culture has little influence on management of 
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information security. Organisational culture is dominated by hierarchy culture, where 
success is determined by low cost, which explains the lack of fund for information 
security program.  
RQ4. How can non-profit organisations improve their information security governance 
in the context of Zanzibar? 
This question was addressed in Chapter 6, which presented a framework for information 
security culture. The framework will improve the governance of information security in 
the non-profit organisations in the context of Zanzibar. Chapter 7 presented an evaluation 
of the framework by grounding with the theory of semiotics. Semiotics helps to evaluate 
the framework for information security culture by providing much deeper analysis of 
information security in the case study. A process model for information security 
governance was developed for use in the evaluation of the framework. 
8.3 Research contributions 
The main contribution in this research is the semiotic process model for evaluating 
information security framework for non-profit organisations in the developing countries. 
By grounding the process model through the theory of semiotics, information security 
management in a non-profit organisation was analysed intensely through six layers of 
norms. The proposed process model was able to integrate both social and technical issues 
in evaluating information security management in a non-profit organisation. The model is 
adaptable to the need and environment of any organisation in the world. Prior to this 
research, there was no study which specifically grounded the theory of semiotics to model 
information security management in a developing country’s environment. (Section 7.5) 
Other contributions of the thesis are: 
1. The research adds to the body of knowledge an important literature in the 
information security governance, requirements and procedures of non-profit 
organisations in the developing countries. 
 
2. The research provides significant empirical evidence on the shortcomings of 
information security governance in ten public sector’s non-profit organisations. 
(Chapter 4) 
A case study covering the public sector, provided in depth empirical data about 
the issues and influences on governing information security in ten non-profit 
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organisations. This data presented significant information, which was previously 
unknown in the context of Zanzibar.  This research produced empirical data by 
adapting ISO 27002 best practices in information security governance and 
OWASP standard for web security. 
 
3. The research presented significant empirical data on the national and 
organisational culture that was previously unknown in the context of Zanzibar. 
This study contributes new insights into the influence of culture in the 
management of information security. (Chapter 5)  
This research produced empirical data by adapting studies from the GLOBE 
Project and Competing Values Framework. 
 
4. A framework for information security culture was recommended that will 
enhance information security governance in non-profit organisations. (Section 6.3) 
 
5. A mapping between semiotic framework and national culture dimensions was 
provided that shows how each layer of the semiotic framework is influenced by 
national culture. This is a new insight when adapting the process model to other 
countries. (Section 7.3) 
 
6. A framework for information security culture based on semiotic evaluation. 
(Section 7.6) 
8.4 Research implications 
The study has revealed insightful information on the governance of information security 
in non-profit organisations in a developing country context. It also identifies the cultural 
factors that impact the implementation of information security management in non-profit 
organisations in the context of a developing country, together with a framework and a 
semiotic process model for enhancing the management of information security. 
The research can benefit the information security professionals and government policy 
makers by gaining insight into practices of management of information security in non-
profit organisations and how to improve information security by implementing the 
proposed framework and process model.  
Also, the study has revealed that the theory of semiotics can be used to analyse and 
improve information security where organisations face both social and technical issues in 
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their operations. Getting insights into cultural factors that influence management of 
information security can have significant contributions in the successful implementation 
of information assurance in non-profit organisations.  
8.5 Research limitations   
The research was conducted in non-profit organisations that belong to the public sector in 
the context of Zanzibar. Ten organisations were involved in the Phase I and nine 
organisations were involved in the Phase II of the research. Organisations were in 
different fields of services. Two of the organisations were larger in size compared to the 
others. Organisations were selected based on adoption of information systems in their 
services. Investigation on cultural issues may be biased due to participants being educated, 
work in the public sector and may be afraid to speak the truth. The impact of bias was 
minimised by using random selection of participants and assuring anonymity for 
participants.  
The research employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The size of the 
research population was small and specific so it will be inappropriate to generalise on 
research findings, but the findings have provided useful insights for future work. 
Research aimed was to get a deeper understanding of issues facing information security 
rather than generalised. The reader will be able to take the information provided in this 
research and use it to help solve problems specific to their own environment. The 
research depends on the work of Stamper (1973), House et al (2004), Cameron and Quinn 
(1999) and BSI (2007). 
8.6 Validation of the framework for information security culture 
The framework for information security culture has been validated via the theory of 
semiotics in Chapter 7. To further validate the applicability in practice within the socio-
cultural context of Zanzibar (or any other country where the framework would be applied) 
it will be necessary to instantiate the framework for instance in the form of policy 
documents or direct guidelines tailored against the organisations. Then, the framework 
would be deployed in a non-profit organisation in Zanzibar for a certain period of time, 
such as six months. An investigation is needed before and after six months of its 
implementation to assess the success of the framework. A further approach to validate the 
framework is to implement it in a non-profit organisation outside Zanzibar. In this 
approach cultural solutions should be adapted to suit the environment wherein the 
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organisation resides. An investigation is needed to assess the applicability of the 
framework before and after its deployment for a certain period of time. 
For instance in the case of the State University of Zanzibar, the researcher will have a 
discussion with the university’s Management Committee in order to get authorisation to 
deploy the framework at the university and investigate its applicability. If the framework 
is successfully deployed at the university, then it could be deployed to other non-profit 
organisations in Zanzibar.  
8.7 Future research 
The future research can look into developing the proposed framework and process model 
further. More research needs to investigate information security governance in non-profit 
organisations not belonging to public sector in the context of a developing country. The 
future research can look into the possibility of implementing semiotic diagnostic to secure 
Cloud Computing and Virtual World applications for usage in the non-profit sector. Other 
future research could investigate the validity of the framework developed in this thesis in 
Zanzibar or another developing country or in a private non-profit organisation. Also, 
future research could investigate the comparison of the applicability of the framework in 
rich developing countries versus poor developing countries. Furthermore, the future 
research could investigate the impact of culture on management of information security in 
a developed country context.   
In this project, an exploratory case study was used. Further research could look at the 
application of an exploratory case study research as a potentially research approach to 
investigate problems outside information security in the non-profit sector. Grounding 
theory technique could be used in further research to strengthen data analysis in such a 
project. 
Further research can look at challenges of enforcing law involving crimes on information 
systems and users of information systems in a developing country environment. Also, 
future research can investigate how to quantify information security breaches in a 
developing country environment. In addition, future research can look at usability factor 
of biometrics in a developing country view with a focus on social issues. Finally, further 
studies could be involved in developing a framework for benchmarking of information 
security governance in the context of a developing country. 
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8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis. This research has provided meaningful understanding of 
information security governance of non-profit organisations in the context of a developing 
country. A framework for information security culture has been recommended for 
effective information security governance in the non-profit organisations.  The chapter 
discussed contributions of the research to the body of knowledge, implications of research 
and future works. By reading this work organisations in the developing countries could 
have an initial point of reference for their security requirements. 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE I - INFORMATION SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
(Phase I) 
 Management Staff 
Respondent ID: ......................... (For the researcher use)  Date: ..................................... 
Organisation and Department: .......................................................................................... 
Position: ................................................................................................................. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Number 1-5 represents your response to the statement. Please mark (√) on a box that you think 
represents most appropriate choice for your response. 
  
Item Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
 Information  security policy      
1 There is an information security policy for the organisation.      
2 Information security policy is conveyed to all employees.      
3 Information security policy is periodically reviewed.      
 Organisation of Information Security      
4 There is an information security committee in place.      
5 There is a budget for information security program.      
6 The organisation is capable of implements information security awareness program.      
7 The organisation defined and documented all information security roles.      
8 There is a restriction on the use of personal information processing resources such 
as laptops. 
     
9 There is some confidentiality or non-disclosure agreement for protection of 
information asset. 
     
10 There is some authorisation for use of confidential information.      
11 There is some procedure in place that specifies how to contact authority (e.g police).      
12 There is some contact with information security associations.      
13 The organisation conducts independent information security review.      
14 The organisation conducts information risk assessment when dealing with an 
outside party. 
     
15 The organisation addresses some security needs before giving customer access to 
organisation’s assets. 
     
16 There is some agreement with third party involving accessing organisation’s 
facilities. 
     
 Asset management      
17 There is an inventory of assets.      
18 The inventory of assets includes software assets.      
19 There is assets manager.      
20 There is information classification in the organisation.      
 Human resources security      
21 There is a training and awareness program periodically in information security.      
22 There is a disciplinary action against the non-compliant employee.      
23 Security roles and responsibilities are defined, documented, and conveyed to would 
be employees. 
     
161 
 
Item Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
24 There is a background verification check for candidates of employment and third 
party. 
     
25 Terms and conditions of employment include an item about information security.      
26 All employees, contractors, and third party receive information security awareness 
training. 
     
27 All employees return organisation’s assets upon termination of their employment.      
28 The access right to information assets is removed after employment termination.      
 Physical and Environmental Security       
29 There is a security perimeter to protect the area that contains information and 
information processing facilities. 
     
30 The office rooms and facilities have locks.      
31 There is an emergency generator.      
32 The ICT equipments are connected with Uninterrupted Power Supply unit (UPS).      
33 The cables are protected from interference.      
34 The organisation’s equipment is maintained.      
35 The equipment is maintained according to supply recommendation.      
36 There is organisation’s guideline on working off-site premises with organisation’s 
equipment. 
     
37 There is a guideline on ICT equipment disposal or re-use.      
38 The organisation facilities are protected against damage from fire, flood, explosion, 
civil unrest, rainfall, lightning, and man-made disaster. 
     
39 The equipment is protected against theft and unauthorised access.      
 Access Control      
40 There is an access control policy.      
 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance      
41 There is use of cryptographic control policy.      
 Information Security Incidents Management      
42 There is a reporting mechanism about information security incidence.      
 Business Continuity Management      
43 There is a business continuity plan in the event of a disaster.      
44 Business continuity plans include information security.      
 Compliance      
45 The organisation is in compliance with the legal requirement.      
46 There is a guideline to ensure intellectual properties rights.      
47 There is a guideline to ensure the protection of organisational records.      
48 There is a guideline to ensure data protection and privacy of personal information.      
49 There is a guideline on prevention of misuse of information processing facilities.      
50 There is a guideline on ensuring all security procedures are performed correctly to 
meet compliance with security policies and standards. 
     
 
Thank you very much indeed for your help! 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE II - INFORMATION SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
(Phase I) 
IT Staff  
Respondent ID :.........................( for the researcher use) Date: .......................................... 
Organisation and Department: ........................................................................................... 
Position: ............................................................................................................................... 
Strongly disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Number 1-5 represents your response to the statement. Please mark (√) on a box that 
you think represents most appropriate choice for your response. 
Item Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
 Physical and Environmental Security      
1 There is a guideline on removal of equipment, information and software.      
 Human Resource security      
2 There are qualified network and system administrators.      
 Communication and Operations Management      
3 There is a separation of development, test, and operational facilities.      
4 There is a guideline for acceptance of new information systems.      
5 There is a policy for prohibiting the use of unauthorised software.      
6 There any backup policy for information and software.      
7 There is a network operational guideline.      
8 The security features, service levels, and management requirements of all 
network services have been identified and documented. 
     
9 There is a removable media guideline.      
10 There is some procedure for handling and storage of information.      
11 System documentation is protected against unauthorised access.      
12 There is information exchange policy.      
13 There is a guideline for physical media under transit which contains 
information. 
     
14 There is a policy to protect electronic messaging.      
15 There is a policy to protect information in electronic commerce passing over 
the public network. 
     
16 There is a policy to protect information involved in the on-line transaction.      
17 There is a guideline to keep audit logs recording user activities, exceptions, and 
information security events. 
     
18 There is a procedure to monitor system use.      
19 System administrator and system operator activities are logged.      
20 Clock is synchronized with agreed accurate time source.      
21 Employees and system activities are regularly monitored under existing legal 
framework. 
     
22 Use of resource in computer systems is monitored.      
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Item Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
 Access Management      
23 There is a user password guideline.      
24 There is a review of user access rights periodically.      
25 There is a user guideline for selection and usage of password.      
26 There is a clear desk and clear screen policy.      
27 There is a policy for use of network services.      
28 Remote users are authenticated.      
29 There is automatic equipment identification in the network.      
30 There is separation of networks into domains according to function.      
31 There is a restriction on users’ ability to connect to the network.      
32 There is routing implementation to enforce access control policy.      
33 There is an implementation of users’ identification and authentication for 
access to organisation's information systems. 
     
34 There is a system to manage passwords.      
35 There is a guideline for system utilities usage.      
36 There is a guideline for session time-out.      
37 There is a guideline for connection time to information systems.      
38 There is access control policy.      
39 There is mobile computing policy.      
40 There is a tele-working guideline.      
 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance      
41 Data input to organisation's information systems were validated.      
42 The security risk assessment is applied to ensure message integrity.      
43 There is a validation of data output from organisation's information systems.      
44 Encryption is used to protect sensitive information assets.      
45 There is cryptographic key management guideline.      
46 There are procedures for managing software installation on running systems.      
47 There is a restriction on access to program source code.      
48 There is a guideline protection of test data on running systems.      
49 There are procedures for implementing changes to running systems.      
50 Applications are reviewed after changes in operating systems.      
51 There is discouragement on modifying software packages supplied by vendors.      
52 Periodical technical vulnerabilities assessment is carried out, and actions are 
taken to address any found. 
     
 Information Security Incidents Management      
53 There is reporting mechanism for information security incidents.      
54 There is a guideline to quantify and monitor information security incidents.      
 Business Continuity Management      
55 Business continuity plans are tested in a regular basis.      
 Compliance      
56 There is a regular check on technical compliance.      
57 There is a guideline for information systems audit.      
 
Thank you very much indeed for your help! 
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE III - INFORMATION SECURITY ASSESSMENT (Phase 
I) 
General Staff  
Respondent ID: ................... (For the researcher use)  Date: .............................................. 
Organisation and Department: ……….................................................................................. 
Position: ............................................................................................................................. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Number 1-5 represents your response to the statement. Please mark (√) on a box that you think 
represents most appropriate choice for your response.  
Item Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
 Information  security policy      
1 There is an information security policy in place.      
2 I have read the Information security policy.      
3 Information security policy is periodically reviewed.      
 Organisation of Information Security      
4 I have signed confidentiality or non-disclosure agreement for protection of organisation's 
information assets. 
     
 Human Resource security      
5 There is a periodic awareness and training program in information security.      
6 There is a disciplinary action against the non-compliant employee.      
7 My background has been verified.      
8 I agreed and signed terms and conditions of employment that includes responsibilities for 
information security. 
     
9 I was provided with information security expectation of my position.      
10 I receive information security awareness training regularly.      
 Physical and Environmental Security       
11 Access to my office is through a door that has a lock.      
12 My desk and cabinet can be locked.      
13 I wear employee identity card all the time inside the organisation's building.      
 Communication and Operations Management      
14 There are rules for using electronic mail and Internet.      
15 I have only one role in my employment.      
 Access Control      
16 I am the only person who knows my password for access to organisation's information 
system. 
     
17 I use a screen saver that is password protected.      
18 I have read clear desk and clear screen policy.      
19 My password contains alphabets and numbers characters.      
 Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance      
20 I use encryption when sending sensitive information.      
 Information Security Incidents Management      
21 I know where to report information security incidents.      
 Business Continuity Management      
22 I am aware of organisation’s business continuity plans.      
 Compliance      
23 I am aware of organisation’s intellectual property policy.      
24 I am aware of organisation’s guidelines on retention and disposal of information.      
25 There is an organisation’s data protection and privacy policy.      
Thank you very much indeed for your help! 
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRE IV – SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF WEBSITES (Phase I) 
IT Staff 
Respondent ID: ............................................. (For the researcher use)   
Organisation and Department: …........................................................................................ 
Position: ............................................................................................................................... 
Date: ............................................................ 
Organisation's website address: ........................................................................................ 
 
Mark a box that represents your response. 
Item Statement Yes No Don't 
know 
1 Does the organisation host the website in-house?    
2 Is the website developed in-house?    
3 Is the website runs database queries?    
4 If the answer in 3 is yes, is there separate physical server for web and 
database? 
   
5 Is there the organisation’s guideline for user id and password used in the 
website? 
   
6 Is there the organisation’s guideline for displaying user data in the 
website? 
   
7 Is there a separate development, test, and production environments for 
web application? 
   
8 Does the organisation implement the current Open Web Application 
Security Project guidelines to protect its website? 
   
9 Do you test your web application for security vulnerabilities?    
10 Does the organisation have restriction on who is allowed to publish the 
web application to production environment? 
   
11 Does the organisation’s website implement encryption?    
12 Does the organisation have guidelines on web application that involves in 
data collection or transmission? 
   
13 Does the organisation review web server logs for security incidents?    
14 Is there any periodic training in secure coding to organisation’s 
developers? 
   
15 Is there any periodic security review of the organisation’s website?    
16 Does the organisation in compliance with any web application security 
standard? 
   
 
 Thank you very much indeed for your help! 
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APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW GUIDE I - THREAT ANALYSIS (PHASE I) 
IT Staff 
Respondent ID: ........................... (For the researcher use)  Date: ……………........................ 
Organisation and Department: ……...................................................................................... 
Position: ................................................................................................................................ 
 
1. What are the core services of organisation/department? 
  
Item Name of service 
1  
2  
3  
4  
 
2. What is an approximate number of computers on the use in your organisation? 
 
3. Is there an organisation's Local Area Network? If yes, what its size?  
 
4. Is there an organisation's Wide Area Network? 
 
5. Is there Internet connection?  
 
6. Is there a wireless network? 
 
7. Is there remote login access? 
 
8. What is the percentage of the organisation's services are automated?   
 
9. In your organisation, what would be damage due to loss of availability of 
information  system? 
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Item Information system Damage  
1   
2   
3   
4   
 
10.  List all information security incidents occurred in your organisation in the last 
two years.  
Item Incident Damage 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
 
      11. List the educational and professional qualifications of all IT staff.  
 
Item Qualifications Number of Employees 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
 
12.  List all networking equipment your organisation is connected to.   
                
Item Equipment Quantity 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
 
12. List all software installed in the organisation’s computers and servers for 
protecting the  organisation against security breaches. 
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Item Software 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
 
       13. What is a percentage of the total budget is allocated for information security? 
 
14. Is there periodic virus scan? 
 
       15. Is there periodic anti-virus updates? 
 
       16. Do you attend a periodic information security awareness and training programs? 
 
17. Is there a qualified information security professional among staff members? 
 
18. Do you share the password of any system in the organisation with someone else? 
 
19. Have you ever allow your organisation's computer to be used by your relative? 
 
20. Have you ever suffered from computer virus/trojan/other malware? 
 
21. If the answer is yes for question 20, list the names of virus/trojan/other 
malware and damage coursed? 
Item Virus/Trojan/Other malware Damage 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
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22. Has anyone’s email address ever been used to send emails to their contacts 
without their consent? 
 
23. Have your organisation ever experienced the following effects due to 
information security breaches. Please select the appropriate effect from the list.  
 
Effect  
Fraud and embezzlement  
Robbery and theft of ICT equipments  
Defamation  
Infringement of privacy  
Customer information leakage  
Hacking activities  
Denial of service  
System sabotage by employee  
Loss of information  
Website hijacking/defacing  
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System Possible Threats Possible Vulnerabilities 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
Thank you very much indeed for your help! 
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APPENDIX F : QUESTIONNAIRE V – National Cultural Evaluation (Phase II) 
Public Sector Employee 
Respondent ID: ........................... (For the researcher use)  Date: …………........................... 
Organisation and Department: …........................................................................................ 
Position: ............................................................................................................................... 
 
Substantially 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree nor 
Agree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Substantially 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number 1-7 represents your response to the statement. Please mark (√) on a box that 
you think represents most appropriate choice for your response. 
 
 Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Followers are expected to obey their leaders 
without question. 
       
2 Followers should be expected to obey their 
leaders without question. 
       
3 Most people lead highly structured lives with 
few unexpected events. 
       
4 Most people should lead highly structured lives 
with few unexpected events. 
       
5 People are generally very tolerant of mistakes.        
6 People should be generally very tolerant of 
mistakes. 
       
7 Leaders encourage group loyalty even if 
individual goals suffer. 
       
8 Leaders should encourage group loyalty even if 
individual goals suffer. 
       
9 Employees feel great loyalty toward this 
organisation. 
       
10 Employees should feel great loyalty toward this 
organisation. 
       
11 People are generally dominant.        
12 People should be generally dominant.        
13 Boys are encouraged more than girls to attain a 
higher education. 
       
14 Boys should be encouraged more than girls to 
attain a higher education. 
       
15 More people live for the present than for the 
future. 
       
16 More people should live for the present than 
for the future. 
       
17 Students are encouraged to strive for 
continuously improved performance. 
       
18 Students should be encouraged to strive for 
continuously improved performance. 
       
Thank you very much indeed for your help! 
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APPENDIX G : QUESTIONNAIRE VI – Assessment of Organisational Culture (Phase 
II) 
Public Sector Employee 
Respondent ID: ........................ (For the researcher use) Date: ............................. 
Organisation and Department: .............................................................................. 
Position: .................................................................................................................. 
 
There are six questions in this questionnaire. Each question has four options. Divide 100 
points among these four options depending on the extent to which each option is similar 
to your own organisation. There are two response columns, one labelled NOW as it 
represents the current situation and another labelled PREFFERED as it represents 
situation you think in five years. 
 
1. Dominant Characteristics NOW PREFERRED 
A The organisation is very personal place. It is like an extended 
family. People seem to share a lot of themselves. 
  
B The organisation is very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. 
People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks. 
  
C The organization is very results-oriented. A major concern is 
getting the job done. People are very competitive and 
achievement-oriented. 
  
D The organization is a very controlled and structured place. 
Formal procedures generally govern what people do. 
  
 TOTAL 100 100 
2. Organisational Leadership NOW PREFERRED 
A The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing. 
  
B The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify entrepreneurship, innovation, or risk taking. 
  
C The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus. 
  
D The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running 
efficiency. 
  
 TOTAL 100 100 
3. Management of Employees NOW PREFERRED 
A The management style in the organization is characterized by 
teamwork, consensus, and participation. 
  
B The management style in the organization is characterized by 
individual risk taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness. 
  
C The management style in the organization is characterized by 
hard-driving competitiveness, high demands, and 
achievement. 
  
D The management style in the organization is characterized by 
security of employment, conformity, predictability, and 
stability in relationships. 
  
 TOTAL 100 100 
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4. Organisational Glue NOW PREFERRED 
A The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and 
mutual trust. Commitment to this organization runs high. 
  
B The glue that holds the organization together is a commitment 
to innovation and development. There is an emphasis on 
being on the cutting edge. 
  
C The glue that holds the organization together is an emphasis 
on achievement and goal accomplishment. 
  
D The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules 
and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is 
important. 
  
 TOTAL 100 100 
5. Strategic Emphases NOW PREFERRED 
A The organization emphasizes human development. High trust, 
openness, and participation persist. 
  
B The organization emphasizes acquiring new resources and 
creating new challenges. Trying new things and prospecting 
for opportunities are valued. 
  
C The organization emphasizes competitive actions and 
achievement. Hitting stretch targets and winning in the 
marketplace are dominant. 
  
D The organization emphasizes permanence and stability. 
Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important. 
  
 TOTAL 100 100 
6. Criteria of Success NOW PREFERRED 
A The organization defines success on the basis of development 
of human resources, teamwork, employee commitment, and 
concern for people. 
  
B The organization defines success on the basis of having the 
most unique or newest products. It is a product leader and 
innovator. 
  
C The organization defines success on the basis of winning in the 
marketplace and outpacing the competition. Competitive 
market leadership is key. 
  
D The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency. 
Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling and low-cost 
production are critical. 
  
 TOTAL 100 100 
 
Thank you very much indeed for your help! 
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APPENDIX H: INTERVIEW GUIDE II – Complex Societal Issues Concerning 
Governance of Information Security (Phase II) 
 
I would like to do an interview with you concerning the issues that face the governance 
of information security in your organisation. I would like you to answer according to 
your point of view and express your opinions. All the answers you give me will be 
confidential and only be used for the purpose of this study. I will only take your name for 
my record only.  
 
Q1. What do you think about the usage of computers and internet in this 
organisation? 
Q2. What do you think about the cooperation between IT staff and security staff? 
Q3. What do you think about the confidentiality of information in this organisation? 
Q4. Do you think employees trust each other in this organisation? 
Q5. What do you think about policy enforcement and disciplinary action in this 
organisation? 
Q6. What do you think about the communication between employees when 
problems are discovered and solved? 
Q7. What do you think about the availability of funds for implementation of daily 
tasks in this organisation? 
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APPENDIX I: An Introduction Letter to Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I am conducting a research at the University of Bedfordshire, focusing on potential 
solutions in relation to information security management. As a part of that research, 
your organisation has been selected as one of ten organisations in Zanzibar to 
participate as a case study. 
Information presented by interviewees will only be used for the purpose of this research. 
In the description of results of this survey, no identification of individual persons will be 
made. Individual answers will be kept confidential. Your details will be taken for my 
records only. 
Thank you in advance for your priceless time and thoughtfulness. 
Yours faithfully 
 
Hussein Shaaban 
PhD Student, IRAC 
University of Bedfordshire 
Email: Hussein.Shaaban@beds.ac.uk 
 
 
 
